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ABSTRACT 
THE UTILITY OF ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS SCIENCES 
The structure of the thesis reflects the three main areas of investigation. The 
legitimacy of analogy as a systems concept, the derivation of a model of 
analogy for systems thinkers and the description of a framework for practice. 
In the first section we are concerned with establishing an appreciation and 
understanding of the potential utility in the concept of analogy for systems 
thinkers. Having briefly surveyed the history of analogy in systems thinking 
and acknowledging the CUITent methodological interest in metaphor we note that 
our interest in analogy has been a target for our critics and led to a loss of 
credibility. 
The thesis calls for a re-evaluation of this situation and we hence describe a 
system thinker's view of science as the grounds on which the utility of analogy 
is normally dismissed. The first three chapters show that the basis on which 
science attacks analogy as invalid and inappropriate is itself contentious and that 
identified 'weaknesses' in the scientific framework can become strengths in the 
re-conceptualisation of a model of analogy. We consider and distinguish the 
dynamic relationships between analogy, model and metaphor. 
In the second section having established the potential value of analogy as a 
concept, the thesis develops an explanation of how a model of analogy for 
systems thinkers can be conceptualised. In the development of the model we 
will consider particular implications of three types of analogy, 'positive', 
'negative' and 'neutral' analogy and discuss the suggestion that they reveal 
possibilities for exploring different and contrasting rationalities; these issues 
will be discussed looking at the relationship between analogy and rationality and 
in this context the validity of the argument from analogy. In the final section the 
thesis asserts that that systems thinking should not shy away from explicit use 
of analogy and shows how can use the framework of analogy to re-
conceptualise systems concepts. 
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PREFACE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with developing an understanding of the concepts of 
analogy and metaphor and their usefulness in systems thinking. 
The twin concepts have enjoyed a growing interest and relevance in recent years 
because the issues their examination raises have dogged philosophers for 
centuries, although they also remain distinctly and intriguingly contemporary. 
They include, for example, how we can investigate 'reality', how we can learn 
about it and derive knowledge of it that is transferable. 
For this reason the over-arching concept of analogy and the not altogether 
subsumable sister concept of metaphor, are particularly stimulating for the 
development of systems thinking. In this discussion the main concern is with 
establishing the value and legitimacy of the perplexing sorority as interpretive 
conceptual tools. This kind of quest is not unfamiliar to the systems 
community. 
The thesis is theoretically based and develops three main themes; the validity of 
analogy as a philosophical concept, the nature of 'reasoning by analogy' and 
the potential of the latter for use in practice, as well as theory. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
'The world is round and the place which may seem like the end may 
also be only the beginning.' 
Ivy Baker Priest, Parade, Feb 16 1958. 
Analogy, as a form of modelling, is very important to the systems way of 
thinking since it is clearly a non-reductionist modelling approach. Alternative 
conceptualisations positively 'emerge' in a rigourous and developed analogical 
model. This appears to suggest that the structure of a given analogy can act to 
release concepts, interpretations or information [in a broad sense] from usual 
interpretations, which are inherently involved with paradigmatic and rational 
frameworks of derived understanding and utility. 
In the format in which this quality of analogy is examined. it is suggested that 
the heuristic legitimacy and value derivable by the use of a structured analogy 
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can be formalised in a framework. This matter itself leads to deriving 
methodological principles with which to work fruitfully with analogy. In this 
way metaphor too, can be given a place on a so-called 'methodological 
continuum' • 
In the attempt to examine and develop the notion of analogy as a model, a 
number of puzzling matters were encountered. Modelling, even in the social 
sciences, has traditionally rested on the underlying assumptions and methods of 
the natural science paradigm. This thesis takes the view that the wholesale 
transference of modelling assumptions from natural science will not do for 
systems thinkers. It is timely to attempt to develop alternative approaches to 
model building and ones which are better suited to the systems framework. But 
for any such process to be useful we must try to gain an understanding of the 
concept of modelling analogy, within a robust philosophical arena, or credibility 
will be foresaken, even before we start. It is hence in this vein that the thesis 
joins the debate in systems sciences on the utilities of the diverse rationalities 
operating non-reductionistically in systems thinking. 
A 'framework of analogy' is introduced and explored in the thesis. Within the 
framework, the structure of the model works to juxtapose modelling 
rationalities and hence begins to promote a capacity to make them accessible, or 
'systemically reducible'. In this way there is also an umbilical link through to 
the developing discourse of critical systems thinkers. 
Overall, the main concern is with developing an understanding of mechanisms 
in analogy which can lead to the expansion of theories across new conceptual 
domains. This activity is very important, particularly when exploring systems 
concepts and their underlying theoretical potentialities, prior to their 
incorporation in pragmatic methodologies. The benefits of specific 
methodological uses of systemic concepts will not be understood until this task 
is undertaken. 
1.3 STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
To paint a clear a picture of the thesis for the reader I shall DOW outline the 
structure while highlighting the objectives of the investigation into 'The Utility 
of Analogy in Systems Sciences'. 
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The single most imponant aim is the introduction of a developed model of 
analogy through which a discussion and demonstration of its utility for systems 
sciences can emerge. 
The line of argument follows the three themes linked by the idea that analogy is 
of interest and potentially of value to systems thinkers, in terms of analogy as a 
concept, as a form of reasoning and in method terms. 
The thesis hence develops arguments to meet the over-arching objective, via 
discussion of sub-objectives in each chapter. For example, in order to reach a 
position whereby we can begin to consider a systems thinker's concern with 
analogy, we first need to establish an understanding of analogy as a concept 
We begin with a survey of the use of analogy in systems thinking to date. In 
the first chapter we find that systems thinking has an intimate and sometimes 
uncomfortable relationship with overt or covert analogical principles. 'Intimate' 
because it will be argued that binding notions of the 'open system' and other 
systems concepts are inherently analogical. 'Uncomfortable' because both 
friends and enemies of the systems movement have been scandalised by the 
apparent reliance on what appears to be an extraordinarily feeble basis for sound 
inference. 
Equally, metaphor is arousing more and more interest in the systems 
community, since it is taken to offer help in creative problem solving. Several 
studies in systems science have already been directed towards using metaphor 
to augment or initiate systems methodologies. For this reason, we must 
beware. 
The credibility of the systems approach has suffered for its lack of theoretical 
self examination in the past. One might argue that it is characteristic of the 
systems movement to plough ahead pragmatically, if prematurely, with the 
practical applications of intuitively appealing systems concepts and then be 
either disappointed with the results, or embarassed that we are not taken 
seriously by other disciplines. This accounts, perhaps, for the systems 
practitioner's complaint that, 
'Systems assertions are often understandable. undeniable and matters of 
fact. The substantive difficulties for the practitioner arise in establishing 
the relevance of any particular systemic description of a problem as 
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being relevant to the issue under consideration.' 'Eden and Graham 
[1983]. 
Of course, the other side of the coin is that there has already been 'too much 
talk' and that it is time for action in the real world application of systems 
concepts. My own opinion is that if we go full steam ahead in the introduction 
[or arguably, the re-introduction] of analogical and metaphorical concepts in 
systems methodologies, we risk at least two things. 
Firstly and obviously, that we will risk missing the full potential insights that 
these two concepts can offer the systemic problem solving perspective. The 
point has been made by Eden and Graham above. Metaphor and analogies 
particularly, are easy to understand and use at the superficial level. So are many 
other systems concepts, but it must be time to go beyond the superficial. 
This brings me to the second danger we risk overlooking. If we have not 
undertaken a structured and philosophically based investigation of analogy, 
what can we learn from their use beyond an immediate thrill of creative insight 
or conceptual novelty? How, without a model of analogy, can we take what 
we learn elsewhere? Systems thinkers have to take this aim to heart, for we 
should aim to be nothing if not peripatetic. 
Therefore the thesis begins with a brief discussion of the uses of analogy and 
metaphor in the systems movement so far. The flI'St chapter will set out the 
ways systems thinkers have developed their notions of analogy and describe 
criticisms these conceptualisations have prompted. It will be argued that a 
clearer understanding of analogy and metaphor is required and that criticisms 
directed towards their use in reasoning are misplaced and of dubious origin. 
In the second chapter we pursue the aim of establishing a clearer understanding 
of the concept of analogy and its potential utility in systems sciences. The task 
of establishing a credible notion of analogy is initiated by developing a view of 
the characteristics of science, in order to show the basis from which analogy is 
normally criticised. Within that chapter, I hope to show that the notion of a 
robust, 'factually based' scientific rationality will dissolve away, allowing two 
features of analogy to emerge as relevant to systems thinking. 
These two characteristics are pursued in the next chapter, which consists of a 
philosophical discussion of analogy. In the discusiion, we will draw out these 
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main points. Firstly, that analogy as a form of comparison has traditionally 
been conceived as a 'loose' identification of resemblances, but it will it also be 
shown to be rigourous and highly important in theory development. Secondly, 
that the validity of the argument from analogy, which has much concerned 
philosophers, can be assessed in terms of an argument relating to any form of 
model, since models are vital ways of developing appreciations of theories and 
concepts. 
The potential utility of analogy to systems thinkers established, the succeeding 
chapters will hence consider two main areas; What is a useful model of analogy 
for systems thinkers? When is an argument from analogy a valid argument, that 
is, under what circumstances can the practical explorations of analogy be useful 
for theoretical development in systems theory? 
In discussing the characteristics of the framework of analogy, the notions of 
positive, negative and neutral analogies are introduced. These 
conceptualisations are vital to the investigation of the utility of analogy for 
systems thinkers. Particularly important is the suggestion that positive, 
negative and neutral analogy reveal possibilities for exploring different and 
contrasting rationalities. This will be illustrated with examples of re-
conceptualisation of a number of systems concepts. 
By the end of that section, we will have debated the importance of the concept 
of analogy to systems thinkers and how we can get to grips with its use through 
a modeVmethod which describes its processes. For example, we will establish 
that systems thinking should not shy away from explicit use of analogy, and 
illustrate how analogical reasoning can be drawn upon in systems thinking, as 
well as highlighting some ways in which it should not, by considering two 
main issues. Firstly that analogy is generally useful when used explicitly and 
rigourously, specifically such as in re-conceptualisations of systems ideas. 
Secondly that analogy has flawed usage when it is used in partial observation, 
typically to point out aspects of similarity, the most superficial appreciation of 
the framework of analogy. 
Lastly, in the concluding chapter and having established the utility of analogy in 
the systems sciences, I will make some reference to issues of praxis. The tenor 
of this thesis is principally theoretical although during the course of the research 
two case studies were carried out attempting to use analogical problem solving 
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principles in real world problem solving contexts. The case study reports 
submitted to the organisations concerned are recorded in full in the appendices. 
Hence, in my concluding remarks I will make some references to the 
practicalities of developing the utility of analogy further. 
I have represented the structure of the thesis in a table fer the convenience of the 
reader who may find it necessary to refer to this summary of the arguments 
presented in the main body of the thesis. The table is illustrated at the end of 
this Preface. 
1.4 NOTE 
The text is presented as per the fannat required by Senate regulations. 
The thesis is divided into chapters. At the beginning of each I will give an 
introduction to the argument presented and describe the aim of the chapter. At 
the end of each, the reader will fmd a set of 'conclusions' drawing out the most 
significant themes for discussion in the succeeding chapter. 
To add clarity, the chapters have been su~divided although the reader will note 
that some chapters are more so divided than others. The reason for this is that 
in some chapters discussing the concept of analogy, broader brush strokes are 
necessary. The initial argument is highly discursive and concerned principally 
with extracting the theoretical, contextual themes pursued in greater detail as the 
thesis develops. With the greater detail comes a more refmed sectionalisation as 
the characteristics of the model of analogy are presented. 
With regard to referencing. the Harvard system has been used. When a text has 
been widely used or is considered of special importance to the argument, I have 
referenced the author and the date of publication in the body of the text Further 
details of all references are given at the end of the thesis. If the work is quoted 
directly in the text, I have followed the quotation with the page number of the 
original text. Some additional material, however, is referenced in footnotes at 
the end of each respective page. Footnotes have been used when the text 
concerned has been consideced of secondary importance 10 the argument, or has 
been consulted only once. Articles which have appeared in newspapers are also 
referenced in the Footnotes, which are numbered thfoughout each individual 
chapter. 
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1.5 STRUCTURAL SUMMARY. 
'THE UTILITY OF ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS SCIENCES' 
CHAPTER 1HEME SUMMARY 
One Establishing legitimacy Critics have unfairly 
The Utility of Analogy for the CONCEPT of lambasted the systemic 
In Systems Thinldng; Analogy. use of analogy. A 
A Survey. reconsideration is 
overdue . 
Two •. ~. CONCEPT of Arguments that analogy 
A Systems Thinker's Analogy ... is unscientific raise 
View of Science. questions on the nature 
of science itself. We 
argue that features of 
science do not support 
its criticisms of analogy. 
Three ... CONCEPT of Reviews of analogy and 
Analogy; A Analogy. metaphor stress their 
Philosophical Point of potential use in modelling. 
View 
Four: Introducing a MODEL Discussion of the 
A Model of Analogy of analogy for systems characteristics of a 
thinkers. model of analogy and in 
what ways it is of 
interest to systems 
thinkers . 
Five .... a MODEL of Positive, negative and 
Analogy and Rationality analogy for systems neutral analogies 
thinkers. introduce different 
rationalities within the 
framework of analogy . 
Six ... a MODEL for Using the framework of 
The Utility of Analogy analogical PRAXIS. analogy we discuss the 
potential utilities of 
diverse rationalities and 
describe the re-
conceptualisation of 
systemic concepts. 
Seven A CONCEPT, A Summary of the 
Lessons for Systems MODELAND A arguments for The 
Sciences METHOD OF 'Utility 0/ Analogy in 
ANALOGY the Systems Sciences' . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
USE OF ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS THINKING: A SURVEY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will present a brief historical survey of the systems 
thinker's use of analogy and latterly of metaphor. In the descriptions, 
criticisms of the use of analogy both actual and potential, will become 
evident. The objective of the chapter is to establish the necessity for a 
theoretical re-evaluation of the concept of analogy. 
1.2 ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS THINKING 
An analogy compares one thing with another in order to indicate resemblances 
between them and thereby to increase understanding of the lesser known of the 
two. The systems approach relies quite heavily on the explicit use of analogy, 
the 'Brain of the Finn'l considers a neurocybemetic analogy, and the notion of 
the 'Open System'. for example is inherently metaphorical. More recently 
many systems thinkers are increasingly interested in the associated use of 
metaphor, a more subtle, creative, 'calling forth' of resemblance, also inherent 
in the concept of the 'Open System' but also in 'Diagnosing the System for 
Organisations'2 and in notions of 'Hartl and 'Soft' systems thinking. 
These are, however, concepts which conjure up many problems for all those 
who become interested in them. Philosophers, psychologists and linguists, for 
example, are interested in explaining by what criteria certain sorts of 'structured 
comparison' are deemed more insightful than others and their concern is in 
establishing a credible role for analogical and metaphorical phenomena in 
theory. But equally, methodological practitioners of the pragmatic persuasion 
are also keen to exploit the pervasive, 'common sense' utility of these 
approaches for real world problem solving ends. 
The impetus of this research has involved looking at the way analogy is useful 
to the systems concept and then in more detail, at how utility may be made more 
, 
1 S Beer, 1981, Chichestez, John Wiley II. Sons. 
2 S Beer, 1985, Chichestez, John Wiley &. Sons. 
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explicit for a clearer view of the ways in which it can be incorporated in 
methodology and systems theory. 
But first it is worth looking at the ways analogies and to a lesser degree, 
metaphors, are prevalent in systems thinking. 
1.2.1 An Analogical Legacy 
In Lilienfeld's [1978] analysis of the emergence of the systems approach, he 
comments on many of the first documented efforts to develop systemic 
concepts. These relied quite openly on analogies and metaphors drawn across 
many established intellectual boundaries and their free usage in the early days of 
the development of systems thought is taken to illustrate, by Lilienfeld, the 
triteness and baselessness of systemic ideas. 
Of these original thinkers we might briefly consider in a more sympathetic tone, 
the legacy of analogy bequeathed to systems thinkers. 
1.2.1.1 Stephen C.Pepper's 'Contextualism and Organicism'. 
Stephen.C.Pepper [Lilienfeld, 1978, p8] developed the concepts of six 'Root 
Metaphors'in his work3 to describe the principal metaphysical systems which 
he proposed as able to comprehend and account for the world of experience. 
He dismissed two of the six, dogmatism and mysticism, virtually straight away. 
Mysticism on the grounds that it was simply too private and dogmatism because 
it relies on 'infallible authorities' which could appear contradictory. 
Pepper went on to develop a metaphysics of 'world images', each one 
determined by a root metaphor able to supply a conceptual framework capable 
of analysis and extrapolation. The four world images Pepper did consider 
worthy of study were Formism, ['Platonic Realism'], Mechanism [the 
Newtonian view], Contextualism and Organicism, the latter two images clearly 
the more powerful contributions to systems thinking. 
Contextualism was the name given to the philosophical implications of early 
pragmatism in which the world is seen as an infmite complex of novelty and 
3 Pepper, s. C., 1970, World Hypotheses-A Study ill EvidellCt, University of California 
Press, BClkeley and Los Angeles, [originally published 1942]. 
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change, order and disorder. From this flux metaphor, investigators select 
certain contexts to serve as organising gestalts or structures without which the 
vast array of real world details would either drive the investigator into a state of 
catatonic shock, or perhaps worse still, remain invisible and meaningless. The 
organising context, in creating a theme, acts to fuse into a unity the items which 
in other contexts remain discrete entities. The largely metaphoric concepts of 
quality and fusion, undoubtedly holistic are the most significant, 
'Fusion is an agency of qualitative simplification and organisation ... 
some fusion must remain in the quality of an event, otherwise the event 
would break apart and we would have, not a single event, but two quite 
unconnected events.' [Pepper, 1942, p271]. 
The interest of contextuallsm is clearly linked to the utility enjoyed when a 
particular analogy is developed or a metaphor is called forth and explored for a 
given purpose. The contextualist assertion that all conceptual schemes occur 
within a universe of applicability and can never grasp the total structure of 
events possibly accounts for the profusion of analogies used in our everyday 
thinking, language and learning. 
The root metaphor of organicism, also derived by Pepper is more popularly 
employed in systems thinking. This is more overtly based on conditions of 
actual analogy, whereas contextualism reflects at a more abstract level, the 
process and putative 'structure' [model] of analogical reasoning, to which we 
shall come in due course. 
Hence as Lilienfeld [op.cit. pII] stresses, the contextualist uses the category of 
integrating structures, [contexts], to explain experience but denies to these 
integrating structures, as Lilienfeld puts it, any 'reality of significance' which 
we might otherwise take as 'any meaning in its own right'. By contrast, the 
organicist maintains that the integrating structures surrounding and extending 
through given events are more numerous, coherent and more real than a 
contextualist could permit, thus attributing to the fundamentally analogical 
organising structures, a meaning in their own right 
The organicist, then, views knowledge via the organismic metaphor of 'the 
organic relatedness of material fact' [Pepper, op.CiL p310]. This view 
proposes the overthrow of a given scientific theory. DOW usually seen in the 
Kuhnian [Kuhn, 1962] framework of scientific 'revolution'. Incidentally, 
Kuhn's view does DOt allow for the accumulation of 'truth' between paradigm 
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shifts. and this does not lead to chaos but rather the replacement of a relatively 
limited integrating structure by a more comprehensive and accurate form. In 
Pepper's terms. the materials of experience are not lost over time, but 
transferred from systems in which they did not belong, to a system in which 
they do belong. He makes the following remarks on this, 
'Each level 0/ integration resolves the contradictions 0/ the levels be/ow 
and so removes the e"ors that were most serious there,· each level brings 
about improvement in judgement. Each level exhibits more truth 
through higher integration o/the/acts'. [Ibid. p307]. 
We shall have more to say on concepts of fact, truth and judgement later in the 
next chapter of the thesis. 
1.2.1.2 L.J. Henderson's 'Equilibrium'. 
Lilienfeld also briefly sketches the work ofLJ.Henderson [1879-1942]. whose 
influential use of the term system. passion for quantification and as the former 
disparagingly describes. his 'enthusiastic and somewhat si'!'Plistic belief that 
systems models can adequately encompass the totality 0/ society', [Ulienfeld, 
op.cit. p 14] mark him out as a forerunner of systems thought. Henderson 
based his sociological writings on the work of Pareto. the concept of a system 
derived by the physicist Josiah Gibbs. and additionally on biochemical and 
physiological analogies. 
In Pepper's terms, Henderson's pragmatic emphasis rendered him a 
contextualist. in that he believed that concepts used in science had only a 
provisional value and that man put far too much faith in 'the reasonableness of 
their ideas and actions', underestimating the pervasiveness of the irrational 
action and motive. The systemic concept to which Henderson's4 work 
principally contributes is that of equilibrium. which he considered as essential in 
the understanding and study of social processes. 
Thus. by implication. the importance of maintaining an 'equilibrium' was 
directly related to a'health analogy', although in much of his writing Henderson 
was concerned to play down the significance of its analogical basis, betraying 
the 'naive scientism' for which he is strongly criticised by Lilicnfeld Hence, 
4 LJ.Henda'son, 1970, The Social System: Selected Writings, ed. B.Barb«, University of 
Chicago Press, Olicago, ppl36-139. 
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'In order tofu our ideas let us consider a relatively simple mechanical 
system. It may seem that we are reasoning from analogy but this is not 
so. On the contrary, we shall be reasoning logically from premises 
stated above, because the mathematical formulation necessary to 
describe this mechanical system would be formally identical with that 
necessary to describe the analogous social system'. [Ibid. pp136-139]. 
Flood [1988a, p314] notes that Koehlers argued forcefully against an 
'equilibrium' theory for organisms. While he recognised that the two principal 
ideas of machine theories, [the second law of thermodynamics and the law of 
dynamic direction] are compatible and relevant to a development of a concept of 
eqUilibrium based on mechanistic analogy, unless a broader view of these 
principles is taken the analogy is misleading. We can consider Koehler's three 
main objections to the analogy, as summarised by Rood, 
'( aJ no organism is detached from the rest of the world, thus the 
principles are not directly applicable to living systems-they are not 
closed; 
(b) organisms art not in equilibrium with their immediate environment-
at rest many organisms are in an unstable position,' and 
(c) from the point of view of physics an (presumably) young adult 
(human, say) contains substantial stores of energy compared to a child-
development of life is associated with an increase in such energy.' 
[Ibid.]. 
In many ways Koehler's objections to Henderson's equilibrium theory for 
organisms can be seen to be directed towards the analogical features which 
infonned the basis for inference and hence transference of the the principles 
concerned. As we have seen, Henderson himself would have probably 
denied the analogical basis. The criticisms, however, are typical of those 
applied to analogies; clearly in any analogy, it is as easy, if not easier, to 
point out ways in which phenomena are not alike, than ways in which they 
are or might be so. It is the issues underlying the basis for establishing 
whether matters are or are not comparable that are the interesting ones. 
S Koehler, W., 1938, The Place ofVQ]ues ill tltt World of Facts, Livenight, pp314·328. 
[Reprinted in Emery, F.E., 1969] 
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1.2.1.3 Walter B.Cannon's 'Homeostasis'. 
Henderson's Harvard colleague, Walter B.Cannon, has been described as 
another early systems thinker but one who, this time, worked more openly with 
analogies, developing his highly regarded medical knowledge influentially in 
his book The Wisdom of the Body'6. 
Cannon's main systemic theme was 'homeostasis' and although much of his 
book was concerned with the physiological description of this concept, Cannon 
in his conclusion used analogy to argue from the biological to the social, 
'Are there not general principles of stabilization? May not the devices 
developed in the organism for preserving steady states illustrate methods 
which are used, or could be used, elsewhere? ... Might it not be useful 
to examine other forms of organisation-industrial, domestic or social-in 
the light of the organisation o/the body?' [op.cit. p305]. 
Cannon draws a potent analogy and this drives his ideas that insights derived 
from physiology might prove fruitful for the study of society. Lilienfeld argues 
that Cannon's analogy develops into an argument against individualism. 
Lilienfeld, perhaps unwittingly, is ascribing a considerable degree of credibility 
to the analogy in making his accusation. But Lilienfeld's position is paradoxical 
and is an indication of a rather superficial understanding of analogy. He takes 
seriously the potential argument against individualism which he find in 
Cannon's comparison and in this attributes power intrinsically to the vehicle 
with which Cannon has developed his ideas. Yet throughout his commentary 
Lilienfeld negates the value of analogy. 
Lilienfeld's objection that the analogy represents an argument against 
individualism is based on the idea that although individual cells engage in a 
certain amount of self regulation, in the more complex organisms these cells 
become fixed in place in specific organs and, in effect, resign many individual 
problems of survival -getting food, disposing of waste- to the central nelVous 
system. Hence Cannon's physiological analogy is drawn, in sociological terms, 
with primitive food gatherers, who move about and rely 00 their immediate 
environment for sustenance. More complex social envirooments give rise to 
divisions of labour and mutual dependencies, giving relative freedom from 
other functions by developing centralised controlling ~hanjsms. 
6 The Wisdom oflhe Body', 1963, Nonon, New York. [originally published 1932]. 
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Cannon is criticised by Lilienfeld for drawing a 'direct' analogy. I have 
assumed that Lilienfeld is using this term to refer to an analogy which places 
importance in aspects of similarity only, Lilienfeld himself does not defme the 
characteristics which he takes as identifying a 'direct' analogy. The analogy is 
between the 'fluid matrix of animal organisms' and the transportation systems 
of states, with common carriers, [trucks. trains, boats and 10 fonh] directly 
analogising with the blood and lymph. Money and credit. in that they facilitate 
exchange, are taken as integral pans of the 'fluid matrix of society'. 
The conditions of such an analogy are broad and far reaching. The central 
administrative organs of the 'body politic' are deemed as dealing with 
'accumulations of toxins', 'problems of dispersal' and 'medico-social' 
intelligence. Hence in the notion of 'medicosocial' intelligence, just as it 
eliminated plagues and epidemics, its ability to solve other problems is 
instantaneously appealing to the naivete of 'common sense'. But such broad 
analogies are too loose and therefore as we have already noted, it is possible to 
name as many, or more dissimilarities, as similarities. Conversely the analogy 
is also, in some ways, infinitely expandable. the result being that it is very easy 
to criticise and ridicule. 
But I would suggest that criticism of an analogy which is aimed at these points 
itself dissects an analogy prematurely. In this case I would argue that the 
criticisms are based on a superficial scan of the features of similarity between 
the body and society. As will be argued in a later chapter the 'negative' aspects 
of an analogy [the areas of dissimilarity] or what will be introduced as the 
'neutral' aspects [the 'don't know' areas] can be taken as of as much. or more, 
value than areas of similarity in deriving the new and creative views of 
particular features or situations. for which analogies are most used and useful. 
1.2.1.4 Ludwig von Benalanffy's 'Open System' . 
Lastly, in his brief survey of systems thinkers Lilienfeld turns to Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy whose work is perhaps best known and to whom many systems 
concepts are attributed via his development of the concept of the 'open system' 
which frrst emerged in his essay, 'The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and 
Biology'7. In the ideas expressed in this influentiCll piece, von Bertalanffy 
7 Printed in Science, 1950. 
22 
aimed to establish the foundations of systems thinking on a biological rather 
than. as Lilienfeld puts it, a philosophical or merely formalistic basis. I would 
argue that the biological basis was also intrinsically analogical. 
The concepts of complexity, hierarchical levels of organisation and emergence 
led von Bertalanffy to conclude that higher levels of organisation involve new 
laws not deducible from laws appropriate to lower levels. Not surprisingly. 
this rather more advanced conceptualisation of organicism caused von 
Bertalanffy to believe in a fundamental unity of the sciences. Even Lilienfeld 
felt bound to admit that the 'parallels he finds in these various spheres are more 
that mere analogies', [op.cit.p17] but he also calls for three levels to be 
clarified; 
'}. Analogies. These are scientifically worthless-supeTjicial similarities 
in phenomena that do not correspond to underlying factors or laws 
operating in them. 
2. Logical homologies. Here phenomena differ in causal factors 
involved but are governed by structurally identical laws- for example the 
flow offluids and of heat conduction are expressed by the same law. 
3. Explanation in the proper sense, dealing with the appropriate 
conditions and laws.' lop.cit. piS]. 
The role of General Systems theory, according to von Bertalanffy. was to 
distinguish between analogies and logical homologies [although in the example 
given above. analogies played an important role in developing the theory] and 
act as a screen to what Lilienfeld calls 'incorrect' analogies. but how this was to 
be done was not specified. No wonder notions of General Systems Theory 
have been treated with some disdain by systems thinkers in recent years. But 
we will come to more on this in a later chapter. 
1.2.2 Due Cause lor Concern. 
In his attack on the systems viewpoint, Lilienfeld takes the use of analogy by 
these thinkers as the main pivot of his argument. In his chapter on the 
'Convergence of Systems Thinking', he cites the following. 
'Systems thinkers ... behave as camp followers of'science', not of 
sciences, picking up whatever details serve to illu.strate their views ... 
they collect analogies between the phenomena ofOM/ield and those of 
another, (preferring to call them isomorphisms, though the di.fference is 
IIbt discernible), the description of which seems to offer them an esthetic 
delight that is its own justification'. [op.cit.p191]. 
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It is pertinent at this stage to pursue a brief aside as regards the differences 
between analogies and isomorphisms of which systems thinkers are, I would 
suggest, increasingly aware. 
1.2.2.1 Analogy and Isomorphism 
An analogy, as has been mentioned at the opening of this chapter is mainly used 
in an act of comparison between two 'things'. The things might be objects, 
isolated features of phenomena, or situations, with the purpose of indicating 
their 'resemblances' but this is not an end in itself, although critics, as above, 
seem to think it is. 
Analogy must also have an inherent relationship with theory development for it 
to be useful. Further, the construction of a model of an analogy in systems 
between two domains is merely the starting point of a structured method of 
investigation into a directed area of inquiry, incorporating a variety of 
procedures and concepts. If critics are to offer useful criticism. surely it should 
be toward how a structured investigation is to develop to which they should 
turn their attention and not to bland dismissals of how what they take to be 
tenuous similarities, first come to be observed. 
This is clearly different from the concept of isomorphism which the systemist 
sees as concerned with the similarities or identities of form. In this way, a map 
and the countryside it represents, or a number of apparently dissimilar 
differential equations may be 'isomorphic'. Isomorphic concepts are valuable 
in science because, for example, it may be possible to work through one feature 
of a system simply because for one reason or another, it is more convenient to 
do so and then be sure that a similar process will have a similar effect or yield 
similar knowledge in the isomorph of that system. No such assumption is 
possible when we are dealing with an analogy and making this assumption 
perhaps accounts for poor applications and trivial investigations or appreciations 
of analogies to date. 
There is clearly a fundamental difference between the concepts of analogy and 
isomorphism in this respect. We are interested in analogy because an analogy 
may use resemblances to aid knowledge development but the conditions of 
resemblance must each be carefully scrutinised, and··explored according to the 
purposes of constructing the analogy. 
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1.2.2.2 Is Systems Thinking an Analogy? 
Later in his chapter on 'Systems Theory as Ideology' Lilienfeld goes as far as to 
suggest that the principal characteristic of systems theory, is 'that it is an 
analogy, despite the denials o/many systems theorists' [p247]. 
I will not dispute this last point, but an objection will be raised to Lilienfeld's 
implication that analogies are themselves specious, although again there are 
clearly many examples [and not isolated to systems circles] of analogies poorly 
or superficially applied. This is not sufficient reason, however, to disown the 
potentials of the concept concerned. Further, as lberall [1972: Preface, xii] 
points out, the general theses of the systems approach are often plagued by the 
criticism that 'only analogies are being proposed, rather than real principles 0/ 
science' which as we shall argue in the next chapter are largely ephemeral in any 
case. 
It is apparent that the use and role of analogies have' been taken as of 
fundamental importance to the systems 'movement' by our critics, even if this 
has not been fully admitted by systems writers. This again is not surprising 
given the hostile reception the main idea of using analogies seriously to develop 
knowledge and theory usually stirs up. 
But in some ways the difficulties of showing rigour and logic in analogies are 
symptomatic of other associated problems of theory and practice in systems 
sciences, again a point for which it is often lambasted. It is in making the 
transition from the utility of the 'praxis', to then deriving legitimate theoretical 
concepts which may be subsequently developed for future application which is 
the most problematic area for systems thinking. This is arguably a very 
sensitive issue, especially since many of the concepts involved are so intuitively 
appealing that often practitioners have very high expectations of their practical 
potentialities. 
In this context we must now consider the concept of metaphor and in notions of 
systemic metaphor, how systems thinkers are hoping to apply it in real problem 
solving exercises. 
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1.3 METAPHOR IN SYSTEMS THINKING. 
Metaphor is turning up increasingly in systems thinking, both in theoretical 
tenns in the notion of systemic metaphor and particularly in that of 'creative 
metaphor' for methodological application. 
In this chapter I have presented under two different headings, analogy and 
metaphor in systems thinking respectively. But I would suggest that systems 
thinkers typically do not make sufficiently clear the theoretical distinction 
between the two. We have already argued that analogy and metaphor are 
intuitively appealing and suggested that this makes them readily incorporated in 
methodological analysis. 
In their paper, 'Creativity and Metaphor in Soft Systems Methodology'S Davies 
and Ledington consider the incorporation of metaphor in Checkland's Soft 
Systems Methodology [1981] and take as one of its strengths that, 
' ... it allows for the separation of the real world of the problem situation 
for the conceptual or abstract world of the development of systems 
representations.' lop.cit. p31]. ' 
Davies and Ledington point out that many users of SSM fmd this stage of the 
methodology problematic. experiencing difficulties in deriving useful models 
for effective comparison and debate, although the users are offered the guideline 
to develop relevant models without a clear indication of how this criterion can 
be met. Davies and Ledington suggest that in depth exploration of a 'problem 
situation' may lead to three types of problem. 
Firstly the exploration can lead to a proliferation of material making the user feel 
overwhelmed and this can lead to a 'rather generalised and somewhat neutral 
nu>del being developed' • [Ibid]. Also, for problems in which ideological issues 
are of central importance, there are problems associated with convergent 
thinking and conservatism in choosing relevant systems. 
Secondly. there are situations which the analyst feels that the situation is 'fairly 
self explanatory' implying that intuitive problem solving is appropriate. This 
leads to a lack of variety in the choice of relevant systems and to ideas about 
8 Journal of Ap,plied Systems Analysis, Vol.IS, 1988. pp31-3S. 
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certain models being the 'only ways' to describe the problem situation, 
rendering SSM 'unnecessarily impotent at the comparison stage,' [op.cit p32]. 
A third problem can arise as a result of difficulties in dealing with the abstract 
nature of a conceptualisation of a problem situation. Davies and Ledington put it 
this way. 
the problem situation may be expressed as one related to 
information, or communication, or even human relations, costing, 
organisation, development, survival, innovation, etc. All these are terms 
are often uncovered as issues in organisational analysis but they have no 
concrete substance and so are difficult to express in image form.' 
[Ibid]. 
The crux of the Davies and Ledington paper is that these three problems can be 
alleviated with the use of metaphor to stimulate creative thinking and link 
studies concerned with innovation and problem solving to set the scene for the 
introduction of metaphor in SSM. Their objective is clearly to refresh processes 
of conceptualisation in developing relevant systems with metaphor. Metaphor 
is linked by the authors to the area of creative thinking • 
•... writers looking at problem solving have recommended creativity 
techniques to break out of convergent thinking and this has been called 
lateral thinking or the breaking out of 'mind sets' ... Such techniques 
may be useful in encouraging divergent views of relevant systems and 
the leaving behind of the real world in using SSM.' [Ibid]. 
We will see in Chapter Three that a number of commentators on metaphor 
[Black, 1966, 1979; Boyd, 1979; Lackoff and Johnson, 1980] would take 
issue with the notion that metaphor, unlike SSM, can be explicitly linked to 'the 
leaving behind of the real world'. Many of their arguments are based on the 
premise that any conceptualisations of a real world and certainly any description 
of it, are themselves inherently metaphorical and that disaggregation in this 
respect is nonsensical. 
The motivation behind Davies and Ledington's proposition is chiefly pragmatic; 
'We believe that the conscious use of metaphor in SSM modelling is 
worthwhile .. : but I would suggest it demonstrates that the implications of 
theories and analyses of concepts of metaphor have Bot been seriously 
absorbed. This must be seen to jeopardise the credibility of their use of 
metaphor, making it appear ad hoc and wholly driven by the individual 
circumstances of the SSM case study. It is thus possible to argue that their 
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posltlon is uncenain and potentially indefensible on theoretical and 
methodological grounds. For example, we can consider their following 
assertions, 
'Another imponant point with ... analogy is that the chosen analogous 
representation will indicate something of the emotions and dominant 
ideology being expressed .. : [Ibid]. 
'Metaphors are useful because they often allow a more concrete 
representation of something with an esoteric nature. It is far easier for 
an object such as a dog, or a car, or a building to be modelled in action 
than such esoteric notions as organisations management or in/ormation. 
It is easier to expand the analogy into a wily dog slinldng around, a 
sports car speeding around or an ancient building crumbling into ruin. 
This is one way which metaphor aids modelling.' 
[op.cit.p33]. 
With regard to the fIrst passage, Davies and Ledington have already failed to 
make clear the distinction between analogy and metaphor in their paper and so 
use the terms interchangeably. They also fail to explore what special 
characteristics of analogy facilitate a demonstration of 'emotions and dominant 
ideologies' beyond describing analogy principally in terms of an exercise in 
abstraction. Unless we can go funher than this, we are forced to ask ourselves 
why we are bothering to use analogies at all. 
Equally, unless we have a model of the characteristics of analogy it makes 
acknowledging that it is possible to recognise a 'dominant ideology' , or fonn 
appreciations of 'emotions' contained therein highly dubious. There are no 
tenns of reference unless other features of the analogy or metaphor are exposed. 
In this analysis I will indirectly consider aspects of 'emotion' and 'dominant 
ideology' within the more workable framework of the relationship between 
analogy and rationality. 
Of the second passage I would suggest that many theorists would be outraged at 
the suggestion that metaphors, ' ... allow a more concrete representation of 
something with an esoteric nature'. The analysis of metaphor has found the 
distinguishing qUality of metaphor to be frustratingly 'Don-concrete'; for 
example, Black [1979] talks of the 'open-endedness 9', and Leathetdale [1974], 
of the 'non-literalness 10' of metaphor. Atkinson [1984], • systems thinker, 
9 See Section 3.4.1. 
10 See Section 3.4.1. 
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thinker, also describes the concept loosely as'romantic metaphor 11'. These 
concepts clearly do not imply concreteness and the theorists concerned also 
argue that metaphor is itself nothing if not esoteric. Further, principally because 
Davies and Ledington have not sufficiently distinguished between analogy and 
metaphor, I would suggest that the examples given arc analogies and not 
metaphors, on the grounds that images are to be dissected, and not fused, to 
add insight to the selection and development of relevant systems. 
But systems' interest in metaphor does not end at the methodological level. It 
has been raised also to near epistemological heights and this is evident in that it 
appears to be increasingly modish to talk now of 'systemic metaphor' and the 
'open systems metaphor'. Atkinson's [1984] thesis on 'Metaphor and 
Systemic Praxis' is concerned, with conceptualising the adaptive whole system 
and, among other things, with 'giving credence to the argument for the 
existence of such a root metaphor' and with exploring 'the possibility of 
alternative systemic metaphors.' lop citp119]. Metaphor is indeed a current 
issue in systems thinking. But what do we mean by this? What are we saying 
about the systems viewpoint by adopting this terminology? I do not believe that 
this issue has been adequately addressed. EqUally as I have suggested. there is 
confusion between concepts of analogy and metaphor. 
Flood [1988a] claims, for example, that the 'open system metaphor' is limited 
in dealing with conflict I would suggest that it is the rationality within which 
the open system metaphor is explored in a given situation and not the metaphor 
itself which we should question. In our discussion of metaphor we will be 
arguing for a notion of fusion between domains inherent in metaphor and in this 
fusion, rationalities become invisible with emphasis directed to the immediate 
insight called forth by the metaphor. 
The rationalities involved in the use of metaphor or analogy, I shall argue, 
might be invisible although this does not mean that they have disappeared 
altogether, but perhaps this accounts for the misappropriation of the concept 
metaphor in methodology and arguably its implied incorporation in systems 
epistemology. In sum, however, I consider the use of the term 'systemic 
metaphor' to be apt in systems thinking since metaphor is how we see the world 
and metaphorical and analogical influences are intrinsic to our languages 
11 ATKINSON. CJ .• 1984. Metaplwr and Systemic Praxis. Pb.D.1besis. Department of 
Systems. University of Lancaster. 
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describing it -they are structured analogically and through our eye for 
resemblances. We must know more about what the potential contributions of 
analogy and metaphor are to the systems viewpoint. 
Later in the thesis I will argue for points of distinction between analogy and 
metaphor. I will also present the case that in pragmatic concatenation of 
analogy and metaphor in methodology, the utility for systems modelling is 
reduced and not enhanced as it might be when the concepts are conceptualised 
in terms of an analogical/metaphorical continuum. On such a theoretical 
continuum formal, ideal type models of analogy and metaphor, [the 'Formal 
Analogical Model' and Atkinson's12 concept of 'Romantic Metaphor'] 
conceptualised at each end. In the framework of analogy we will work to 
establish a clearer understanding of these concepts and explore notions of 
positive negative and neutral analogy as aspects of investigative rationality. 
Overall, there is much speculation in 'systems thinking' about the role of 
analogy and metaphor in the theories and practices of the systems approach. 
The controversies that have arisen have prompted a vigorous discourse. This 
thesis will contribute to that debate. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
12 Ibid. 
In this chapter we have noted that systems thinking has undergone a 
cynical attack for its use of analogy. We have also suggested that the 
use of analogy has been translated into an interest in metaphor but 
argued that a clearer distinction must be made between the two concepts 
and that we must increase our understanding to justify its importance to 
systems thinking. 
We will now move on to consider the context of the systems approach 
and look at how systems thinkers view science, since it is on the 
grounds that analogy is unscientific that systems thinkers fight shy of a 
more explicit analysis of its utility in systems sciences. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A SYSTEMS THINKER'S VIEW OF SCIENCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Preface it was stated that analogy is of great interest to systems 
thinking and in Chapter One we have briefly surveyed the use of 
analogy and metaphor in systems thinking. In order to reach a position 
whereby we can begin to reconsider a systems thinker's concern with 
analogy, we need first to establish an understanding of analogy as a 
concept This we initiate by developing a view of the characteristics of 
science in order to show context in which analogy is normally criticised. 
We will be concerned to show that feature of factual science are based 
on concepts which are not absolutes but negotiable within a rational 
framework. 
The objective of the chapter is to show that the characteristics of science 
are themselves contentious and using that critique we will go on to build 
a more philosophical view of analogy in Otapter Three. 
2.2 THE UBIQUITY OF SCIENCE 
In this chapter we will explore a systems thinker's view of science, because 
science affects all our lives and in the academic community particularly notions 
of science are ubiquitous if not altogether consistent 
For these reasons a discussion of the characteristics of science is pertinent and 
necessary. The scientific framework must be described in order to set the tone 
for the rest of the thesis which will attempt to establish some ideas about 
analogy and 'reasoning by analogy' as valid and legitimate conceptual tools. It 
will be seen however that these ideas will not be cast in the mould of traditional 
scientific reasoning. Further, systems thinking is still referred to in many 
quarters as 'Systems Science' although we differ from traditional scientists of 
both natural and social persuasions on many fundamental issues. 
Thus before we can begin an analysis of analogy as a concept we will begin 
with a broad discussion of what informs and what is entailed by the scientific 
way. This exercise will show that for the philosophical and methodological 
misdemeanours analogy is called to answer, science itself has no alibi. 
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A fami1iarity with matters of scientific advance is an intrinsic pan of existence in 
our contemporary society, demonstrable in the tendency to 'take it for granted' 
that high degrees of innovation will not only improve our future prospects but 
will also ameliorate the resource excesses of the past. But despite the 
recognition and acceptance of the notions of 'scientific advance' and 
'technological progress' there has been relatively little interest in understanding 
why and how such 'advances' come about. 
Rose and Rose have made a most interesting observation on society's view of 
science which they propose is normally seen through the embodiment of the 
actor in the process, namely the scientist, 
'Before the Second World War, scientists general/y appeared in novels, 
children's stories and so forth as rather endearing, absent-minded 
figures, possibly mad ... but on the whole fairly innocuous, inventors of 
machines which did easy things in a complex way but which often failed 
to work. This is far from true today. The scientist, in novel, play, film 
and comic, is a figure of power, sometimes sinister, sometimes naive 
and virtuous but if so a helpless tool in the hands of those who wish to 
misuse him ... above al/, he is no longer a figure of innocent fun. No 
one remains innocent about the potential of seemingly highly theoretical 
research'. [[1970.xiii]. 
The cliche of the absent minded or 'mad' professor is no longer a humorous 
characterisation but now potentially a threat. Arguably, science is now about 
real people and not an altruistic quest for pure knowledge. In this context we 
can note Porter's recent remarks, 
'Serenely soaring in the realms of pure thought, dispassionately devoted 
to discovery,. this is the beau ideal of science often presented to us. But 
in the real world science doesn't work like that. There is the science of 
the military, of the oil companies, and the food and drugs 
multinationals,' and lining up against these today, the science of Friends 
of the Earth and Greenpeace, science for the planet and the people. 
Thai's not to prejudge matters, implying one is true and the other all bad 
faith. Bur it does mean that science can no longer tower above thefray. 
Like everyone else, scientists have their passions, polemics and 
politics.' [19901]. 
One wonders on which side science of the universities or science of the state 
would stand? But we are not really confronting anything new here. Science and 
technology have been intimately linked to political development ever since 
. 
1 Porter, R, 1990, 'From moNJds to mo"uys GIld Man', Book Review, ISI4I9O, The Sunday 
Times. 
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Galileo who in order to have funds for other research, made a prompt and 
lucrative sale of the telescope to the Venetian State- as an instrument of war. 
Galileo, in this context, made his position clear in a letter seeking employment 
to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 
'Great and remarkable things are mine but I can only serve (or rather be 
put to work by) princes, for it is they who carry on wars, build and 
defend fortresses, and in their royal diversions make those great 
expenditures which neither I nor any other private person may.' 
[19572]. 
Perhaps because of a growing awareness of these kinds of links, the tenor, the 
methods, the broad 'objectives' of science are coming under an increasingly 
particular scrutiny. In an age already populated with inquisitive 'watch dogs', 
how long can the 'beau ideal' of science be convincingly sustained, or how far 
should we go to protect it? 
We also have to ask ourselves if the answer to both questions will be influenced 
by the fact that we live immersed in an artificial environment which is largely 
the result of scientific research. Our present environment and arguably its 
problems is the 'successful' result of struggle to overcome 'forces of Nature'. 
This was what Bacon saw as the goal of science, necessary in order to bring 
about 'the relief of man's estate', [Easlea, 1973, p248]. Further, as a direct 
result of our situation, how far is it now possible for us to stand back from the 
'real world' and equally, the conceptual environments we have made for 
ourselves and take stock of science and its products? Some might argue that 
from our very concern with the links between science, politics and big 
business, it is getting easier all the time. 
Additionally, there are associated problems. Science has given us the confident 
expectation that -in the enforcement of our dominance over nature- it will 
provide us with explanations and predictions. In a world riddled with the 
complexities of visible and invisible interrelationships, the method of science 
will yield knowledge, truth and successful and objective application of its 
outputs. Even to a born again systems thinker [who treasured these hopes for 
the systems approach] it seems a dangerous and arrogant posture. 
2 Drake, S., 1957, 'The Discoveries GIld Opinions of Galileo' ,Doubleday Anchor, 1'63. 
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Rude facts of the matter are emerging all the time. The scientific rationality 
which sustains the momentum of science is not the only one, and arguably it is 
one rather inadequately familiar with the real and potential consequences of its 
explanations, predictions and interventions in systems which have different 
appreciations, expectations and criteria for acceptability. There is evidence all 
around us, for example, the far reaching sociological, economic and political 
consequences of the birth control pill. Or more recently, the Crief Scientist of 
British Nuclear Fuels who advised that employees worried about the genetic 
consequences of the levels of radioactivity in their working environments 
should refrain from having children. It was definitively the scientifically 
rational answer to their concerns. Most would agree it was also inappropriate 
and facetious. 
Further, the means by which scientists seek knowledge can appear 'out of step' 
with the needs of the rest of society, an example being the vivisectionist 
methods of natural science in an increasingly 'green' environment and the 
activities of the 'scientific' research centres currently generating worrisome 
waste levels in the delicate ecological system of Antarctica. 
But not being able to foresee the immediate or future consequences of one's 
actions is evidently not merely the prerogative of the scientists. For the scientist 
however, 'not knowing about knowledge' arguably does have some more 
immediately apparent benefits, unavailable to others. This is such that the 
isolated perspective of the immediate moment can make many endeavours of 
past scientists look 'silly', and by contrast many achievements of the present 
can look 'miraculous', if the concepts have not been placed in the framework of 
their full historical perspective. A timely warning on this sensitive issue comes 
from Bunge, 
Those who do not approach science with a philosophical and historical 
attitude tend to regard every scientificformula as trivial as soon as rhey 
learn to handle it and the latest theory as the final, or at least the 
penultimate one, the last being, of course, one's own forthcoming 
contribution.' [1959, p24]. 
Different accounts questioning 'what science is' and what, therefore we can 
'realistically' expect it to do, strongly highlight the increasing importance of the 
relationship between science and philosophy. Very diverse 'models of science' 
are arising more and more frequently, partly we shall argue IS a result of the 
increasing popularity of the 'metaphoric' view of science. Additionally, partly 
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because the long standing assumption that there is a single, timeless, correct, 
'scientific method' has lost its potency. 
It is the significance of other factors which are now of most consuming interest. 
An historian of science3 goes as far as to suggest that. 
The conventional accounts of great scientific discovery may be myths 
designed to conceal the true nature of science ... Scientists have created 
the myths surrounding the heroes of discovery because they would like 
us to believe tluJt knowledge is generated by simply observing what 
exists in the world. To admit that new theories involve new ways 0/ 
conceptualising nature is dangerous because it implies tluJt scientists 
IuJve to think creatively and then persuade others to take their ideas 
seriously. Cultural, religious and even social images may have shaped 
the way new theories were constructed and the way in which they were 
received.' 
New models for thinking about science are developing. Hesse, [1976, pI], 
gives the example of the henneneutic account which takes its models from the 
problems of interpretation of texts, those problems associated with 
understanding an alien culture and the ideological challenges of Marxist and 
other, [e.g. Foucault, 1970] potentially radical interpretations of our own 
society and culture. Bunge [op.cit.] too stresses the need (or an historicist 
emphasis to counter what he proclaims to be a 'conservative' attitude in 
philosophy, which is unhistorical and evidently a hindrance to the development 
of theories and modes of theorising from without and within. 
The task of the philosophy of science for a long time stood as discovering the 
criteria of a 'correct method' in science. The way it was to be established was 
through the analysis of scientific theories as 'scientific', i.c. by criteria internal 
to the object of study and without regard to external factors, such as the social 
conditions at the time the theories emerged or the psychology of the individual 
scientists involved. In this context Bunge suggests that, 
' ... he who forgets the historicity of ideas tends to regard the last 
scientific theory as the final one and is prone to build scholastic shells 
around theories with a view to protecting them from heterodoxies.' 
[1959, piS]. 
3 Bowler, P., 1990, Darwin: Origin of 1M SpeCWIU, Article,' The Correspondent. 
15/4/1990. 
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One of the most interesting accounts of science in recent years has been Kuhn's 
[1962] seminal work expounding his view of science as 'paradigmatic'. This 
viewpoint sees the history of science in terms of 'successive paradigms and 
revolutions' between which there are few or no rational links or more 
influentially, accumulations of truth. Masterman [1965] argues that the value of 
Kuhn's contribution and additionally the surprisingly two-faced reception it has 
received from philosophers of science and 'research workers in the sciences', 
lie in the same source. This is the fact that Kuhn 'really looked at actual 
science'in several fields instead of confining his field of reading to that of the 
history and philosophy of science, in other words, to one field. 
Kuhn's work has, of course, been strikingly influential although perhaps more 
implicitly than explicitly so. Nevertheless, a recent book on 'The Politics of 
Evolution' by Desmond [University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp503] is a 
discussion of evolutionary theories reflecting Kuhn's conceptualisation of pre-
science in pre-Darwinian evolutionary science, 
Those were heady times for science. Explorers were returning from all 
corners of the earth with the most bizarre finds, a warm blooded 
creature with a bill, that lays eggs but suckles its young? No wonder 
naturalists rowed over the platypus. Geology was baring strata upon 
strata of fossil fauna whose eons long history boggled the mind. 
Science was on the move. Theory cancelled theory, scientists fell into 
factions and accusations of jobbery, rabble rousing and plagiarismfilled 
the medico -scientific press.' Poner, [Ibid.] 
Three competing schools are discussed by Desmond. In revolutionary France, 
Lamarck had attributed the diversity of species to evolution-from monads to 
man- a descent which the critics railed against as 'disgusting to religion morals 
and human dignity alike.' Paley, an Anglican Churchman and Cuvier, the 
French naturalist, proposed a universe of design; fish had fins and horses 
hooves because God had custom built every last bone and tissue and each 
species had been perfected for its place in its own niche. Lamarck's English 
disciples scoffed at such ideas and proposed instead that similarity of form 
across species showed that creatures of higher orders had developed from 
lower. 
Morphological unity though witJ.1out the concept of evolutionary change was 
crucial to a third school. From the comparison of ~s, wings and arms, many 
scientists hoped to demonstrate the concept of underlying forms; living 
creatures arose as variants upon basic archetypes within a single plan. 
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Desmond examines these three models of nature and attempts to show that these 
hypotheses were not simply plucked out of thin air but rather each embodied the 
extra-scientific experiences, aspirations and interests of its advocates. Design 
Theory was tailor-made for scientific gentry who, as Porter describes them 
were, 'snugly ensconced in the Royal Society or Oxbridge colleges'. This 
scientific sect were convinced that the British constitution was itself 
providentially designed down to the last pocket borough. Their social vision 
was inherently hierarchical and they projected their 'all is for the best' dictum 
on to their model of nature. Desmond stresses, to those that already believed 
that all was perfect, what possible need was there for change? 
But what of the other players in the serum? Porter's description cannot be 
matched, 
' ... the foes, the Lamarckians and fellow travelling "philosophic 
anatomists?" Petty bourgeois medico-scientific meritocrats,fuming on 
the scientific margins, battling to oust the oligarchs. Such radicals 
believed power must spring from the people. They put their faith in 
change. No wonder they promoted a view of nature itself as "self 
made" propelled by creativeforcesfrom below.' [Ibid]. 
Desmond's analysis concludes that both the radicals and reactionaries were 
bound to lose, 'high politics in the age of Peel saw 1'1U>deration triumph'. In 
science the Royal Society reformed and the medical corporations modernised. 
In this annosphere the third model of science, that of 'orderly progression under 
transcendental law' flourished. In the dominant view of the 1840's the 
victorious model of nature seemed eminently British, displaying unity in 
diversity and continuity in change. This theory had won, suggests Desmond, 
because its hour had come. Its chief exponent Robert Owen was rewarded with 
a pension at thirty eight, a house in Richmond and regular dining privileges at 
Downing Street. It had won, although not forever, since the Darwinian model 
was already lurking on the horizon. 
Thus the programme for this chapter is an analysis of 'science' explored via a 
'model of natural science'. Exploration of the general concept of science 
through a specific model will unfonunately introduce a level of abstraction 
arguably undesirable at this early stage. Common sense would suggest that for 
a discussion to be useful, we must be ostensibly con~ed to strip the concept 
['science'] to its bare bones and not to disguise it with an abstract and 
ponderous contemplation of merely one facet of an essentially multi-sided 
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figure. But that criticism inherently requires that we retain a concept of the 'beau 
ideal' and that we cannot do. This intention is, in essence, ultimately irrational 
and even impossible, because it takes literally what we shall be suggesting has 
no literal interpretation. Science is a metaphor among metaphors and this is the 
crux of the matter; in this case, natural science is as good as any of a number of 
images of science and additionally, because it is more visible, better than most. 
Initially speculation on this matter brings us necessarily to a brief exploration of 
the role of models in and of science and although this bogey will arise again at 
several stages throughout the thesis, it will be dealt with swiftly in this initial 
chapter. Masterman (1965) has already noted the potential ambiguity of 
'modelling of science by analysis of a model in science', although claims that 
the ambiguity itself is deliberate and useful. The ambiguities arising from the 
study of a model of science [natural science] are not of course, particular to the 
investigation of science. They stir up similarly perplexing issues for other 
disciplines besides. But arguably these matters are a more familiar concern to 
any self-conscious examination of human inquiring activity which does not 
make it any less important outside the social science to which, until Kuhn, such 
issues were usually confined. 
Carr, [ 1964) in his acclaimed reflections on the theory of history and the role 
of the historian discusses the point in these terms, 
7n the social sciences subject and object belong to the same category 
and interact reciprocally on each other. Human beings are not only the 
most complex and variable of NJlUTaI entities but they have w be studied 
by other human beings not by independent observers of another 
species ... This sets up a relation which is peculiar to history and the 
social sciences between the observer and what is observed ... history is 
shot through and through with relativity.' Carr [1964, 1987 edition 
p70]. 
But the point is that the situation Carr describes is not peculiar to the human 
sciences, science too is permeated with greater or lesser degrees of relativism. 
For this reason we can support Masterman's claim. Hers is an argument which 
might also be accommodated in systems theories pertaining to levels of 
recursion and in this context wotthy of full quotation, 
There are models in science (models of crystaistructuTe, cosmological 
models, models of conflict, etc.) and there are also models of science 
(the positivist, the hypothetico-deductivist, etc.). I have sometimes 
thoug ht of distinguishing the second lind from the first by talking about 
Images [metaphors] of science rather than models. First a model of 
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science in history, philosophy or sociology of science is a model in the 
sciences of history, philosophy or sociology of science, since it is a 
model of a human and social enterprise, namely science, natural or 
social. Therefore, the use of models in and models of may help to 
illuminate each other. Second, the paradigm-critique itself compels us 
to consider self- reflexive situations in which the critique is turned in on 
itself. That Kuhn gives an interpretation o/Icience in terms of 
paradigms itself both creates and is a partial consequence of a paradigm 
change in the understanding of the history of science. However vertigo 
inducing this insight may be, it implies that we cannot prematurely seek 
to escape the potential logical circle by trying to make distinctions which 
may only be appropriate to a pre-paradigm empiricism.' [op.cit.p3]. 
Hence we will tentatively and arguably ambiguously, proceed as follows. 
Following a perusal of the generalised ideas we have on science through the 
vehicle of 'a model of factual science', a number of points will emerge as being 
of interest and consequence to the next stage of our discussion. Principally 
these will concern the negotiabilty of fundamental characteristics of the scientific 
enterprise and the legitimacy and appropriateness of various methods of science 
in different domains. In consideration of the 'legitimacy and appropriateness' 
of different methods across diverse domains I will make first mention of the 
potentials for analogy to aid theory development and then lastly in this chapter, 
sketch why I see the systems framework as the most appropriate destination for 
evolving models and concepts of analogy. 
2.3 'SCIENCE' SEEN VIA FACTUAL SCIENCE. 
A model of factual science which may also be projected onto a philosophical 
level will serve as a breaking point into the 'logical circle' to which Masterman 
in the above quotation refers. 
I have already given an indication as to why I am am looking at science through 
the microcosm of factual science but additionally factual science is held to be 
characteristic of 'science' because it is the dominant embodiment of the 
empiricist account in which Hesse [1976, pI] sees science as objective, 
cumulative, success-oriented and value free. Hesse goes on to argue that from 
the perspective of the emergent models of science as introduced above, that this 
conceptualisation is no longer adequate as either an ideal or methodological 
model of science [particularly in the context of the social sciences]. 
As we have and will continue to argue, the challeng~ of the various models of 
science has overrun the empiricist account quite comprehensively. Of them the 
Kuhnian [Kuhn 1962] hermeneutic interpretation of science is the most 
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powerful. Its interpretation is in terms of successive paradigms and revolutions 
between which there are few or no rational links or accumulations of truth. 
Additionally the notion of successive paradigms which are irreducibly 
dependent on their own social culture or on the subculture of their own 
scientific elites has spawned development in sphere,s beyond empiricist 
accounts. 
For the moment we will look at each of the ascribed attributes of factual science. 
Science as variously and coterminously objective, cumulative, success-oriented 
and value free will be examined to establish a critique against which the meta-
concept of science itself can be considered: fIrst the model in and then the 
model of science will be considered. 
2.3.1 Factual Science is 'Objective'. 
The grand aim of all science is to cover the greatest number of empirical 
facts by logical deduction from the smallest nwnber of hypotheses or 
axioms.' Einstein, Life, January 9, 1950. 
'Science is built of facts the way a house is built of bricks, but an 
accumulation of facts is no more science than a pile of bricks is a 
house'. 'Henri Poincare, La Science et Hypothese. 
'All fact collectors ... are one story men.' Oliver Wendell Holmes. The 
Poet at the Breakfast Table, 1892. 
This subsection, in discussing whether factual science is 'objective', will be 
referring to the idea that science is concerned with establishing the 'facts'. In 
the fourth subsection I will be concerned with a related issue, that is, the usual 
dilemma caused by concepts of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' in terms of 
whether science can be described as 'value free'. 
The issue of what constitutes a 'fact' is one which in every day life we do not 
consider very often. We take them as given, they appear to have some kind of 
embodiment, we assume a reality in which there are facts with some kind of real 
existence. Emmet [1964, pl09] gives an interesting description and it will be 
used in this brief analysis to illustrate how misleading this assumption might be 
if we allow it to penetrate too deeply into our ideas about science, or perhaps 
even in making other 'everyday' decisions and evaluations. 
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Emmet asks us to imagine we are comparing the lengths of two sticks, 'A' and 
'S'. If one is longer than the other, he suggests that it will be generally agreed 
that the decision regarding which is longer would generally constitute a matter 
of 'fact'. The decision could even be put to public test by putting 'A' and 'B' 
next to each other, if we were in any doubt. 
But what if the lengths of the two sticks were indistinguishable to the naked 
eye? Then we would require instruments of some kind to 'measure' accurately 
between them. Emmet stresses that even though two observers, using their 
naked eyes, might have come to different decisions about which is the longer of 
the two sticks, it is likely that they would still agree that the 'actual length' of 
either of the sticks, is a matter of fact and not opinion, one is longer and one 
shorter. The measuring instrument can give a reading on this question to the 
degree of accuracy to which it is capable, even if it is unable to separate them, it 
is still likely that the matter would be resolved if a more accurate instrument is 
applied. Their lengths remain a matter of fact, even though those facts are 
difficult to discover. 
Further, what if 'A' and'S' are of different materials. which enjoy a degree of 
expansion or contraction depending on the surrounding ambient temperature? 
Which length would be the 'real length' of either one, or more importantly, 
when could the act of comparison between them most usefully be recorded~ 
what is the role of 'fact' and 'opinion' now? 
Overall, the example illustrates that 'facts' are not independent entities but for all 
practical purposes reliant on a plethora of other concepts and frameworks. 
Even in this simple case we introduced ideas of measurement, levels of 
accuracy in instruments, variations of test conditions and so on. 
If we could establish what we count as a 'fact' in factual science, we could then 
go further in deciding whether science is concerned with establishing the 
'facts', what characteristics they have and whether this activity is worthwhile. 
The dictionary 4 defmes a fact as 'a thing certainly known 10 lIIzve occurred or 
be true, a datum of experience'. ConfIrmed statements about facts are usually 
called 'empirical data', although this does not give us an indication of the means 
by which candidate 'facts' are initially selected for poiential confmnation. One 
.. Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Ed., Oxford, 1982. 
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clue might lie in the methods of the confmning procedure, since Bunge 
suggests that scientists; 
' ... reject the bulk o/perceived/acts as being a mass 0/ accidents, they 
select what they regard as relevant facts, they control and when possible 
they reproduce/acts in experiment.' Bunge [op.cit.p38]. 
The rejection, selection and identifiable reproduction of 'facts' suggests that 
something must precede even the initial stages of possible experimentation. 
'Facts' can only take their meanings and relevancies from something beyond 
their mere 'existence" in a relationship which selects the putative fact from the 
masses of sense data or conceptual stimuli available to us. Science can, to an 
extent, describe their apparent presence. but to be useful science must have a 
relationship with philosophy to explain them; although there is even more to it 
than that. Peter Bowler. an historian of science. makes some vivid remarks on 
'Scientific myths' in this context and goes further in suggesting that, 
' ... the familiar images 0/ the 'heroes' are popular manifestations of a 
deliberately slanted view of history presented by scientists themselves. 
The stories focus our attention on the discovery of facts as the key to 
any scientific breakthrough and played down the role of conceptual 
innovation in the construction of new theories ... the true story always 
involvesfar more than the straight discovery offacts .. .' [op.cit .1990]. 
In the chapter to follow we will look closely at and argue strongly for the 
significance of the role of analogy in conceptual innovation and we should not 
be surprised that the above remarks spring from an historian of science. It 
arguably results from the output of the continual self-questioning, self-
consciousness in inquiry that Carr had summarised for us earlier. In some ways 
the tradition of, if it can be allowed, pseudo-empiricism in historical analysis 
must come under an even more stringent and peevish scrutiny than the 
accumulation of empirical data in science. which can usually acquire legitimacy 
through repeatability. But we will make another of Carr's points, which I am 
arguing, present an appropriate and valid critique of the status of fact and 
inherently the status of objectivity in science. 
Carr. as an historian argues persuasively and wittily for a dualist perspective on 
the nature of fact. In his profession he finds that, 
'Facts are not really at alilikeftsh on ajishmonger's slab. They are like 
fish swimming about in a 'Vast and so~times inaccessible ocean and 
what the historian catches will depend partly what part of the ocean he 
chooses to fish in and tackle he chooses to we, the two factors being 
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determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large the 
historian will get the kind of facts he wants. History means 
interpretation.' [op.cit. p23]. 
Carr's view of history is such that he stresses the historian can view the past 
and achieve understanding only through the eyes of the present. The scientific 
preoccupation with fact is an attempt to deny this interpretive feature of what 
must go on 'behind the facts'. Bunge'S argument was that theories of the 
present can look miraculous and those of the past appear silly when we lack an 
historical perspective. The matter also has a connection with notions on facts 
because the basis -the rationality- on which facts are selected is not timeless but 
changes over time. Looking at Carr and CollingwoodS, another historian, 
The historian is 0/ his own age and is bound to it by rhe conditions 0/ 
human existence. The very words he uses, words like democracy, 
empire, war and revolution have current connotations Irom which he 
cannot divorce them ... ' [Ibid p25]. 
'St Augustine looked at history from the point 0/ view of the Early 
Christians; Til/amont from that 0/ a seventeenth century Frenchman; 
Gibbon/rom that 0/ an eighteenth century Englishman; Mommsen/rom 
that 0/ a nineteenth century German. There is no point in asking which 
is the right point 0/ view [although this is effectively what science 
asks]. Each was the only one possible lor the man who adopted it . .' 
[Brackets added.] R.Collingwood, [1946] p xii. 
The point of critique is clear, in its task of offering explanations and 
predictions, science is concerned to establish what is the 'right point of view'. 
Scientists must conjecture what is behind apparently observed 'facts' by 
inventing concepts for use in hypotheses or systems of hypotheses [theories] 
although these concepts might have no empirical counterpart, since they do not 
correspond to percepts. 
We can draw fmally in this context from Carr's views since he argues most 
cogently that, 
'It does notlollow that because a mountain appears to talce on different 
shapes from different angles o/vision, it has objectively either no shape 
at all or an infinity 0/ shape. It does not /ollow that, because 
interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the/acts 0/ history 
and because no existing interpretation is wholly objective, one 
interpretation is as good as another ... ' [op.cit. p27]. 
S Collingood, R., 1946, 1M Idea of History, P xii. 
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Clearly these issues do not reduce the utility of 'fact' in a framework ostensibly 
based on empiricism. From factual science we can consider as examples such 
empirical concepts of 'mass', 'energy', 'adaptation', 'selection' and from social 
science those of 'social class' or 'historical trend', which have no perceptual 
counterpart although this does not seriously threaten the 'factual' connotations 
of these concepts within their scientific research areas. 
But the mere 'gathering of facts' in science cannot be taken as the sole purpose 
of 'scientific research'. Such data must be capable of being incorporated or 
interpreted by means of a theory, if it is to be useful for understanding and 
application. Overall, the nature of what constitutes a scientific 'fact' is to be 
found in a complex relationship between observation and experiment, 
perception and theory. Necessarily, data must always be party to an indivisible 
relationship with an implied theoretical framework, in that empirical data cannot 
stand alone, nor can it be obtained without reference to some kind of theory and 
the data itself forms the raw material for the elaboration of theory. 
A standard text book on scientific method by two American philosophers 
describes the method of science as essentially 'circular'; 
'We obtain evidence by appealing to empirical material to what is alleged 
to be 'fact'; we select, analyse and interpret empirical material on the 
basis o/principles: M R Cohen and E Nagel, [1934, pS36]6. 
Additionally, the methods of Rutherford, the esteemed scientist were described 
by one of his most distinguished research colleagues, Sir Charles Ellis, 
'He had a driving urge to know how phenomena worked in the sense in 
which one could speak 0/ knowing what went on in the /dtchen. I do 
not believe that he searched/or an explanation in the classical manner ... 
as long as he knew what was happening he was content.' [19607]. 
This perhaps accounts as to why scientists are hesitant to accept 'new facts' 
unless their 'authenticity' can somehow be evaluated and established with 
reference to 'what is already known'. The criteria for how we come to establish 
what we are prepared to classify as 'already known' will be discussed in the 
following subsection. 
6 M.R.Cohen and E.Nagel 1934,lIatroduction to Logic GIfd Scie1tlific Method. 1934. pS36. 
7 In Trinity Reyiew. Cambridge, Lent Tenn. 1960. p14. 
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Meanwhile, Bunge [op.cit.p80], gives an example of this tendency in 
suggesting that this is the reason why most scientists distrust repom on 'extra-
sensory perception'. So-called 'psi' phenomena contradict the main body of 
'what is known' in psychology and physiology and thus in some way, 'do not 
fit the facts' which are, broadly speaking, taken as collective experience and 
theory. But a much more relevant and contemporary example is at hand than 
magical notions of 'ESP'. We can consider a recent article reporting on an 
academic conference,8 
'Last Easter, in the confused aftermath of the astonishing announcement 
by Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons that they had achieved cold 
nuclear fusion, one thing seemed clear: their test tube fusion experiment 
at the University of Utah was so straightforward that the hundreds of 
other laboratories around the world trying to replicate it were bound to 
establish whether the claim was valid within a few months ... A year 
later, the "truth" about coIdfusion remains elusive.' 
In the article the issue of cold fusion is presented as involving a debate between 
two camps, that of 'twenty five reputable research groups so far reporting 
positive evidence of at least one of the three signs of nuclear fusion' and those 
'scientists who have already dismissed coldfusion as complete delusion'. The 
debate can be seen as focussing on whether notions of cold fusion 'fit the 
facts'. The facts arc not at all clear, and establishing them is evidently a highly 
emotive matter. In some ways the article too invokes a religious metaphor in its 
presentation of the issues, 
'Early suggestions that the process could be developed quickly into a 
cheap, clean and unlimited energy source for the next century have 
proved very over-optimistic. But there is a widespread impression 
particularly in the UK, that the whole affair was a ghastly scientific 
mistake and that only Fleischmann, Pons and a small band of true 
believers are still pursuing coldfusion .. .' [Ibid]. 
Other factors arc also at work. For example, Fleischmann and Pons are angry 
about what they report as the consistently hostile attitude of the science journal 
Nature whose editorial, preceding the conference had been entitled. "Farewell 
[not Fond] to cold fusion". Their central problem appears to be why the 
process is so capricious. Some scientists who claim to have detected signs of 
cold fusion say that their experiments run for days or weeks without giving off 
any results and then suddenly give off bursts of neuttons and/or tritium and/or 
8 Cookson, C., 1990, 'Sparu ItillflYUtg owr coldfwion', Article. Financial Times, 
6/4/90. 
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heat. Not only is the timing completely unpredictable, but there is no obvious 
correlation between the three signs of fusion. There do not appear to be any 
clear facts from which the investigators can immodestly wrestle the truth. 
In other words researchers are certainly experiencing non·repeatability of 
evidence in their experiments. This, of course, allows sceptics to dismiss 
occasional positive results as background effects or random variations. Not 
only are the true believers faced with practical operational difficulties, but 
according to the conventional theories of physics, nuclear fusion is impossible 
in a Fleischmann-Pons cell. Nevertheless all these factors appear to be acting as 
spurs and not restraints to research; some distinguished physicists are working 
out new theories to show how cold fusion could occur in the Fleischmann-
Pons' "palladium lattice". Scientists in Japan are funded by central government 
and are working in over forty groups to research the possibilities of cold fusion. 
Ayer's [1973] comments on the staus of fact are appropriate here and the 
following point illustrates its vicious circularity, 
The factual content of the theory will be identified with the account 
which is derivable /rom it of what is actually observable .. .it is to some 
extent an arbitrary question what is to count as purely factual. 1 op.cit. 
p33]. 
Of course, it is a matter of contention. the scale of which is dependent on the 
source of the objections, as to whether every branch of science as an enterprise 
can be said to empirically seek what is known as 'factual knowledge'. Science 
can never examine an 'object', a phenomena, a conceptual relationship merely 
as it is, but only through the interface that object has with the scientific activity. 
For example a biologist can sometimes change or destroy the object of his 
research and the anthropologist, no matter how subtley he arranges to study an 
alien community, will find [and must assume that] his presence is 
accommodated in their behaviour. 
Logic and mathematics are examples of formal or ideal science and the 
statements they establish consist of relations among signs, whereas the factual 
or material sciences refer to events and processes. Hence formal sciences are 
concerned with describing formal entities and the relations between them and 
cannot therefore lay claim to establishing 'factual knowledge'. 
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Nevenheless, the individual fields of physics, chemistry, physiology, 
economics and so fonh, as spheres of scientific activity, come to employ 
mathematics as a tool for the precise reconstruction and manipulation of the 
complex relations that it purports to describe among 'facts'. Formal sciences 
rely on logical and demonstrative methods of exploring their theories, and in 
this way, mathematics and logic are deductive sciences, their truths are 
consistent only in terms of a previously admitted system of ideas. In other 
words they are not 'absolute' but require a logical consistency in order to 
maintain that a given statement is 'probably true'. Factual science, on the other 
hand, finds this insufficient in exploring its hypotheses and also uses 
observation and experiment in techniques of verification and/or falsification. 
But for scientific knowledge to be described as 'objective' means, after Bunge 
[op.cit.], that it; 
'a) agrees approximately with its objective i.e. that it seeks the 
attainment offactual truth, and 
b) it verifies the adaptation of ideas to facts by resorting to a peculiar 
commerce withfacts (observation and experiment) an intercoW'se that is 
both controllable and reproducible.' [p36]. 
M'Pherson [1974] has also stressed the apparent objectivity of what he 
describes as 'the scientific way', 
'It is important to have a clear view of the natW'e of science ... The 
accent in science is on the nature of the test by which the validity of the 
hypothesis is demonstrated. From this validatory basis we have 
theories that save the appearances very well, until, of coW'se, a new 
hypothesis arrives which suggests that we see observed phenomena in a 
new light. But science itself is not only experimental method, it is a 
particular way of reasoning, the correctness of which can be tested by 
observation'. [op.cit. p219.] 
M'Pherson's description makes no mention of how potentially controversial 
hypotheses could arise and in addition. the implication in his conceptualisation, 
is that correctness is verifable by empirical observation. It could be suggested 
that this view is rather myopic since we have noted that not all concepts are also 
percepts. It would have been helpful too, to receive some guidance as to how 
the particular scientific 'way of reasoning' supersedes the 'experimental 
method' science itself has developed, if we are then to test 'correctness' 
whatever that might be, by observation. 
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Empirical facts are usually derived by means of experiments involving the 
deliberate isolation of some factor-the object of the experiment-and its 
subjection to controlled stimuli of one sort or another. But the 'experimental 
method' can be taken outside the laboratory and sometimes not include actual 
experiments at all. Astronomers do not conduct experiments with celestial 
bodies but astronomy still counts as a scientific activity and indeed is flI'IIl1y 
placed in the factual science framework. 
Bunge [op.cit, p72] and Chalmers [1978] have both cited the useful example in 
this context of the discovery of the planet Neptune by Adams and Le Verrier 
and claim their procedure in this accomplishment was typical of modem 
science. Adams and Le Verrier did not, it is suggested, perform a single 
experiment, nor did they even start with 'the facts'. Their problem was to 
explain 'certain irregularities' found in the motion of the outer planets, although 
these irregularities were not observable; they were discrepancies between 
observed and calculated orbits. The 'fact' that they set out to account for was 
not sense data, nor was it in the frrst instance observable as sense data, but 
rather merely a clash between empirical data and consequences deduced from 
the principles of celestial mechanics. 
Scientific knowledge as we have noted also 'rationalizes' experience instead of 
merely describing it. A scientific account of 'experiences' is not just a list, but a 
propositional explanation, referential to a whole set of ideas that cannot, in any 
fmal sense, be judged for correctness by experience. Explanations are offered 
in terms of, in some senses, 'negotiable' hypotheses and systems of hypotheses 
[theories], and not 'facts'. 
Science, therefore, is unable to refer to facts as 'objectively existent' things, 
qualities or relations, since these exist only by means of an inference from 
experiential and conceptual sources and are thus meaningful, not in terms of 
observables but only in certain theoretical contexts. For science to be useful it 
has to go beyond immediate experience to make the necessary jump from 
observation to theory by winnowing the criteria of 'meaningful' propositions, 
from the chaff. 
2.3.2 Factual Science is 'Cilmuilltive'. 
'Everything has to be taken on trust; truth is only that which is taken to 
be true. It is tM currency of living. TMre may be nothing behind it, 
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but that doesn't matter, so long as it is honoured.' Tom Stoppard, 
Rosenkrantz and Guildenstem are Dead, 1967, Act 2. 
'There can be no final truth in ethics any more than physics until the last 
man has had his experience and said his say.' William James, The 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, The Will to Believe, 1896. 
The sense in which 'cumulative' is meant here is such that the above would 
otherwise read, 'Factual Science is formed by successive additions', This 
section will briefly but necessarily consider the ascribed role of 'truth' in 
science and thus also the relationship between science and philosophy. 
'Truth' is that usually taken as the property implicitly ascribed to a proposition 
by belief or assertion of it. There have been many theories on the nature of 
truth, the most common being the 'correspondence theory of truth' which 
proposes truth as a correspondence between a proposition and the fact, the 
situation, the state of affairs which is taken to 'verify' it. The correspondence 
may, but need not, be regarded as some sort of natural similarity or resemblance 
between proposition and fact. 
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Nevenheless, some philosophers holding that all 'awareness of facts' is itself 
propositional, i.e. that it necessarily involves the assertion of some proposition, 
maintain tbat truth is a relation of 'coherence' between propositions. 
Pragmatists by stringent contrast, defme truth in terms of 'vital truths" and the 
'satisfactoriness of belief. Thus assertions are believed or not believed just for 
the sake of convenience, quite independently of their rational and/or empirical 
foundation, hence the empirically verifying fulfIlment of expectations is only 
one possible form of this. Another and more common view among the 
pragmatists is operationalism which takes truth 'contextually' and is bappy to 
define it as, 'the successful working of an idea'. 
Popper attacked the instrumentalist position on the grounds of their negation of 
the imponance of 'truth', Instrumentalists hold that scientific theories are 
merely useful tools for ordering cenain domains of experience, Hence 
according to the instrumentalists, Mach [1943], Duhem [1954] and Poincare 
[1958]. it is meaningless to ask whether a given theory is true or false since 
they can only be more or less useful. Theoretical terms are free creations of the 
human mind and not related to physical entities or reducible to observable 
terms. 
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Popper argues that in contrast to the highly critical attitude requisite in a pure 
scientist, the attitude of the instrumentalist is one of complacency at the success 
of applications. 
This implies that truth has been taken as a real quality rather than a relation, a 
view which has some plausible connection with analytic propositions whose 
truth depends not on something external to them, but on the meaning that is 
intrinsic to them. 
Another widespread criterion of truth has been 'self evidence'; that which is 
acceptable at fIrst sight, that which, in sum, is intuited. The issue of 'intuitive 
knowledge' has occupied significant philosophers from the ancient, Plato and 
Aristotle, for example to the modem times of Husserl and Bergson. It refers to 
that knowledge which is taken as immediate, 'direct', attained without 
intermediary steps or procedures. It may be knowledge of propositions, of 
sensory objects or of spiritual objects. Kant goes as far as to describe our 
acquaintance with sensory objects as 'sensory intuitions'. 
Bergson, Husserl and other intuitionists have shared the opinion that essences 
can be grasped without further ado and additionally, naive rationalism maintains 
that there are self evident truths and principles which, far from having to pass 
any test, are the source of every other proposition, 'formal or factual'. 
The success of Newtonian physics convinced many physicists that part of 'the 
truth' had been found. Popper describes their feeling of triumph, 
'A unique event had happened in the history of thought, one which 
could never be repeated: the first discovery of the absolute truth about 
the universe. An age old dream had come true. Mankind had obtained 
knowledge, real certain indubitable and demonstrable /cnowledge, not 
merely ... human opinion'. [Quoted by Easlea, op.cit. p4 9]. 
But for us to accept a piece of knowledge as 'scientific' it is not necessary that it 
is true, rather the scientist is more concerned with how it has come, or how it is 
coming, about. Ayer, has also puzzled over the notorious question, 'what is 
truth?' He suggests in his discussion that, 
9 Popper, K .• 1963. COlljecturu eutd RefoJatiollS. Routledge. p93. 
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' ... the purpose of a 'theory of truth' is simply to describe the criteria by 
which the validity of the various kinds of propositions are 
determined ... .all propositions are either empirical or a priori ... ' [1973, 
p116]. 
Ayer points out, by implication, that 'truth' in science is thus reduced to a 
concern with the qualities of the propositional forms of scientific activity, i.e. all 
of it. Although usually our concern with aspects of truth apply to a wider field 
than this, that is, we are most preoccupied with whether our 'beliefs', 
'opinions', 'judgements' and 'values' are 'true', those are not the business of 
factual scientific inquiry. 
The disinterested pursuit of truth has had a stonny history and we should 
examine why we seemed to have expected otherwise. In our discussion on facts 
it was implied that facts are meaningless unless structured by some other 
framework than inductivist observation. There is a parallel in the area of 
scientific 'truth' since clearly scientists are not searching for 'any kind of truth'. 
For example as Easlea points out, 
' ... they would scarcely be grateful for the gift of a large collection of 
empirically true statements about events observed at random.' 
[op.cit.p4]. 
Rather scientists are searching for facts and truths which are 'interesting'; those 
which can lead to predictions and explanations of what they fmd interesting. 
Concern with the issue of truth in science is concern with the theory of 
knowledge, in other words, its epistemology. This would involve coming to a 
definition of what constitutes knowledge, to determine what sorts of 
propositions can be known to be true and to explain how they come to be so. 
Ayer [1973, p17S] has pointed out that the f1l'st of these concerns is 
unimportant stressing that where we draw the line between knowledge and true 
belief is relatively arbitrary. What is important though, is the way in which we 
come to justify our belief. Following Ayer's [op.cit.] argument, I number of 
significant matters arise pertaining to whether we are to take factual science as 
'cumulative' • 
For example, Ayer suggests how we are to justify • belief in • proposition 
which is related to an event, that is, if it is implicitly empirical ['factual1 and 
one we cannot claim to either perceive or remember: If we are asked why we 
might accept such a proposition, one way would be to adduce another 
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proposition or set of same, with which we believe it to be connected, usually by 
generalisation. If those who want to see justification also accept the 
generalisation, then we can end the exercise here. If they do not accept the 
other 'related' proposition or the generalisations, then these too, must be 
justified in some way, This will either require other propositions or 
generalisations or an accordance with evidence, whatever fam dw might take. 
Being acceptable or not, in this way is clearly nothing to do with whether a 
proposition is 'true' in an abstract metaphysical sense. But significantly Ayer 
[op.cit.] notes that those propositions which are 'acceptable' are bound to be 
identical to those which are seriously put forward as being 'true', Hence, 
'To admit that they may still not be true is in practical terms to admit that 
we may still have occasion to reject them. Consequently, the conclusion 
that a belief has been justified is always subject to revision. 1 op.cit. 
p176]. 
Ayer then proceeds with the point as to whether it is sufficient that the 
propositions which are used for justifying a belief should actually be true, or 
whether it is also necessary that we have 'good reason' to believe that they are 
true. The advantage of the [ll'st, he suggests is that we then have a defmite 
criterion by which to evaluate our beliefs. The disadvantage is that we could 
not then decide when we had complied with the criterion. 
The danger of the second is evidently that Jtaving 'good reason' for the reason 
by which we must decide, means that we could embark upon wmite regress. 
To deal with that we would require to formulate 'special rulings' on the Validity 
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of judgments based on perceptual material, generalisation, memory, and so 
forth. prima facie and lose the potential contribution to such a procedure to be 
made by consistency. In other words we still would not really be tackling issues 
pertaining to what would constitute evidence for a given statement to be 
established as true. 
There is a standard view of science in which it is described as progressing on 
two levels, the theoretical and the observational. Whereas the second tier makes 
reference to observed things and processes. theories make use of terms and 
concepts that are not, as we have noted, directly observable and thus cannot be 
directly tested. Their function is to explain observational laws that are 
themselves generalisations of directly observable phenomena. 
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Nagel argues that it is a special feature of this two tier picture of science that, 
'... the experimental law even when explained by a theory retains a 
meaning that can be formulated independently 0/ the theory and it is 
based on the observable evidence that may enable the law to survive the 
eventual demise o/the theory: [1961, p86]. 
In the falsificationist account of science, to which we shall come in the next 
section, even when a theory is in disagreement with experimental results and is 
replaced by one that is in agreement with the data in question, the 'genuine 
facts' accounted for by the old theory are not discarded. Hence science while it 
is not cumulative at the theoretical level it is such at the observational. From 
Baslea, 
' ... through the ever changing flUX 0/ scientific theories, there is 
therefore a solid growth of knowledge which represents progress in 
empirical understanding. 1 op.cit., p6] 
We will, therefore conclude this subsection by noting that an encompassing 
notion of scientific 'truth' is largely chimerical. Bunge has pointed out that it is 
not claimed that scientific knowledge, unlike philosophical or technological 
knowledge be true, rather, 
' •.. truthfulness which is a goal, does not characterise scientific 
knowledge as uniquely as the means, way or method by which scientific 
research approaches problems and checks proposals of solutions'. 
[op.cit.p61]. 
If we are to take scientific 'truth' as a blind alley in discussing the way in which 
factual science is said to be cumulative, what can this assertion be referring to? 
That is, factual science is formed of what kind of additions? By what means are 
they selected and by what criteria or mechanisms are they incorporated with 
other features of factual science? 
2.3.3 Factual Science is 'Success Oriented'. 
'By their fruits ye shall know them'. The Bible, Matthew, 20:7. 
We have implied so far that science is concerned with establishing 'interesting 
truths and facts' for purposes of prediction and explanation of what the scientist 
considers an interesting phenomenon. This broad assertion requires funher 
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analysis and begs the questions, why do a particular group of men/women find 
certain phenomena interesting and what form does their interest take? 
We will look at the second question first and suggest that the form scientific 
interest takes is that of a scientific theory. But what does this entail? Firstly we 
are aware that theories imply universal statements and therefore they cannot be 
induced from observed facts because no-one has ever observed the universal 
statement to ensure that the theoretical assertion is the case. Nor, of course, 
could it ever be so observed and the universal set may hence be thought of only 
as an imaginative hypothesis. 
In discussing factual science as success-oriented, we will consider two criteria 
by which factual science is adjudged to be successful, fIrStly the steady process 
of empirical confirmation of hypotheses as described by the verification 
principle and secondly in the latter's inverse, the disconfmning process of 
falsificationism. There is a point of controversy in these two areas concerning 
the fundamental issue of what constitutes a scientific or unscientific theory. 
The debate led Popper to suggest that it was a mistake to suppose that the 
essential feature distinguishing a scientific from a non-scientific theory was that 
the former was 'verifiable'. Verification concerns the establishment of a belief 
or proposition as true. It is a criterion most popularly used by logical positivists 
who require a proposition, if it is to be taken as significant, to be verifiable by 
sense experience [sense datum] or by attention to the meaning of words 
expressing it or by inference from propositions that are directly verifiable by 
induction or demonstration. 
Ayer describes the verification principle in the following way, 
• •. A sentence is factually significant to any given person if and only if 
he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express, 
that is, if he knows what observations would lead him under certain 
conditions to accept it as being true or reject it as being false.' [1936, 
p3S] • 
Ayer then goes on to distinguish between two senses of the term 'verifiable', 
talking of strong and weak verification. The former refers to a condition in 
which 'if and only if the truth of a proposition could be conclusively 
established in experience. The latter case of weak verification describes when it 
is possible for experience to render it merely probable. These definitions are 
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not, of course, two genuine alternatives and equally there is an argument which 
suggests that all empirical propositions are hypotheses which are thus 
continually subject to the test of further experience. 
Therefore it is not logically possible for the truth of any such proposition to be 
conclusively established in which case there could be DO universe of 
applicability for notions of 'strong verifiability', thus rendering the strong/weak 
distinction otiose. Ayer proposes that there is a class of statements which may 
be conclusively verified, the 'basic statements' which refer to the content of a 
singular experience. 
But the vast majority of the propositions and hypotheses occupying factual 
science are not singular experiences-since the scientific objective is explanation 
and prediction. So how is the principle of verification as a criterion of 'success' 
and meaning to be understood? 
Again, Ayer comments that it is only by the occurrence of some 'sense content' 
and consequently by the truth of some observation statement that any statement 
about a material thing is actually verified-but for any test that we acrually carry 
out to establish sense datum there is an infmitely large number of other tests 
which might have given the same result. This, he suggests, 
' ... means that there is never any set of observation statements of which 
it can truly be said that precisely they are entailed by any given statement 
about a material thing.11936, p16]. 
Hence even from the logical-positivist viewpoint, to which the principle of 
verification is most commonly attributed, a number of problems arise in clearly 
establishing what verification requires, for procedural application in factual 
science. The problems concern philosophical difficulties with experiential 
propositions [singular statements] being universally taken as observation-
statements recording an 'actual or possible observation'. This is too liberal a 
criterion for verifiability since Ayer stresses, 'it holds good for any piece of 
nonsense one cared to put'. Further and perhaps most significantly, the 
assumed relationship between principles of verification and sense datum 
overlooks the fact that most empirical statements are to some degree vague. 
Popper suggests that on the contrary we can identify Scientific theories because 
they are capable of empirical falsification in which every genuine test of a theory 
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is an attempt to falsify it. We are, in the sense of the establishing the 'success 
orientation' of science involved in creeping up on truth from behind. The 
scientific method of research then is, as Popper suggests, 
'oo. not to de/end lour present conjectures] in order 10 prove how right 
we were. On the contrary we try to overthrow them. Using all the 
weapons 0/ our logical mathematical and technical armoury we try to 
prove that our expectations were/a/se ... in order to putforward in their 
stead new unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, IIt'W rash and 
premature prejudices. 10' [Easlea. op.cit.p4] • 
We can also perversely explore the 'success-oriented' description of science in 
terms of falsificationism. The falsificationist freely admits that observation, 
[accumulation of fact] is guided and preasupposcd by theory and can therefore 
abandon any claims implying that theories can be established as true or probably 
true in the light of observational data. While it is not suggested that any putative 
theory is true, the falsificationist prefers the working assumption that a given 
theory is the 'best available' or the 'best yet'. 
But what is to happen when there is an inconsistency between two sets of 
hypotheses, one theoretical, one observational? Which of the sets is it 'rational' 
to reject? The matter cannot be arbitrary and therefore we must discuss the 
putative rules which Popper submits to this issue. 
The matter of selection between the two sets of hypotheses throws Popper's 
demarcation of scientific and non-scientific into some difficulty. If, for 
example, observational statements are to any degree theory-dependent, then 
theories are not compared against 'neutral experience' but against interpreted 
data. Therefore the criteria by which theories are falsified are not as 
straightforward as Popper might hope. When fact and theory disagree, it is the 
theory of experiment which needs revision. 
In this context, Popper argues that precisely because experiments are open to 
interpretation, the danger is that it is always possible and arguably 'easier' to 
verify a theory rather than to strive to falsify it. Therefore Popper suggests that 
we, 
.... adopt a highly critical attitude towards OUT thetN"ks i/we do not 
wish to argue in circles'.[Easlea, op.cit. p811]. 
10 Popper, K.. 1934. Tile Logic of SCiellliflC Discow:ry. HarPer. 1965 pp279-280. 
11 Popper. K., 1934. Tile Logic Of Scielllific Discovery. Harper, 1965, pI07. 
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The argument develops such that when there is a clash between low level 
observational data and high level theory, it is the theory which must be rejected. 
Easlea notes that in this conceptualisation, 
There is no other way out. A scientist must be a man who seeks and 
welcomes the opportunity to confess the error of his ways. Dogma and 
commitment must play no part in the scientific method.' lop.cit p9]. 
The arbitrariness of Popper's methodological rule is evident and the claim that 
science is a rational enterprise .must become suspect Popper stresses that it is 
our way of choosing between theories on a cen.ain problem situation that marks 
science as rational. He expands, after Easlea, ••• we are told ... that of the two 
theories Tl and TI, the theory TI, is to be preferred to the theory TI, which 
has failed the severe tests that theory TI had passed. The criteria for this choice 
is outlined by Popper on the basis that, 
'As long as there are no revolutionary changes in our background 
knowledge the relative appraisal of our two theories, Tl and 1'2 will 
remain stable.' 11963, p235] 
The assumption that background knowledge will not change is arbitrary and for 
rationality to be maintained he makes an arguably most unscientific suggestion, 
' ... almost all the vast amount of background knowledge will for 
practical reasons, necessarily remain unquestioned,' and the misguided 
attempt to question it all -that is to say- to start from scratch, can easily 
lead to the breakdown of critical debate.' [Ibid.] 
The requirement is clearly set for a reductionist viewpoint, and his hence rather 
unpalatable to the systems thinker, 
Thus all criticism is piecemeal, we should stick to our problem and try 
to solve no more than one problem at a time'. [Ibid. P 238]. 
In the flI'St subsection I tried to briefly survey the notion of a 'fact' under the 
heading 'Factual Science is Objective'. I remarked at that stage that a pure 
interest in the facts as a manifestation of objectivity was lDC2dy one facet of the 
issue. I will now return to that theme, this time to cOllsidC'J' a related area, 
principally, a discussion of the assertion that factual science is 'value free'. 
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2.3.4 Factual Science Is 'Value-Free' 
This assertion is initially rather ambiguous. Does it imply, for example, that 
factual science can itself exist, in a 'disembodied, abstracted, conceptualised' 
way, that parallels Benjamin Constant's (1767-1834) view of art, derived from 
Kant's work on aesthetics: 
'An/or ans sake and with 110 purpose: any purpose pervens an. But art 
achieves a purpose which is IIOt its own'. Journal Intime, 11 February, 
1804. 
This conceptualisation might easily confum the fears on the isolationist nature 
of science expressed at the beginning of the chapter, but will not be pursued as 
the most interesting issue here. Rather, the assertion that factual science is 
'value free' is more likely to refer to the abstract and indeed, 'disembodied' 
character of factual science that is ascribed to it as a process. Both possible 
interpretations carry a strongly metaphysical implication. 
But the fundamental suggestion is that any individual who adopts such a 
process will in no way whatsoever influence its outcome. The position 
describes what has been otherwise named [Manesich, 1978, p19] as the 'value 
neutrality of science'. According to this prescription, any discipline aspiring to 
the status of science and in this context particularly factual science must 'guard 
its boundaries against the intrusion o/value judgements'. 
Value judgements are of interest, because they arise as a result of a relationship 
between a given object, situation or 'fact' and a person or the senses of that 
person. Emmet [Op.cil p143] points out that it is contrary to common sense 
and indeed to experience to treat the effects of this relationship as necessarily the 
same among individuals or in such a way as to suggest that there is some sense 
in which they 'ought' always to be the same' [i.e. ethical theories]. Value 
judgements reveal a private side to factual science which is normally viewed 
through the lens of public facl 
We implicitly return here to the flI'St of two questions asked in the preceding 
section on why a particular group of men/women fmd certain phenomena 
interesting. In this context is it really sensible, then, to neglect the influences of 
and on the individuals who conduct the scientific process? Surely the 
influences of these individuals, that is, certain inherent philosophical principles, 
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[for example, their views on the nature of reality, their criteria for establishing 
knowledge], must take pan in a tacit way in scientific research. Perhaps this 
neglect has been a serious contributor to the problem mentioned at the outset, 
namely that we think of and treat science as either somehow already separated, 
or conceptually separable from, the ways of the world in a broader sense. 
In other words, no less important to the spectacular achievements of applied 
'factual science' are the consequences: overannamcnt, overpopulation, potential 
energy and resource shortage, unemployment, pollution of mind and 
environment. Perhaps we should switch our attention to uncovering the value 
judgements and points of emphasis inherent in the development of the 'whole 
hierarchy', as Manesich puts it when suggesting, 
' ... we cannot escape the fact that value judgements, so obvious in 
politics, business, law and other practical areas are embedded in a 
hierarchy of norms penetrating right down to the applied sciences.' 
[1978, p6]. 
Value judgements then must be seen to have some consequence to factual 
science, if only, as Bunge puts it, 
' ... because investigation is done by human beings who are unwilling 
[or unable] to take off their world views when undertaking scientific 
research.' [op.cit., p13]. Brackets added. 
Bunge, at a later stage, goes on to discuss the influence of the individual 
scientist on the process of science and implies that the most interesting point 
about the latter is its positivistic concern to develop methods and techniques 
which will enable opinions to be formed which are justifiable [fonDing objective 
knowledge], or vice versa. An example is readily available in the assumed 
neutrality of the manner by which scientists select 'relevant facts' above others, 
as we discussed in the first subsection. 
Bunge describes the way in which the notion of a value judgement in its 
broadest sense of a 'subjective' decision is viewed within factual science: 
'Ask a scientist whether he thinks he is entitled to endorse a statement in 
the field 0/ science just because he likes it, or because he regards it as 
unassailable dogma, or because it seems to him to be lelf evident, or 
because hefinds it convenient. He will prob(1bly answer in this guise: 
None 0/ these would-be truth criteria warrants objectivity and objective 
knowledge is the target o/science. That which is accepted only because 
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of taste, authority, alleged self evidence (habit), or convenience is just 
belief or opinion but not scientific knowledge.' [op.cit.. p60] 
We have already seen that notions of objective knowledge or truth criteria are 
not as straightforward as they might fU'St appear and it is likely that inspection 
of the ideas surrounding the notion of 'value judgement' willahow it too. to be 
equally spurious. 
Ayer. [1936, p28] pointed out that a usual assumption made on this subject in 
factual science is that questions of value are 'really' questions of 'fact'. It is not 
altogether surprising that he should put forward this view, since it is consistent 
with his positivistic philosophical stance and therefore continues to allow the 
process of factual science to stand aloof from what are in some senses ethical 
matters. It clearly assumes that notions of 'good and bad, right and wrong' are 
identifiable or at least vaguely recognisable in a given situation implying that 
they are in some sense 'absolute' standards. Ayer is also obliged to note in this 
context that, 
' ... "statements of value" are genuine synthetic propositions, but they 
cannot with any show of justice be represented as hypotheses, which 
are used to predict the course of our sensation: and, accordingly, that the 
existence of ethics and aesthetics as branches of speculative knowledge 
presents an insuperable objection to our radical empiricist 
thesis.'[op.cit.p 137]. 
The view that questions of value are reducible to questions of fact results in the 
assumption by factual science that value judgements, should it be necessary, are 
also amenable after a fashion to the empirical method. A.J.Ayer [op.cit.] 
describes his view that ethical judgements are very often afactual classification 
of an action belonging to some class of actions by which a certain moral attitude 
is habitually aroused. He goes on to give an example to demonstrate the 
assertion that an ethical value judgement is actually a matter of fact, 
Thus, a man who is a convinced utilitarian may simply mean by calling 
an action right that it tends to promote, or more probably that it is the 
sort of action that tends to promote, the general happiness: and in that 
case the validity of his stalement becomes an empirical maner of fact. 
Similarly a man who bases his ethical upon his religious views may 
actually mean by calling an action right or wrong. that it is the sort of 
action which is enjoined or forbidden by some ecclesiDstica/ authority 
and this also may be empir.ically verified.' [Ibid. p27]. 
The apparent illegitimacy of value judgements in the process of factual science 
implies. as I have mentioned, that it is concerned with establishing methods by 
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which to render value judgments justifiable, or in some senses unnecessary. It 
implies that the scientific procedure will be able to derive methods to decide 
questions [or negate them] on the subject of inquiry. For example, we can 
consider the task of answering the everyday question, 'which of these two 
chairs is the more comfortable?' To answer this, science, by establishing 
'facts' pertaining to the majority [by sample testing], and then statistical 
generalisation, would hypothesise a prediction as to which chair, under given 
circumstances, a majority of a sample group would find most comfortable [or 
stretching a point, could tolerate for longer], for a given purpose. 
An important distinction in this discussion of factual science should be made on 
two main interpretations of what constitutes an 'opinion'. Firstly we must 
distinguish between being asked for an opinion relating to matters of taste and 
personal preference and secondly opinions which call for us to exercise 
judgement, which mayor may not involve some kind of testing or learning 
procedure. 
In the fIrSt sense of 'opinion' we are implying an act of choice and choice itself 
involves a comparison of, sometimes, a highly generalised character. Hence 
the answer to 'which chair is more comfortable?' might be in the first case, 'it 
all depends' but in the second case, in forming a judgement on the issue, it is 
normally taken to concern a 'matter of fact' open to confrrmation or 
contradiction. 
In sum, the problem of the role of value judgements in factual science is 
fundamental to all epistemological investigation. It is an unresolved and highly 
controversial issue. Many commentators have insisted and it is probable that 
they will continue to do so, that every branch of science must be 'neutral' and 
therefore free of values. 
Further, the assumption is then, of course, that this issue is more pertinent in 
the social rather than what has here been described as factual science [although 
it might be otherwise known as 'natural' or 'applied science']. The noted 
sociologist Max Weber strongly defended this view, introducing the idea of 
Wertfreiheit, [value freedom] as the exclusion of value words and value 
judgements from the discussion of human and social affairs. The exclusion 
was intended to remove the moral and political inflUences of the sociologists 
from their view of their study, with the aim of minimizing possibilities of 
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disagreement and eliminating from scientific work controversial and disputable 
material. 
Clearly, for social scientist the idea represents the influence of the factual 
science framework in this area, paradoxically itself reflecting a methodological 
value judgement in that to count as scientific, social science can accept only 
those assertions which could be established as true or at least 'reasonable', and 
curiously without disagreement even though we are no closer to establishing 
what this might mean. 
2.4 THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: A Discussion 
We began this chapter by stressing that it is imponant to note the historicity of 
ideas lest we be accused, among other things, of claiming too much for present 
findings. Before we are tempted to draw a curtain on the discussion of the 
'model of science' discussed so far, some contextual consideration is clearly 
appropriate. 
From the above discussion it is apparent that many of the matters which 
preoccupied ancient philosophers and scientists of other paradigms have been 
'excommunicated' from our present ideas on how to conduct a 'rational' 
investigation of the world, or worlds around us. It has been noted that by the 
end of the fifteenth century man no longer viewed himself as a pious spectator 
of 'God's works' but an active participant in nature's processes. Man had 
come to a conclusion that he was, 
' ... a creature who could, by gaining knowledge that would give him 
power over nature ... make what he willed ... Nature was to be mastered 
by new science ... ' [Easlea, op.cit. p 253.] 
The Aristotelian image of science and nature had clearly not resulted in 'gaining 
power' over it and this became a central aim in the development of science. 
Baslea suggests that in Bacon's eyes science was the opportunity for man to 
restore his dominion over Dature that although originally granted by 'Divine 
Bequest' had been lost at the Fall. Scientific knowledge was hence miefined in 
this style. There was evidently a transition from the belief that, 
' •. .Nature which not only inspires but also oppresses men is not so 
much to be dominated and exploited ... as understood and interacted 
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with, so that her oppressive ways can be increasingly made 10 yield to 
those of her ways that nourish life.' [Ibid. p 252] 
From the point of view of the 'new science', causal knowledge was deemed to 
be all that was required to enforce a power over Nature and speculation on the 
purposes and goals of phenomena, as in the Aristotelian, teleological school 
was now considered irrelevant 
The quest for causal knowledge was readily embraced by the new thinkers. 
Descartes asserted that, 
'It is possible to obtain knowledge highly useful in life ... we can have a 
practical philosophy by means of which knowing the force and actions 
of fire, water, air and the stars and heavens ... we may in the same 
fashion employ them in all the uses for which they are suited, thus 
rendering ourselves masters and possessors of nature.' [Easlea,op.cit. 
p 25312] 
It was clearly a view which could be used to justify any intervention in nature 
since no longer was nature taken to have organic characteristics of sensitivity, 
emotion, intelligence that up to the Renaissance. many thinkers had developed. 
In fact the conceptualisation of the world had become the very opposite of the 
spiritual, magical metaphor above. The overriding conceptualisation of nature 
was that of 'matter in motion' and nothing more. Obviously as Easlea points 
out, [op.cit.p256] by implication no moral self-examination is required by those 
who might wish to tum such a conceptualisation to their advantage. 
Further, even notions of tastes, colours, odours did not belong to the new 
conception of science. Galileo insisted that they were no more than names 
residing only in the consciousness and hence if the living creature were 
removed all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated and there 
would be nothing left but that which was required in the mechanistic view ... 
shapes, numbers, slow or rapid movement The reductionist conclusion 
inevitably followed and Descartes was able to put in a nutshell a faith which has 
dominated many fields of science since. Thus, 
'If anyone could know perfectly what are the small pans composing all 
bodies he would how perfectly the whole of NllUTe.' [Vartanian A., 
1953, p47.] 
12 From Descartes' DiscolITse Oil Method. Part 6. 
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Further, the striJdngly influential 'Oockwork Metaphor' [punning aside] clearly 
began at this moment. Kepler argued that, 
'At one time I believed that the motor causes of the planets was a soul... 
The aim I have set myself here is to affirm that the machine of the 
universe is not similar to a kind of divine animated being but similar to a 
clock.' [Rossi, P., 1970, p141.] 
The machine analogy was so successful in permeating the conceptions of the 
world that Descartes argued not only that animals had no souls but that they 
were fundamentally no different from complex machines. Live animals were 
promptly nailed to boards and opened up to view their blood circulations. 
Vivisection began at that moment since as Easlea puts it, 'mere matter in motion 
has no rights', [op.cit.]. 
There was, of course, some resistance to the mechanistic view, but evidence 
and history suggest that the Aristotelian paradigm had been struck a blow from 
which it never recovered and not only did it appear intellectually inadequate but 
also socially unacceptable. Bacon's verdict on Aristotelian thought was 
damning. 
'Such teachings, if they be justly appraised, will be found to tend to 
nothing less than a wicked effort to curtail human power over nature and 
to produce a deliberate and artificial desperation.' [Quoted by C. Hill13]. 
Kepler too attacked the views of his mystical contemporary Dr Roben Fludd14• 
Easlea notes that, to the outdated plea that, 
' ... English Universities should turn to the teachings of the Renaissance 
and that profoundly learned man Dr Fludd, ... the Oxford Astronomer 
Seth Ward angrily replied that it would be utter foolishness to dwindle 
after the windy impostures of Magick [sic] and Astrology'. [op.cit. 
p256]. 
Easlea also points out an interesting parallel in another aspect of society 
reflecting the influence of the change from an organismic/animistic to a 
mechanistic world view. 
13 Hill, C., 1965, The /fttelieclUlJl OrigiltS of lhe Eftglisll Revolillioft. Oxford. p90. 
14 Pauli, W., 1955, The Influence of Archetypa1ldeas on the sclentwc Theories of Kepler. 
in C.GJung and W.Pauli, cds., Tite /1IterpreUllioft of Nature G1fd lhe Psyclte,llout1edge. 
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We find that seven years be/ore capital punishment was abolished in 
Englandfor the crime ofwitchcro/t (a social activity credible only with a 
magical world view) capital punishment Juul been introduced for the 
breaJcing of machines'. [Ibid.]. 
In the discussion of science as objective, cumulative, success oriented and value 
free, all that we have so far been able to establish is that the characteristics of 
factual science have largely appeared to be what we might call 'negotiable', 
within an apparently 'rational' framework. We took four broad characteristics 
of what we have called 'factual', otherwise, 'bard" 'material' and 'natural' 
science and surveyed each in tum. 
The claim that factual science was 'objective' was examined with an interest in 
its concern with 'facts'. It soon became clear that the 'bare facts' of empiricism 
are not there for the taking and the relationship between science and the 'facts' 
is implicitly theoretical. with that theory deriving from a framework which 
'goes behind the facts'. 
We are obliged. therefore to make some comments on the development of 
theory in science. Bunge notes this requirement and suggests that the 
characteristics of theories are not what we might call 'unilateral'. We have noted 
that Bunge stressed. 
'We have a division of Ihe sciences, viz., into f0177UJ1 or (ideal) or 
factual (material). This preliminary branding takes care oflhe object, or 
theme of the respective disciplines,' it also accounts for the difference in 
kind between lhe statements which the f0177UJ1 and the factual sciences 
try to establish ... whereas formal statements consist in relations among 
signs, lhe statements oflhefactual sciences refer in most cases 10 extra 
scientific entities, 10 events and processes ... 
... In other words, thefactual sciences have 10 look at lhings and 
whenever possible they have 10 change lhem deliberately in attempting 
to ascertain 10 what degree their hypothesesfit thefacts.' [op.cit.p31]. 
In the formal sciences of relation. theories are wholly deductive and experience 
must be seen to play merely a suggestive part in developing the points of 
departure. that is the axioms. Thus it is important to note in this respect that 
experience is far from being the 'judge' of theories even in the factual sciences 
where hypotheses are confinned or refuted. 
Theories are checked with facts and with other theories. Theories themselves 
are enacted within a framework of scientific rationality since they are not, as 
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Bunge [op.citp78] has stressed built 'ex nihilo', but on certain bases which 
support them before and after any test. 
Notably Bunge goes on in this vein to point out, 
'A hypothesis with a factual content is not only sustained by empirical 
confirmation of a certain nwnber of its particular consequences, e.g. 
prediction. Scientific hypotheses are, or tend to become embodied in 
theories; and theories are all related among each other,' the swn total of 
them constitute the intellectual culture: [op.cit.p78]. 
The nature of the scientific culture/rationality must therefore effect and be 
affected by the development of theories and as we shall argue, corresponding 
models. This latter relationship will be discussed further in the following 
chapter. Nevertheless, in this context we have not yet established what 
scientists ascribe as a 'theory'. Hence Bhaskar asks, 
' ... can theory do what experience and deducibility fail to do, i.e. 
provide a rational ground for our ascriptions of natural 
necessity."[1975, pI55]. 
Bhaskar goes on to suggest that the answer clearly depends on the extent to 
which the former contains components irreducible to the latter. He also notes 
that in solving this question, the onus is on the philosopher to locate the 
'surplus element', or the emergent element as systems thinkers might put it, in 
the systematic organisation of our knowledge or the capacity of theory to 
explain many different laws or predict new facts. 
In Achinstein's 'Concepts of Science', [1968] he examines the various criteria 
of what constitutes a meariingful theory according to the axiomatic or 
hypothetico-deductive account, that is an account which requires theories to 
conform to certain logical criteria, i.e., frrstly assuming the case antithetical to 
Bhaskar's suggestion. 
In this tone, Achinstein suggests, 
'On the axiomatic account a theory is no more and no less than a set of 
sentences {'axioms'] stated in a specified vocabulary, together with all 
the consequences ... plus the proofs of these consequences. In soon, a 
theory is a hypothetico-deductive system.' [op.cit., pI29]. 
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Significantly, Achinstein's examination of the various criteria given to ensure 
that theories of this kind are 'meaningful' leads him to propose that the 
hypothetico-deductive defmition of theory is not sufficient to explain the role of 
theories in science. He suggests, in fact that it is related to the positivist 
rationality, holding that terms interpreted as referring to something 
unobservable are either unintelligible or scientifically meaningless. Achinstein 
has the following to say on this maner, 
'Such claims are unjustified. The alleged problem of meaning is 
spurious because it is based on the unwarranted assumption ... that 
terms interpreted as referring to unobservables are unintelligible. Nor 
have proponents of the Positivist account shown that their new concept 
allows them to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate metaphysics. 
Quite the contrary, since given the explicated concept of meaning and 
the criterion or criteria they propose, we have finally seen that almost 
any term in any theory becomes meaningful. Finally, the explicated 
concept of meaning does not allow a more adequate re-construction of 
theories, since it renders the task of theory construction a trivial one.' 
[op.cit., pI18]. 
Interestingly, Achinstein goes on to claim that theories can be given significance 
by using terms which are already available and are used in connection with 
observation, or by attributing to the unobserved items properties which are not 
identical with those attributed to observable ones, but which are similar in many 
possible respects. In other words Achinstein is strongly implying an analogical 
feature to this conceptualisation of theory and this is a matter to which we will 
be referring throughout the rest of the thesis. Further by his own criterion for 
what constitutes a theory [which clearly opposes that which he described as the 
hypothetico-deductive account], Achinstein suggests firstly that it is normally 
believed that the theory, 
' ... provides or will eventually provide some, (or a better) 
understanding of something and that this will be one of the main 
functions {of theory] ... By providing an understanding 1 mean 
something quite broad that can be done in a number of related ways,for 
example by explaining, interpreting, removing a puzzle, showing why 
something is not surprising, indicating a cause or causes, supplying 
reasons, analysing something into simpler, more familiar or more 
integrated components.'lop.citp 123]. 
Secondly that a theory consists of propositions which purport to assert 'what is 
the case'. 
Overall, Achinstein's account of theories rejects a purely logical criterion for the 
formulation of theories and therefore one might assume that the logical structure 
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is seen to be determined or selected out of the logical possibilities by extra-
logical criteria. Some writers, for example Leatherdale [1974, p70] suggest a 
stronger position in that it is specifically the role of models which functions in 
this way. This is an indication of a point to which we shall come in due course. 
For the moment, for illustration, we note that Leatherdale quotes Hutten in this 
respect, 
' ... the model gives the syntactic rules for using the expressions by 
which we described the process. The model is the better, the more 
completely it provides the syntax of the new theory ... '[ 1954, p300]. 
It was clear in our examination that blunt concern with the observation and 
cataloguing of facts is an insufficient explanation of 'the scientific way', for as 
we saw from the discussion of M'Pherson's claim, it does not account for how 
hypotheses might arise. We shall also be arguing that 'discovery' has much 
more to do with the roles of models and analogy than identification of facts in 
science, since, as Bunge describes, 
' ... that the discoveries of science are not the automatic result if a 
conscientious routine application of certain infallible rules ... that 
discovery is a tortuous process in which the "flash" occurs only after a 
period of preparation and worry and moreover it is not the final word, 
but a hypothesis that has to be checked.' [op.cit., pI7]. 
At the following stage we considered the proposal that factual science was 
cumulative, that is it is formed by successive additions of 'truthful' assertions 
of scientific knowledge. We discussed truth as a proposition concerning facts 
and soon found a variety of accounts of truth, none of which were specifically 
attributable to factual science. Further, it was suggested that since the 
distinction between truth and belief was to some degree arbitrary, the 
epistemological consequences for the nature of scientific knowledge again 
appeared to reflect a fundamental negotiability. More important than 
truthfulness of the accumulation of scientific knowledge became the way it is 
collected, and thus the 'good reason' for believing it or receiving it as 'truth', 
came to reside wholly in the self fuelling rationality of the scientific 
methodology itself. 
Thirdly we looked at the assertion that 'science is success oriented' accepting 
the implied ambiguity of acknowledging verificationism and falsificationism as 
twin faces of establishing scientific credulity. Lastly the points on factual 
science as 'value free' brought together the groundlessness of the other 
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characteristics in raising the issues that facts are only meaningful when viewed 
through a 'framework'; truths and beliefs may and do merge indistinguishably 
highlighting the necessity to evaluate how 'facts' come to be derived; and the 
success orientation depends on the goals of investigation established by the 
perspective of the framework. In this context Bhaskar has suggested that the 
reliance on theory and by implication their inherent explication by models 
carries with its own problems in this context. This is such that the, 
' ... criterion is clearly capable of selecting a theory within a given 
metaphysical schema such as that provided by the classical mechanical 
world view. But it is not capable of judging between different schemas, 
when it is precisely the nature or limits ... that is in question. To take an 
obvious example: Aristotelian and Galilean dynamics are in conflict over 
whether when a stonefalls to the eanh, the earth should be conceived as 
fued (Aristotle, Ptolemy and Tycho Brahe) or as moving (Copernicus, 
Giordano Bruno, Kepler and Gali/eo). Now try as you may, there is no 
neutral way of conceiving thefalling of the stone'. [1975, piSS]. 
Thus any references to the theoretical framework must be clarified with a 
consideration of the 'scientific rationality'. The interpretation of data with 
reference to a rationality consists of behaviour that satisfies at least two 
conditions, consistency and the satisfaction of certain aims. To be 'consistent' 
can be interpreted in a number of ways, either that in certain circumstances a 
specific action must always be taken: in other forms it implies a logical 
transitivity. The second condition requires that decisions are made purely on 
the basis of achieving certain aims, the success orientation. 
Thus the fundamental tenets of science appear to rely on conceptions of facts, 
Objectivity and rationality. Easiea notes a description of science as 
emphasising. 
The fundamental feature of science is its idea of objectivity, an ideal 
that subjects all scientific statements to the test of impartial criteria, 
recognising no authority of persons in the realm of cognition.' [Easlea, 
. lIS] op.CIt. P . 
The scientist then, depends on impartial and independent criteria to establish 
beliefs. Further, it can be argued, in the manner of EasIe&, that it is a defining 
characteristic of a 'rational' man that he finds objective ways to distinguish valid 
15 Schemer, I., 1967, Science and Subjectivity, Bobbs-Merill, pI. 
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from invalid beliefs, and it follows that science represents the distinctive 
features of the rational quest 
But what is it to be rational? We will be looking at this in more detail in a later 
chapter. Popper explains it as an attitude that seeks to solve as many problems 
as possible by an 'appeal to reason', that is, to clear thought and experience 
rather than appeal to emotion and passion. The latter case is represented by the 
rather unfairly named 'irrationalists' who insist that emotions and passions 
rather than reason are the mainspring of human action. Popper defends the 
objective view with the rather the curious point that while the irrationalist's 
point might be SO, 
' ... we should do what we can to remedy it and should try to make 
reason play as large a part as it possibly can ... irrational emphasis upon 
emotion and passion leads ultimately to what I can only describe as 
crime.' [Easlea, op.cit.p316]. 
Popper sees science as of great significance in the promotion and strengthening 
of rationality. We will consider a reversal of Popper's emphasis and discuss 
the juxtaposition of rationalities in the model of analogy. The most welcome 
feature in the promotion of a rationality Popper sees as being the reliance of the 
test on impartial and independent criteria and this means that concepts of 
subjectivity, ethical and aesthetical content are routed from the area of inquiry. 
We have discussed the view that rationality is an essential feature of that kind of 
knowledge which is held to be scientific. The scientific rationality itself is 
accepted on the basis that it is made of concepts, judgements and reasoning and 
not of sensations, images and patterns of behaviour. Evidently, in terms of the 
'value free' and 'factual' attributes characterising factual science, the real bone 
of contention is in the issue of an ascribed 'objectivity'. Of course, the scientist 
'perceives', 'visualises models' and makes operations and both the starting and 
end points are ideas. The influence of philosophical frameworks in this respect 
is tacit, in that scientific research is conducted by human beings who must have 
their various weltanschauungen. 
'Rationality' also implies that ideas might be combined in accordance with some 
set of logical rules to produce new ideas by deductive inference. This is the 
16 Popper. K., 1966, The Open Society and Its EMmies. Routledge, Sth Edition. Volume 
2. Hegel and Marx. pp22S. 233, 234, k 236. 
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epistemological importance of the scientific process. But significantly, any 
ideas developed in this way are not new from a logical point of view since. they 
are entailed by the premises of the deduction, they are dependent on the 
conditions of their rational framework. The situation begs the question as to 
whether the rationality bound process of science can be the most effective route 
to creative thought for problem solvers. Yet ideas derived in this way can still 
be thought of as epistemologically new, in so"far as they express knowledge 
which was not in evidence prior to the deduction. 
Hence for a given concept, at a given moment, coherence with a previously 
accepted systems of ideas is necessary but not sufficient with regard to 
formulating factual statements. In other words, factual knowledge although 
'rational' must be seen as essentially only probable; it is the product of both 
deductive and hence demonstrable, and probable, hence inconclusive, 
inferences. 
We noted earlier a repudiation of the naive hypothetico-deductivist account of 
science. In that process of imaginatively constructed theories being 
systematically rejected, should any of their predictions conflict with the solid 
rock of direct observational experience, a number of other issues is raised. 
These concern how observational data is conceived and how anomalies are dealt 
with. Easlea argues that the criteria of the falsificationists leads to a position 
whereby once a course has been embarked upon, the scientist is committed to it 
come what may. It is evidently rather dogmatic. Rationality, despite Popper's 
protestations to the contrary, has been reduced to a commitment to an arbitrary 
methodological principle of one problem {or conceptualisation] at a time but 
never all together. 
It was in this context that we also noted Kuhn's [1962] radical and influential 
attack on this implied concept of a dominant rationality. otherwise a 
conventional wisdom and its related belief that science advanced cumulatively 
towards an ever greater understanding of physical reality. Kuhn noted that, in 
the context of science based on falsification, it is, 
' ... the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit 
that at any time, define many of the puzzles that characterise normal 
science. If any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, 
all theory ought to be rejected at all times.' [op.cit, pI45]. 
71 
The concept of 'scientific revolution' most clearly illustrates the argument for 
the non-cumulative episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or 
in part by a new and incompatible one. Although Kuhn acknowledges that 
while normal science is a highly cumulative enterprise, the fundamental 
incompatibility between successive paradigms is a most significant aspect of 
Kuhn's conception of the process of science. 
This issue emphasises the non-cumulative nature of scientific theory since the 
transition between the incomensurable cannot be made 'a step at a time', driven 
by logic and 'neutral' experience but must occur all at once. Kuhn then talks of 
how a scientist, once s/he has made the 'gestalt switch' between paradigms, 
works to convert the entire profession or relevant group to accept an entirely 
new view of science and the world. 
Kuhn's description of a 'conversion' taking place is important since it implies a 
sort of mystical experience which is not compatible with previously expressed 
ideas on rationality. Easlea notes, 
'In science, as distinct from religion or politics, faith is unnecessary: 
one can know when one is wrong. Kuhn thinks differently. According 
to him there are no objective criteria by which the revolutionary scientist 
can show his colleagues. committed to another paradigm, the error of 
their ways ... since each paradigm will be defended by the criteria it 
dictates for itself.' top.cit. pI5]. 
The view clearly threatens that of Popper whom we have noted as stressing that 
as a scientist in the disinterested pursuit of the truth, one cannot believe what 
one wants to believe, since the criteria are 'independent'. We might reiterate his 
view that the notion of rational science has given us an increased appreciation 
of. 
' ... responsibility of belief, embodied not only in afirm commitment to 
impartial principles by which one's own assertions are to be measured. 
but in a further commitment to make those principles ever more 
comprehensive and rigourous'. [I Scheffler, 1967, p4]. 
But as we have discussed, besides an implied 'rationality', what is USUally 
regarded as important in a 'factual statement' in science, is that it must also 
make reference to 'experience', commonly, experience made manifest [rather 
narrowly] by the tenets of empiricism. The significance of the logical structure 
means that ideas, as they develop, can take their place in a 'systems of ideas'. 
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Paradoxically, we have considered a view of science through a model of 
'factual science' which in the spectrum of scientific activity, one might have 
taken as the least problematic. Indeed, some of the problems associated with the 
metaphysical view of science, that is to say, as abstracting the scientific 
enterprise beyond ordinary happenings are also relevant to the empiricists' 
approach. For example, some argue that empiricism itself is conducive to a 
kind of over-preoccupation with immediacies which may distract attention from 
critical, larger questions. 
Bunge [op.cit.] goes on to stress that further progress in the 'legalisation of 
non-physical phenomena' requires, above all, a new attitude towards the 
concept of 'scientific law'. In the first place it must be realised that there are 
many types of laws, none of them being necessarily better than the remaining 
types. In other words as we have discussed, there is nothing fixed, permanent, 
factual about 'rationality', any more than any other concept. Rationalities, it 
has been suggested, are negotiable and just as there are many types of scientific 
law [morphological, kinetic, of association, of composition] there are many 
types of explanation. For example, as we have noted for a long time, in the 
philosophical tradition it was believed that to explain a phenomena was to point 
out its 'cause'. But it is increasingly recognised, indeed it is intrinsic to the 
systemic ethos, that causal explanation is merely one type among many. 
The development of science in hypotheses involves concepts in a progressive 
transformation of 'ordinary language uses' by incorporating them in theoretical 
schemas, although some concepts are regarded as primitives, others take their 
meanings from their contexts. The way science dealt with the transition from 
observation to theory shows a heavy reliance on a rationality with a strict logical 
consistency and a highly specific practical aim, prediction. Of course the 
bounds of the rationality and the nature of explanations fully dictate the range of 
possible predictions, since scientific predictions depend on 'laws' and on items 
of specific observation which are promptly interpreted as information. Failed 
predictions in science therefore can be wholly accounted for in terms of the sets 
of assumptions of the concepts and rationality in which they exist 
2.S CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have drawn out three main points; fIrStly that 'facts' 
cannot be considered meaningful unless you go behind them, that is, the 
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enterprise of science cannot be principally concerned with facts. 
Secondly that criteria distinguishing truth and belief cannot be 
unequivocally established. Arguably, science is based on belief as 
much as on 'fact' or 'truth'. Thirdly, that science carries within it the 
values of any scientific rationality and community and hence science is 
not value free. 
Having established these points, we can now reconsider analogy from a 
fundamental position in philosophy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALOGY: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two a view of science was presented suggesting the 
argument that science rests to some degree on beliefs and values and on 
the accepted validity of a self referential rationality. Concepts of 
analogy have traditionally been criticised from a 'scientific' standpoint 
and having discussed this basis, it is relevant to reconsider the utility of 
analogy fundamentally, taking in this chapter a philosophical point of 
view. The aim of the chapter will be to develop an understanding of 
analogy and metaphor in order to identify concepts with which to model 
analogy in Chapter Four. 
3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALOGY AND METAPHOR 
In his excellent study on 'The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in 
Science', W.H. Leatherdale, [1974] stresses the importance of analogy and 
metaphor in science for a number of reasons, considering these areas worthy of 
examination on three counts. 
Firstly, that the 'metaphorical view of science' is relatively new and interesting 
enough to merit a detailed consideration. Secondly that the metaphorical 
framework gives rise to several views which need to be distinguished. Thirdly 
that the concepts of analogy and metaphor access a bOOy of philosophical and 
literary work on metaphor which might be of interest in developing our view of 
science. In this chapter we will consider much of Leatherdale's focus, but with 
a change of emphasis to concentrate on analogy and the interelated relationships 
of analogy, models and metaphors. 
Leatherdale initially stresses that concepts of metaphor and also that of model 
are implicitly contained in that of analogy. This will be developed in our 
systems view of analogy later in the thesis. Leatherdale's analysis of analogy is 
extremely useful in this respect, proposing that analogy is principally a more 
simple and fundamental concept than its derivatives of metaphor and model. 
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3.2.1 Concepts 0/ Analogy 
The concept of analogy was introduced into general use by the Greeks, notably 
Aristotle and Plato but has been used in a variety of ways since then. In this 
sense, Leatherdale attributes a confusion to the ambiguity of usage. Analogy is 
used to signify both a relation and the things, objects or phenomena which are 
related by it. Leatherdale suggests that the now commonly used tenn 
'analogue' stands for the latter usage of analogy and he reserves 'analogy' as 
the tenn describing the relation. 
The prevalence of the notion of analogy in common use raises a further 
difficulty. Analogy is also sometimes used loosely in the sense of 'likeness 
with a difference', 'similarity' or more specifically; 
' ... any sort of resemblance provided they do not amount to complete 
inductions.' [Mill, 1949, p4]. 
Evidently both senses of analogy [Le. including that of analogue] and the 
associated notion of a relationship of analogy enter into scientific thinking. It is 
necessary in this sense that the concept of analogy, aside from referring to 
analogy of relations, be further distinguished. Firstly, the characteristic of 
modern philosophy has tended to regard the answer to the question "What is an 
analogy?" as obvious and 'unanalysable'. The 'unanalysable' resemblance 
between two things has been hitherto taken as insignificant to scientific 
thinking. This issue is intimately related to the discussion of 'literal' and 
'metaphorical' language later in the chapter. 
On the other hand, hitherto unanalysable but potentially analysable resemblance 
may well be fundamental to science, either in its early stages or else as part of 
an original insight at a more sophisticated level. In this context, Leatherdale 
proposes that we consider the 'intuitive' perceptions of unanalysable 
resemblances and affinities entering into scientific development. He gives the 
example of the so-called 'Natural Method' of eighteenth century Botany and 
quotes Guyenot1 to illustrate the potential of what is normally taken as 
unanalysable resemblance to contribute to scientific thinking or possibly 
explanation; 
IGuyenot. E .• 1957. Les Sciences de la View aux XVlle &. XVllle Siecles. L7dee 
d'Evolution. Paris. 
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These classes of plants did not result from a methodical analysis of 
characters and did not rest on any precise definitions ... {but were} ... 
nevertheless, guided by a remarkable intuition, instinctively seizing 
upon general resemblances, grouping plants by their affinities for the 
establishment of natural classifications at the end of the eighteenth 
century. It is remarkable that the recognition of those natural groups 
which we call families preceded the precise study of species.' [1957. 
p16]. 
Secondly. Leatherdale describes a conceptualisation of analogy which may be 
taken as 'resemblance in an ensemble of qualities' or of 'properties or 
attributes', not relations given in immediate sense experience. In practice, 
however, he points out that it is difficult to draw clear distinctions between 
discrete qualities and relations. For example. colours. tastes and sounds seem 
to count unambiguously as qualities but those of size and shape implicitly 
contain spatial relations. 
The discussion can then be extended by allowing a looser interpretation of 
'properties'. to include features of size. shape. motion and number under the 
broad definitional umbrella. With this looser view. Leatherdale is able to 
interpret. then differentiate between analogy based on such 'properties' and 
those others including the formulations of esoteric relations. This latter group 
runs close to the metaphoric case of analogy we shall come to in due course. 
Leatherdale distinguishes the two by referring flI'stly to 'manifest analogy', as 
analogy based on properties given in immediate sense experience or in ordinary 
perception and secondly to analogy based on more abstract relations as 
'imported analogy'. 
The differentiation of imported and manifest analogies is a distinction which 
carries a great deal of importance in our discussion of analogy. This is 
principally because many critics of analogy have concentrated their efforts in 
dismissing notions of manifest analogy as outlined above. Leatherdale 
proposes that this consequence is attributable to the 'British Empiricist' 
tendency to concentrate on manifest analogy. with the subsequent effect that 
discussions of analogy have been mainly in terms of logic and induction. 
In some ways we should not find this surprising or alarming since manifest 
analogy is more readily amenable to reductionist symbolism than imported 
analogy. Further, and for this reason Leatherdale proposes that it has been the 
exclusion of imported analogy or the failure to make the initial distinction that 
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has contributed to the critical confusion of the concepts of analogy. That 
proposition is fully supported here. 
The confusion of the two types of analogy outlined is very deep rooted and it 
has caused number of problems which we ought to consider. We may begin 
the discussion by looking at the role of analogy in Francis Bacon's development 
of a scientific method in the'Novum Organum'. Some commentators 
[Leatherdale cites Fischer 1857,] have stressed that it consists of a 'systematic 
tabulation and analysis of analogies'. Despite this, Bacon was clearly aware of 
the appeal and dangers in the uncritical use of analogies, as can be seen from the 
passage below; 
The human understanding is 01 its own nature prone to suppose the 
existence olmore regularity in the world than itfinds. And though there 
may be things in nature which are singular and unmatched, yet it devises 
further parallels and conjugates and relatives which do not exist'. 
Novum Organum, I, 45, P 50. 
It is the concepts of analogy and related 'intuitive ideas' about significant 
resemblances [manifest analogies] and those procedures of metaphoric 
illumination that have given rise to a set of issues long discussed in the 
philosophy of science. These are highlighted in Leatherdale's remarks that to 
avoid what Bacon identifies as an over-preoccupation with regularity in the 
world, human understanding must exhaustively list and compare analogous 
instances, affinities and phenomena to discover the 'true forms' or 'natures'. 
Bacon regarded these 'forms' as being synonymous with 'laws' and the 
discovery of the 'laws of simple natures' he considered to be the goal of 
scientific discovery. Such laws would be describable in terms of qualities and 
properties found in ordinary experience and in the ordinary languages of 
description. 
Leatherdale points out the important issue in Bacon's workis that he does not 
seek causal explanation in terms of mathematical relations or extraneous 
mechanisms, but rather takes some instances themselves as qualitative analyses 
for the source of explanation. How these privileged instances are initially 
selected to play the validating role in establishing the basis of insight into 'forms 
of nature' is not developed, except in the claim that, 
Whereas it is most unskilful to investigate the nature 01 anything in the 
thing itself seeing that the same nature which appears in something latent 
and hidden, in others is manifest and palpable'. [Ibid., I, 88, p86.] 
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It is his objective of the discovery of 'forms' which led Bacon to place such a 
heavy reliance on manifest analogy. Although he deals with remoter aspects of 
analogy ['imported analogy'] in 'Instances Conformable or of Analogy2' and 
'Supplementary or Substitutive Instances3' he does regard them as of little use 
in the discovery of forms and as a 'last resource'. 
Keynes [1921] sums Bacon's contribution in developing the concepts of 
analogy in the following passage, 
'Bacon's great achievement in the history of logical theory lay in his 
being the first logician to recognise the importance of methodical 
analogy to scientific argument and dependence upon it of most well-
established conclusions.' [op.cit. p 268]. 
Bacon's method, according to Leatherdale, is correctly linked by Keynes to the 
processes of scientific argument, rather than to scientific discovery and 
invention. Hence manifest analogy is taken as a method of validation and 
Bacon's own belief that it was also a method of scientific discovery is 
misguided. Keynes goes on to criticise Bacon's conceptualisation, particularly 
his belief that forms would be describable in the context of everyday language 
and experience; 
'Bacon's error was double and lay first in supposing that these distinct 
elements lie upon the surface and consist in visible characters and 
secondly that their natures are or can easily be known to us.' [op.cit. 
p271] 
This significant assumption highlighted here by Keynes is apparent in other 
treatments of analogy, notably that of 1.S. Mill [1949], whose work concerned 
analogy 'real or natural' and its relationship with induction. WheweU4 [cited 
by Leatherdale, pointed out that Mills' method of experimental inquiry, 
' ... takes for granted the very thing which is most diffiCUlt to discover, 
the reduction toformulae ... of the facts of planetary motions, offalling 
bodies, refracted light rays and when in any of these cases we would 
discover the law of nature which governs them or if anyone chooses so 
2 In: Francis Bacon, cd. F.H.Andezson. TM N~ Organon fJIId Relaud Writings. New York, 
1960, ii, 27. pl56. 
3 As above: ii. 42. p216. 
4 From W. Whewell. On tM Philosophy of Discovery. London. 1860. p263. 
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to term it ,the/eatw'e in which all the cases agree, where are we to look 
for our A,B,C, and a,b,c. Nature does not present to us the cases in this 
form and how are we to reduce them to this/orm'. [op.cit. p9]. 
Leatherdale hence stresses that if [manifest] analogy and the philosophical 
mistletoes which spring from it [those of 'Forms' and 'Natures'] are to make a 
contribution appropriate to scientific discoveries, it is to its earliest stages. The 
relationship between analogy and intuitive knowledge at the near pre-scientific 
stage is indeed remarkably close. Leatherdale illustrates this point by using 
Adanson'ss account of his method of classification in Botany, 
'It was by grouping these comparative descriptions that 1 perceived that 
the plants were ranged in classes or families which were neither 
systematic nor arbitrary, not being founded on one but on several parts.' 
[op.cit., p9]. 
The example implies how such an apparently analytic method depends on 
intuitive judgements of resemblance despite such characteristics being far from 
identical in each plant or otherwise, as we shall argue in due course, 'domain'. 
Yet overall it has been the manifest analogies which have received the most 
attention from both scientists and philosophers. As Mill suggested, the 
possibility of reduction to formulae was a major concern in selecting viable 
analogies. In other words, manifest analogies are the only types of analogies 
which are readily reducible to logical treatment in the pseudo-syllogistic format 
of 'A:B:C::a:b:c'. It is in this format which analogies have been most 
commonly and insistently described and expanded as below; 
'a, b, c, d. all have the properties P and Q 
a, b. c, all have the property R: 
Hence d has the property R.' 
In this context, Leatherdale contends that the logical form is mainly an abstruse 
elaboration of the 'common sense' level of understanding of analogy. 
appropriate to our ordinary handling of experience, whether scientific or 
everyday. He argues therefore that 'straightforward' analogical arguments of 
this kind do not appear to have aided the development of science. Evidently 
they do not intrinsically offer any novel insights but can merely act as a broad 
research guideline. 
5 Quoted in E Guyenot, op.cit, p35. 
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But the contention of this thesis is that it is not possible to accept the use of 
analogy as 'straightforward' in the way that Leatherdale implies. The reduction 
of analogical features to the syllogistic format seen above can be said to rather 
'sell the concept short' and does not, in its neglect of the borad concepts of 
imported analogy deal with analogy to sufficient depth. • Straightforward' 
concepts of analogy along with apparently straightforward use in practice do not 
adequately probe the potential utility in a mc:xlel of analogy. 
To illustrate this important point, we will consider the example of a 
straightforward analogy, given by Leatherdale. It is Galileo's argument from 
analogy to show that the 'Earth is a planet'. In the example, we will be 
highlighting aspects which show that this kind of approach is not as 
'straightforward' as it might first appear. In 'the Assayer' 6, 'Starry 
Messenger" and the 'Dialogue Concerning Two Chief World Systems' 8 
Galileo conducts a skilful argument to show that the earth is a planet, with the 
Moon playing an important role as a middle term in the analogy. 
Hence the argument proceeds: 
'Earth is analogous to Moon: 
Moon is analo~ous to Planet: 
Therefore the Earth is analogous to Planet' 
Under rudimentary telescopes, planets were still observed to have visible discs 
while stars remained as mere points of light even under magnification. Jupiter 
was the most direct analogy in this context, since following telescopic 
inspection, it too appeared to have satellites. The Moon again was a significant 
factor in drawing the analogy, it was fundamental to the straigntforward 
analogical relationship being proposed in Ga1ileo's argument 
'As the Medicean Planets are to Jupiter: 
The Moon is to Earth: 
Jupiter and the Medicean planets move: 
6 In; Galileo Galilei, ttanslated by S.Drake, Discowries aM OpinibltS of GalUeo. New York, 
1957. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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Therefore the Moon and Earth move.' 
Thus the Moon, when under examination appeared to resemble the earth with 
mountainous outcrops throwing shadows across the moonscape. Additionally, 
because of its changing 'phases', it was proposed that the Moon was not self-
luminous. The planets were also perceived to have phases, to be diffusely 
illuminated and so appeared similar in constitution to the Moon and hence 
through the analogical relation, the Earth. Venus particularly has phases in the 
same sequence as the Moon and thus by analogy must circle the Sun. It was 
suggested that the Earth when viewed [hypothetically] from the the Moon, 
would also have phases caused by reflecting light and therefore must also circle 
the Sun and so forth. 
Despite the impressive flow of the analogical argument, which we should 
remember is being viewed from a perspective fully accepting a Galilean 
conceptualisation of the planetary system. we might feel that the argument 
belongs at the 'common sense' levels mentioned previously. But there are 
some important points to notice. For example. although it appears to be an 
argument closer to manifest analogy and logical progression, there are a number 
of extraneous theoretical and causal considerations more pertinent to a case of 
'imported' than pseudo-logical manifest analogy. Galileo draws terrestrial 
analogies relating to the diffusion of light and the argument for the Venusian 
phases is based on the conceptions of the fo1lllal Copernican system of thought. 
These points clearly suggest that there are prevalent elements of 'interpretive 
perception' indispensable to the effectiveness of the analogical argument 
As briefly mentioned. the reliance on manifest analogy has not proved itself to 
be sufficient in the development of science to merit its legitimisation as a 
process of scientific discovery. Leatherdale attributes the resulting 'low status' 
of analogy to the fact that manifest analogy allows no place for 'scientific genius 
or inspiration' in deriving novel and creative hypotheses for scientific 
exploration and development. 
To illustrate his suggestion. Leatherdale draws out a number of factors which 
he presents as characteristic of scientific discovery. Firstly that some 'special 
ability' going beyond routine method and secondl~ some novel insight. are 
required in scientific acts of creation and discovery. Thirdly he also suggests 
that such creative perceptions are 'instantaneous and comprehensive'. 
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Leatherdale's fIrst point on this issue raises an interesting issue, namely that if 
the scientifIc method is as objective and systematic as the criteria discussed in 
Chapter Two strive to ensure. why cannot one scientist reason as well as 
another? James9, a noted psychologist suggests that. 
The flash of similarity between an apple and the Moon, between the 
rivalry for food in nature and rivalry for man's selection was too 
recondite for any but exceptional minds.' lquoted in Blanchard. 1943. 
vol.ii. p133] 
It is hard to deny that some scientists do appear to be possessed of some special 
quality which lifts them 'beyond the ordinary'. Leatherdale to reinforce his 
point uses three quotations from famous and respected scientists in which they 
comment on this ability. Sir Humphry Davy 10 [all three quotations referenced 
in Leatherdale, op.cit. p13] suggests for example. 
'Imagination as well as reason is necessary to perfection in the 
philosophical mind. A rapidity of combination, a power of perceiving 
analogies and comparing them by facts is the creative source of 
discovery'. 
And from American geologist O.K. Oilbertll, 
To explain the origins of hypotheses I have a hypothesis to present. It 
is that hypotheses are always suggested through analogy. 
Consequential relations of nature are infinite in variety and he who is 
acquainted with the largest number has the broadest basis for the 
analogic suggestion of hypotheses.' 
Oppenheimer12 puts it as, 
'Science is an immensely creative, enriching experience, it is full of 
novelty and exploration and it is in order to get these that analogy is an 
indispensable instrument .. ' . 
9 W James, Principles of Psychology. Volwne n, p343. 
10 In: Davy, H .• The Collected Works of Humphry Davy. ed. J.Davy, 9 Volwnes, London, 
1839-40. 
11 G.K Gilbert. The Origin of Hypothesis. Illustrated by the Discussion 0/ a Topographic 
Method. Science, 3, 1896, ppl-13. . 
12 R.Oppenheimer. Analogy in Science. American PsycbolQiist. II, 1956, p130. 
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Leatherdale also points to other writers who have recognised the significant role 
of analogy in deriving creative hypotheses for scientific development and 
progress as being Hooke [1961], Kepler [1939], Mach [1943], Maxwell [1890] 
and Poincare [1958]. 
As the former correctly points out, it is quite evident that the kind of analogy 
referred to by these authors is not that of manifest aqalogy previously 
discussed, nor is it employed in any usual inductive method. Equally these 
passages are not referring to an argument by analogy, [a model for which we 
shall be developing in Chapter Four]. Instead, they talk of 'noticing', 
'perceiving', 'suggesting analogy'. This perceptual feature of analogies is 
referred to by Leatherdale as an 'analogical act'. 
In summary, Leatherdale compares an analogical act in process terms to the 
special circumstances of an 'act of recognition', in which there is a conscious 
apprehension of an effort of synthesis. In other words, an act of recognition 
parallels an analogical act in the following way, clearly described by Leatherdale 
as consisting of; 
'... the present consciousness putting out feelers to the past 
[i.e. another domain] and when successful in recall, drawing complexes 
of past experience into the present as an element of the present 
perception or judgement ... An analogical act is rather like an act of 
recognition ... except that it does not concern identification except in a 
special sense of identifying something similar in certain important 
respects to something else. It is closer for example to identifying some 
unknown person as a known person's son, or of recognising afragment 
of melody as something by Beethoven because of its style, without 
perhaps being actually familiar with the melody in question.' [op.cit. 
pI4]. Bracket added. 
Hence the analogical act is one which involves a reformulation. The 
reformulation is perpetrated by importation of new structures or interpretive 
frameworks from another unfamiliar domain of knowledge and experience. 
To distinguish further, in the analogical act Leatherdale introduces the concepts 
of 'topic' and 'imported' analogues. The topic analogue is that matter 'in the 
here and now'. [His conceptualisation of analogy is such that the identification 
of 'topic' analogue, as that referring to the phenomena under investigation, is 
concomitant with that of the 'analogue set' to be presented in the model of 
analogy described in the next chapter]. The notion of 'imported analogue' is 
referential to the new structures drawn in by some process [not yet described] 
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from elsewhere. Leatherdale' s conceptualisation of 'imported analogy' 
corresponds to that of 'new domain' in the framework of analogy to be 
explored later, although the broader notion of 'imported analogy' is more 
accurately identified and developed in terms of the concepts of 'analogical 
reasoning' . 
Leatherdale stresses that it would false to imply that the analogical act can be 
seen as instantaneously accomplishing at one stroke the criteria for developing a 
new paradigmatic view of a given topic analogue or hypothetical enquiry. While 
the 'flash of similarity', as James [op.cit] put it, might well be momentary, its 
effectiveness must additionally rely on other factors. A whole complex of 
antecedent knowledge and behaviour and a similar complex of consequent 
implications and associations for example, in order to 'make sense' of the 
insight. In other words, before the illuminating perception occurs, the topic 
analogue is ranged over and sometimes one part, sometimes another is brought 
into focus or juxtaposed with this or that. The topic analogue, proposes 
Leatherdale, is equally an amorphous entity as that of the imported analogue, 
ever growing and changing, sometimes crystalising out, only to dissolve again 
under the pressure of discordant facts drawn from other areas of the topic and 
imported analogues. It is clear that the syllogistic format by which analogies are 
typically constrained would not be appropriate here. 
Leatherdale's valuable analysis has allowed us to gain some understanding of 
the controversial issue of analogy by surveying and distinguishing among the 
notions of manifest or imported analogy and analogical acts. The former 
conceptualisation has been treated in the quasi-formal style of the logical 
paradigm and the latter two are normally associated with some kind of 
'intuitive' insight above and beyond the usual methods of science. 
This issue is considered to be of importance by Leatherdale who sees it as 
reflective of two features in scientific development which have, as we have 
seen, been frequently remarked upon by commentators and indeed scientists 
themselves. It is appropriate that we discuss them a little further. 
Firstly, the matter of the appare~t 'suddenness' of discovery. In this context 
many scientists feel that their insights have come .independently of former 
efforts and research. The dramatic instances of these 'flashes of genius' are 
perhaps among the most well-known events in the progress of science, such 
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that 'Newton's apple' and 'Archimedes bath' have passed into cultural fable. 
A second feature gives high importance to the principally imaginative feature of 
the intuitive act. Nyman's paper, [1953] also quoted by Leatherdale, discusses 
the role of intuition in this respect. Nyman strongly repudiates the view that the 
construction of hypotheses or theories is the result of methodical, not to say 
mechanical, processes of induction. Further, Poincare comments, 
'Logic, which alone can give certainty is the instrument of 
demonstration: intuition is the instrument of invention'. [op.cit.p23]. 
It is again important to note the difference between the concepts of manifest and 
imported analogy. Leatherdale looks at Gillespie's [1966] analysis of 
Faraday's work. Gillespie was apparently appalled at Faraday's supposed 
mathematical ineptitude and comments on Faraday's substituting reliance on 
analogy, by saying, 
'Analogy, after all, depends on a kind of linear transfer of ideas from 
one area to another, while abstraction/rees ideas/rom the physical and 
poises the mindfor the thought experiment.' lop.cit. p 375]. 
Gillespie's remarks rather perversely give us a good example of the basic 
criticisms levelled at analogy which we have, in looking at the significant 
discrepancies in different concepts of analogy, been trying to dissipate. 
Particularly, the assumed linearity of transfer of ideas is not appropriate to the 
concept of imported analogy. Additionally, when imported analogy makes a 
contribution to thinking, it is evidently non-linear. The pressumption of 
linearity is an attempt to introduce 'logical method' and mapping into the 
creative processes inherent in imported analogy and it is clearly unhelpful and 
inappropriate. This is because it is more relevant for the analysis of manifest 
analogy, for whose features such a method was arguably developed. In this 
remark, I am referring to Bacon's discourse on scientific method. It is an issue 
with serious consequences and we shall be obliged to comment on this matter in 
Chapter Five, when discussing the different rationalities which can be 
introduced via the framework of analogy. 
In the meantime, the other side of the issue shows how analogical acts of 
recognition and concepts of imported analogy can be thought of as a 
multidimensional gestalt-like insight into new ways of investigation. The 
analogical gestalt provides more than the limited inference of mere manifest 
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analogy, but new perspectives, horizons and languages of description and 
interpretation of potentially infinite variety. 
The crucial contribution of analogy has been commented on by Hanson [1958 
p85ffJ, Toulmin [1953, p34], Kuhn [1962, Chapter 10] and also Farre [1968,]. 
The latter's remarks are repeated here, 
The discovery of a way of looking at the world is the necessary prelude 
of a science, not a constituent of it ... The perspective is thus 
fundamental to the whole scientific enterprise, which is inscribed within 
it and which is unrealisable without it.' [1968, p788]. 
The aim in this research is to identify the utility of analogy in systems sciences 
and this involves using the concept of analogy in deriving hypotheses to then 
guide investigation, via a model of analogy. Such a model will be presented in 
Chapter Four in order that we may subsequently consider the possibilities for 
theoretical expansion of systems concepts across domains. 
Our original point of departure in this discussion referred to notions of analogue 
and a notion of an 'analogical relation'. So far we have mentioned the latter 
only in terms of when it is 'noticed' or 'perceived' in analogical acts. In other 
words, although we have discussed issues of 'manifest and imported' analogy, 
the nature of the analogical relation needs further analysis to elude the dangers 
of pursuing analogical features over a potentially inexhaustible number of 
domains. That quagmire would clearly involve being drawn into the areas of 
'hazy and superficial' analogies which are apparently common, but to be 
avoided at all costs, in order to preserve the building argument for the 
legitimacy of the concept of analogy. The dangers of 'hazy analogy' demand 
that we identify the principles by which analogical models and additionally 
arguments from analogy can be constructed. 
An important aside at this juncture is some more precise commentary on what is 
meant by references to 'hazy and superficial analogy'. We have previously 
described manifest analogy as cases of obvious resemblance across domains 
and it is to certain cases of manifest analogy that the label 'hazy' typically 
refers. But in fact this is rather a misnomer, for it is suggested that far from 
being 'vague' and 'hazy't what we identify as superficial analogies have a very 
clear, and hence 'obvious relationship' linking topic and imported analogues. 
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Leatherdale makes a similar point by looking at the prevalence of such analogies 
in the history of science and fmds that more 'obvious' analogies between 
things, commonly analogies of colour, shape or number for example, have 'no 
particular significance' and demonstrate a lack of a creative basis for inference. 
He cites the example that the Sages of Greece, the planets as they were known 
to the Greeks and the gates of Thebes, [and the hills on which Rome was built, 
for that matter] were all seven in number, and for some time this superficial 
numerological analogy was taken to be of some special significance. 
[H.Metzger13, as noted by Leatherdale, op.cit., has made a study on the role 
such analogies have played in the history of science]. 
Similarly, on this subject Achinstein [1968] argues that it is the formal, 
complex/abstract analogies which are the basis for creative inference in the 
scientific use of analogy; 
' ... they are more abstract by contrast, say, with similarities of colour, 
shape or size ... typically, at least in science, similarities a/the latter sort 
do not generate analogies, or do so only insofar as they are relevant/or 
the more abstract similarities.' [op.cit. p 206]. 
We have noted that in philosophy an analogical relationship is a relationship of 
likeness or similarity but with the implication that the likeness in question is in 
some sense systematic or structural. To argue with reference to an analogical 
relationship, then, is to infer from the fact that is one thing is in some respects 
similar to another, the two 'things' will 'correspond' in other as yet unexamined 
respects. 
The idea of correspondence is worth a closer look since it is one which we are 
familiar in terms of the correspondence theory of truth discussed in Chapter 
Two. The Oxford English Dictionary14 gives the definition of correspondence 
as ' ... the relation between things that answer to each other in some respect'. 
Hence as a notion, it is loose enough to be heuristically appealing although 
because of this, difficult to attempt to model. In due course a rigorous model 
will be presented in which an analogical correspondence will be developed in 
terms of positive, negative and neutral analogy. 
13 H. Metzger, 1926, us Concepts ScientifiqlM!S. Paris. 
14 Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, Seventh Edition. 
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Analogy represents a comparison of one thing with another in order to indicate 
similarities and differences between them and thereby to increase the 
understanding of the lesser known of the two. Hence it is in the establishment 
of the relationship of ['imported') analogy that Hoffding [1905) suggests any 
'sophisticated ordering of phenomena is possible'. There is a clear link through 
here to aspects and conceptualisations of General Systems concepts, hence, 
from Boulding, 
' .. .for each purpose and at each level of abstraction ... there must be an 
optimal degree of generality.' [1952, pI]. 
It is timely also to recall Bacon's reminder of the dangers of analogy arising 
from the idea that the nature of the human intellect might make us too prone to 
'seek order'. Hoffding's further remarks draw us away from the superficial 
quest for 'obvious analogy' which can contribute nothing in deriving creative 
hypotheses and inferential bases to work upon. Having said, as Leatherdale 
stresses that ' ... analogy is likeness of the relations of different objects, not 
likeness of single qualities' [properties], he goes on, 
'As there are important differences between the domains of experience, 
the facts not being homogenous but constituting many groups, every 
one with its peculiarities, our thinking must enlighten one group or 
domain by the means of another, especially so, that the experiences 
which arrange themselvesfor thought in the simplest and most fertile 
way are made use of by the understanding of the other. This would not 
be necessary if existence did not manifest qualitative differences. But 
the parts of experience as they are known through experience are not 
homogenous and analogy is therefore a necessary way to 
understanding'. [op.cit.p 28]. 
In other words, a relationship of analogy acts in such a way as to bring discrete 
areas of knowledge and experience together and enables one to see that for 
example, that two things are alike in exhibiting a relation. In this way, the 
identification of the analogical relation is clearly connected with a process of 
abstraction. Leatherdale suggests that it is analogy's property of and relation 
with abstraction, that accounts for its power and utility in mathematics. This 
thesis argues that this property is potentially useful to systems concepts also but 
that it must be treated with considerable caution. 
Leatherdale's case is drawn from mathematics in which we have, he suggests, 
an extremely complex system of abstract relations capable of illustrating 
analogical relations for the most heterogeneous domains of knowledge. Hence 
while there are, he suggests, some implied 'descriptive' features of 
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mathematical symbolism, for example, some symbols refer to variables, some 
to constants, some to the 'proper name' set of cardinal numbers, these 
meanings are contingent upon a symbolism which is flXed and unambiguous. 
Leatherdale develops his point by quoting Hawkins [1958] whom he credits 
with recognising the Gestalt-like analogical feature of mathematics. The point is 
that one set of equations [he gives Laplace's equations as a case in point] serves 
as an analogue for processes of change in a variety of diverse domains such as 
gravitation, electrostatics, electricity, elasticity and the flow of liquids. Hawkins 
expresses his point, 
' ... mathematics changes its position in the world of intellectual 
culture ... from that of tool of economic and technical interests to that 
also of a tool of intellectual growth to be prized and advanced and 
thereforefor some to be regarded as an end in itself.' [op.cit.p149]. 
There is reason to suggest that a developed model of analogy will allow similar 
benefits for the development of systems thinking also. We might now close 
this area of discussion in expressing the hope that it has been satisfactorily 
shown that the value of analogy relies on significant distinctions being drawn in 
a variety of analogical concepts apparent in scientific thinking. 
As we have seen the most fruitful is evidently the concept of 'imported analogy' 
and in the subsequent perceptions of analogy implied in Leatherdale's notion of 
the 'analogical act'. These latter aspects of analogy involve the importation of 
analogues from discrete areas of experience and knowledge with a resulting 
reconceptualisation of the area under investigation. In our discussion we have 
also decoupled the more common concepts of manifest analogy which typically 
involve the unwelcome introduction of a quasi-formal syllogistic framework. 
These have also been shown to be misleading and in some circumstances as 
invoking concepts of 'superficial analogy' which have acted to discredit the 
concept of analogy as a whole. 
3.3 ANALOGIES AND MODELS 
We began this chapter with Leatherdale's assertion that notions of model and 
metaphor inherently contain a concept of analogy. Since we have scanned some 
notions of analogy, we might now broaden the debate and consider the 
relationship between analogy, models and metaphors. 
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The concept of a 'model' aside from that of 'scale model', has this century 
spread throughout many more disciplines than those of physics and 
mathematics. in which the discussions and controversies on their utilities 
originally developed. Equally. the somewhat renewed concepts of metaphor are 
also enjoying a re-birth of interest in many fields of contemporary research and 
the significance of both model and metaphor is to do with their role in 
fonnulating a scientific explanation. 
Hesse [1963] raised an interesting point when she enquired as to the nature of 
'scientific explanation'. Is it necessary. she asked. that a scientific explanation 
of experimental data should be understood in terms of a model or analogy with 
phenomena already familiar? Does an 'explanation' imply an account of the new 
and unfamiliar in terms of the familiar and intelligible or does it only involve a 
correlation of data among other criteria, mathematical elegance, for example? 
A debate arises from these questions centring largely and inevitably on what is 
required in an 'explanation', that is, a debate on the criteria of explanation 
tackles one of the fundamental and traditional goals of science. It refers 
particularly to a dichotomy in the relative attractiveness of the two kinds of 
theory relevant to explanation. ' •.. abstract and systematic' theory versus 
explication in a 'model'. 
3.3.1 Developing the Debate on Analogy and Models. 
Hesse [op.cit.] develops complaints made by the French physicist Pierre 
Duhem [1954, p8OffJ, whose debate with English physicist N.R.Campbell 
[1957, Chapter 6] is still taken as a significant starting point in discussion of the 
role of models in science in the context of their relationship with analogy. 
Although the debate took place at the begiining of the century and was very 
much concerned with the development of physical theories it is still worth 
consideration as a general discourse on the nature and role of theory. 
Duhem [op.cit.] had cited some severe objections to the introduction of 
'mechanical models' which were based on a 'physical analogy' advocated by 
Kelvin and Maxwell and which the latter prescribed as a complement to the 
scientific method as follows; 
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'By physical analogy 1 mean that partial resemblance between the laws 
of a science and the laws of another science which makes one of the two 
sciences serve to illustrate another.' IS 
The broad implication in the tenus discussed earlier in the chapter is that there is 
a role for 'imported analogy' in the development and explanation of scientific 
theories and hence in the philosophy of science. Among the difficulties Duhem 
identified and attacked was the claim that the development of scientific models 
was somehow intrinsic to the parallel development of theories. He complained 
that such models could mislead the investigator by being taken too literally as 
explanations of the matter in hand, thus acting to distract the mind from the 
'search for logical order'. In other words, Duhem claimed that the 
'mechanistic', [although this is being used with an implied sense of 
'systematicity' and is divorced from the functionalist attributes by which the 
term is normally now recognised] character of models at the ontological level 
would lead to much more subtle epistemological and paradigmatic consequences 
for the processes of scientific investigation. 
Duhem instead proposed by way of antidote, that this uncotnfortable situation 
could be avoided and that scientific explanation can be more fruitfully 
described, if models are developed in terms of purely formal, deductive 
systems. For him, the notion of a physical theory comprised a system of a 
small number of extremely general hypotheses referring to abstract ideas and 
also of laws which could be strictly derived from these hypotheses by 
deduction. 
Some of the features of such a theory can be interpreted into observables and 
hence empirically tested, but his main assertion was that theory, as a whole, 
does not require explication by means of any model, and thus the possible 
epistemological problems are eradicable. For Duhem [op.cit.], the ideal 
physical theory would be a deductive mathematical structure, 'unencumbered by 
extraneous analogies or imaginative representations', leaving theory abstracted 
and ideally formalised. 
Not surprisingly, Duhem's stand did not pass without challenge. 
N.R.Campbell [1957], strongly disputed the view that models were 'mere aids' 
to theory construction which could be thrown away once the theory had been 
IS In: J.C. Maxwell. ed., W.D. Niven [op.cit]. Vol.1. plS6. 
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developed on the grounds that they were not logically necessary nor under some 
circumstances. as described. desirable. Campbell argued that the formal 
deductive criterion of scientific theories was not satisfactory because in addition 
to meeting logical criteria, theories must also display an analogy with already 
established laws. Campbell based his counter argument on two main points. 
His fIrst point was that we. as investigators. require to be 'intellectually 
satisfIed' by a theory and that this satisfaction implies that the theory has an 
intelligible interpretation in terms of a model. as well as having in some cases a 
mathematical intelligibility. 
Secondly. Campbell goes on to presuppose the dynamic character of theories. 
In other words and in sympathy with the context of this thesis. Campbell 
stressed that a theory in its scientifIc context is not a static museum piece. nor 
the abstract formalism Duhem suggests. but is always being extended and 
modified to account for new phenomena and circumstance. 
Campbell illustrates his argument with reference to the kinetic theory of gases 
which was developed with the aid of the 'billiard bal/' model. He goes as far 
as to suggest that the analogical base of the model played an essential part in its 
extension and without it. any extension would have been 'merely arbitrary'. 
More will have to be said on the dangers of the arbitrary nature of theory 
extension and it will be argued that it is possible to introduce analogy as a 
rigourous and parsimonious process in research. This strand is very much in 
concert with Campbell's second point on the intrinsic importance of models. 
namely. that without a model. it is impossible to use a theory for one of the 
essential purposes we demand of it. namely to make predictions in 'new 
domains' of phenomena. He stresses. 
' .. .analogies are not "aids" to the establishment of theories,' they are an 
utterly essential part of theories without which theories would be 
completely valueless and unworthy of the name. It is often suggested 
that the analogy leads to theformulation of the theory, but that once the 
theory is formulated the analogy has served its purpose and may be 
removed or forgotten. Such a suggestion is absolutely false and 
perniciously misleading.' Campbell [op.cit. Chapter 6]. 
Campbell clearly suggests that analogies are of 'high signifIcance when 
developing theories and we can gain more understanding of how Campbell 
expected analogies to contribute by quoting from him further. Of special 
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interest in this context is his illustration of the imponance of analogy in 
developing the kinetic theory of gases and the nature of a putative [imported] 
analogy between gas molecules and billiard balls. 
The imponant point lies in identifying those conditions of analogy which have 
significance to an investigation and isolating those properties for full exploration 
according to the objectives of the study. Those features of a 'misleading' 
character in an analogy are not pursued and merely ascribed as irrelevances of 
that particular case. although they may well be of interest or significance under 
other circumstances. For example. 
When we take a collection 0/ billiard balls in random motion as a model 
for a gas we are not asserting that billiard balls are in all respects like gas 
particles (jor billiard balls are red or white, hard and shiny) and we are 
not intending to suggest that gas molecules have these properties. We 
are in/act saying that gas molecules are analogous to billiard balls and 
the relation of analogy means that there are some properties 0/ billiard 
balls which are not found in molecules.' [Quoted by Hesse. Ibid., 
Chapter 1]. 
It should be noted that the debate between Campbell and Duhem on the 
significance of models in the development of scientific theory as a mode of 
explanation was much influenced by the state of their own contemporary 
physics. Some of the details of the argument have not survived actual emerging 
evidence. Certain physicists and theoreticians might take this as an ultimate 
refutation of Campbell's position. since 'modern day Duhemists' propose there 
is a marked absence of intelligible models in quantum physics. 
But in this situation we can identify a degree of paradox. On the one hand it 
suggests that the march of physics goes on regardless of the availability or 
development of 'picturable models'. and this shows them superfluous to the 
scientific process. On the other hand. the idea of 'picturable models' is 
misleading. since a model need not be intrinsically picturable [i.e. it may be 
metaphoric]. Hence.'a three dimensional space curved in afourth dimension' 
is taken as an acceptable model in relativity theory, but it is certainly not easy to 
conjure up in the imagination. [See Figure 3.3.la]. 
Bhaskar. takes the example of the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian 
physics as symptomatic of. 
' ... the current trouble with micro physics, such that our imagination 
cannot find an adequate pictorial representation/or it and yet we have 
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every reason to believe that it is true. Hence a new scientific ontology 
or a fundamental change in scientific concepts may transform our 
conceptions of what is plausible'. [1975, pI55]. 
o 
o 
a 
FIGURE 3.3.1a: A Three Dimensional Space Curved in a Fourth 
Dimension? 
Nevertheless, Hesse [op.cit] in her essay maintains that this debate on the role 
of models is not fully closed. Something to interest us remains in Campbell's 
conviction that without models, theories cannot fulfil all the functions required 
of them; they cannot 'explain' and in particular, they cannot be genuinely 
predictive. 
Thus, by implication, models in some sense are 'essential' to the logic of 
scientific theories, although this assertion must be qualified with a rigourous 
definition of 'model'. Leatherdale points out that Campbell does not use the 
word model directly in his discussion on theory and that Duhem uses it only in 
the sense of 'imaginary' model, so clearly some analysis of the use of the term 
'model' in science is in order. Leatherdale notes in this context that, 
7t is unfortunate that the literature on 'models' displays a bewildering 
lack of agreement about what exactly is meant by the word model in 
relation to science: . 
[op.cit. p 40] 
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Hesse [op.cit. Chapter One] credits Campbell with giving this definition of 
'model' and evidently it is highly general, 
' ... a model is any system, whether buildable, picturable, imaginable or 
none of these, which has the characteristic of making a theory 
predictive. ' 
Leatherdale goes on to give four main senses in which 'model' is typically used 
and finds it useful to point out some ways in which the different 
conceptualisations of model 'agree'. This principally involves the remarks 
made on how the notion of a model displays an analogy. Leatherdale suggests 
that what is persistent in different usages of model is that, in each case, 'model' 
is taken as a 'species of analogue'. In this way he points out that in many 
cases, a model is taken to be a complex analogue of a matter of interest to 
science, although there is no clear cut criteria by which a degree of complexity 
establishes a model as an analogue. Additionally some writers, Max Black 
[1961] for example, include simple analogues and analogies drawn from 
ordinary experience as well as those others who draw the complex and 
systematic analogies from other areas of science. 
Hesse distinguishes two main senses in which model is used in her discussion 
of 'Models and Analogies in Science', those of Modell and Model2. Modell 
refers to 'physical' analogy or those external analogies which are 'imported' to 
fonnulate or develop laws and theories. Model2 corresponds to a theory or part 
of a theory which is under investigation and development 
In Leatherdale's discussion, Modell refers clearly to an imported analogy and 
Model2 he claims to the formulated topic analogue. In the context of the model 
of analogy to be developed in the next chapter, Modell refers to the 'new 
domain' as qualified by the deductivefmductive/analogical relationship with the 
analogue set and Model2 to the process of [hypothesis] development 
concatenated into the dynamics of the fonnal analogical model. 
In more general terms, Modelsl&2 refer respectively to a 'model of and a 
'model in' theory. We have in Chapter Two already noted the problems 
associated with development of concepts in and of science and Leatherdale 
suggests much of the confusion surrounding the role and meaning of models is 
rooted in failing to make this distinction. The matter becomes clearer when 
considered in terms of the role of 'models in' and 'models or a discussion of 
analogy in this way. 
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Leatherdale in his reference to four concepts of model claims that these are the 
result of there being two variants of each sense of model just outlined. The 
variants themselves depend on the degree of formality given to the conception 
of 'model' and broadly caricatured by Duhem's and Campbell's imaginary 
discussion described by Hesse [op.cit. Chapter One]. Leatherdale clarifies the 
point, 
'In the case of either sort of model [Modell, of or Model2 in 1, the 
model may be conceived of as either a set of assumptions about, or 
actual, entities, processes, structures or causes and relations or 
alternatively as a set of propositions or statements connected together in 
a deductive system. [op.cit., p43]. Bracket added. 
Therefore clearly of importance in the discussion of models and analogy must 
be the two-way relationship between theory and modelling. Braithwaite, 
quoted by Leatherdale, [op.cit., p43] has given a much discussed definition of a 
fonnalised conceptualisation of what Leatherdale sees as Mode12, hence, 
'A theory and a model for it ... have the same formal structure since 
theory and model are both represented by the same calculus ... 16 
Or further, 
'If two deductive systems are interpretations of the same calculus and if 
in one interpretation the initial formulas of the calculus containing 
theoretical terms are epistemologically prior to the derived formulas not 
containing theoretical terms, whereas in the second system the derived 
formulas are epistemologically prior, then ... theformer system is related 
to the latter as a model is to theory. In other words a theory and its 
models are formally isomorphic'.11 
Braithwaite is proposing that a theory and its models are formally isomorphic 
and that we come to know most of the propositions of the theory starting from 
the lowest levels and working up to those propositions of the greater generality, 
and also those propositions of the model starting from the highest level 
statements and working down to increased specificity. 
The ideas have been further developed in the so-called 'B-N-S' model [after 
Braithwaite, 1955; Nagel, 1961; Suppes, 1957]. The advantages of deriving a 
16 R.B.Braithwaite. Models in the Empirical Sciences. p230f In: E.Nagel. P.Suppes & 
A. Tarski. (eds.). Logic. Mathematics and Philosophy of Science. Stanford, 1962. 
17 Ibid .• 
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B-N-S 'mode1' for a theory is that the model interpretation is usually more 
straightforward and familiar than the theoretical one and consequently serves as 
a stimulus to thought with the added bonus that any discoveries made using the 
model will have the same logical structure as parallels in the theory. The claim 
for fonnal isomorphism between model and theory is, as Oirill [1970] has 
pointed out, 
' ... a good description of, and an even better reconstruction of the 
relation of models to theories in science, because such formal models 
fulfil two importantJunctions,' 
i) an informative function- aids in understanding concepts and their 
relationship in the theory modelled: 
ii) an heuristic function- aids in the process of extending and 
developing the theory'. 
Figure 3.3.1b is a speculative interpretation and illustrates the proposition that 
extending the theoretical domain is not inherent in the B-N-S model [evidently 
itself a Model2] of the theory/model relationship, although this feature is at a 
later stage attributed to the function of analogical models. 
Achinstein [1964, pp328-349] criticises the B-N-S conceptualisation severely 
on the grounds that the formal similarity between corresponding sets of 
propositions is considered as the only relationship required between theory and 
model. Braithwaite had in fact already put it quite bluntly, saying that, 
' ... the similarity in formal structure is all that is required of the 
relationship of the model to theory'. [op.cit.p93]. 
1. THEORY: The initial foonulas of the 
calculus 
containing tbea:'etica1 tenns. 
,\'7 
'specificity' 
'epistemOlogical priority' 
2. MODEL: The derived formulas of the 
calculus 
oontainin& no theoretical temls. 
,\,a? 
'apecificity' 
FORMAL ISOMORPHISM 
FIGURE 3.3.1b: An Interpretation of the B-N-S Model. 
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BNS originators employ the terms 'model' and 'analogy' interchangeably. 
Achinstein [1964] however chooses to distinguish between them thus; 
' ... the term model is frequently used by the scientist in the expression 
'model of an x' to refer to a set of postulates or assumptions describing 
certain physical objects or phenomena of type x. Accordingly the 
prepositions comprising the model of an x are the same ones 
constituting what may also be called a theory of an x, (the Bohr theory 
of the hydrogen atom, the free electron theory of metals, the Ising 
theory offerromagnetism, etc.) though it obviously is not true that all 
sets of assumptions, even those called theories will be classified as 
models.' 
Achinstein asserts that whatever the precise nature or number of such 
assumptions, it is important to recognise only that the terms model and theory 
are often used to refer to the same set of assumptions. Alternatively he suggests 
that, 
an analogy is drawn between certain objects or phenomena 
described in a model (of an x) or theory and other objects or phenomena 
which may be morefamiliar (i.e.corresponding entities are alleged to be 
similar in certain respects but nevertheless are to be 
disting uished).' 1Ibid]. 
Achinstein's argument is that there are other bases for a relationship between the 
two concepts namely that of physical similarity. 
Obviously it is crucial not to confuse the scientist's model or 'theory of an x' 
with analogies which may be invoked in explaining its features and which may 
have also aided its construction. Hence Lord Kelvin in his Baltimore 
LectureslS offers a certain analogical description of the ether; 
'The luminiferous ether we must imagine to be a substance which so far 
as luminiferous vibrations are concerned moves as if it were an elastic 
solid. I do not say it is an elastic solid. ' 
In this context we can appreciate Leatherdale's note that it is difficult to find a 
brief and precise definition of a model in the sense of Model2 and this is 
relevant to the points of Chapter Two when we attempted to explore the concept 
of science via the construction of a model in science, that of factual science. 
18 Lord Kelvin, Baltimore Lectures 011 Molecular Dynamics and the Wave Theory of Ught, 
London. 1904. pS-12. 
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But if we disregard the variety of uses of the tenn model identified here in tenns 
of Modell &2 viewed formally or infonnally, the main focus of the argument 
returns to two fundametally opposing views of theory. On one side of the 
debate are those writers who believe that theoretical statements and the 
theoretical entities to which they refer, are to be underst<XXi in tenns of, and 
derive their meanings from, references to their logical connections within a 
deductive system of propositions with other statements which refer only to 
observations and experiment procedures. 
Leatherdale suggests that to this group belong, non exhaustively, operationalists 
and positivists. The first because they believe that all extra-logical tenns are 
defmable with operations, that is, actual observations or empirical procedures. 
The second because they believe that all theories and laws are merely predictive, 
summarising fonnulas which serve to link elements derived from direct 
experience. The view is summed up by thinkers like Braithwaite who, although 
describing himself as a contextualist, asserts that, 
' ... an understanding 0/ a theoretical concept in a scientific theory is an 
understanding of the role which the theoretical term representing it plays 
in the calculus expressing the theory ... thinking of a model of a theory 
is quite unnecessary for a full understanding of the theory. ,[op.cit., 
1962,p230f] 
On the other side of the debate we find the 'modellists', as Leatherdale suggests 
they are known, who believe that theories are more than calculi, or predictive 
and summarising devices or deductive systems which generate theorems. The 
modellists' claim is most cogently taken as that put forward by Campbell 
[op.cit., p129f]. Although the latter did not write specifically on the role of 
models, his work is taken as a clear precursor of the modellist viewpoint. 
Campbell's point is such that a theory must have a 'meaning' and that it has a 
meaning by virtue of the analogy it displays with established scientific laws. To 
take our leave from this debate for a while we can close with Leatherdale's 
summary of the spectrum of modellists' views, 
'Achinstein sees the role of a model as attributing inner structures 
compositions or mechanisms to objects or systems so as to explain 
various propenies ... moreover it is supposed to provide at least some 
approximation to the actual situation {i.e. it 11IiJkes ontological claims} ... 
Hesse claims that models supply ... a programme for the extension and 
development of a theory. Spector claims that a model gives semantic 
rules by which we may attribute observation predicates to theoretical 
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terms and hence to observable objects ... Gotlind sees models as 
providing intermediary links between mathematical equations and 
empirical phenomena. Nash makes a similar but stronger claim that a 
model is an essential link without which the mathematics is not a 
scientific theory at all ... Hutten regards one of the chieffunctions of a 
model as being able to supply a descriptive terminology for theory ... ' 
[op.cit., p48]. 
3.4 ANALOGY AND METAPHOR 
We began this chapter by stating that analogy is a special, simpler case than 
either model or metaphor and that it is implicitly contained in each one. 
Metaphor is an area of study which has enjoyed a considerable amount of 
attention in recent years although again, it is hardly a new idea. 
3.4.1 Concepts of Metaphor 
There are a number of views on metaphor which are worth discussion. 
Leatherdale [op.cit.,pl04] quotes Cassirer's [1942] concept of 'radical 
metaphor' as illustrating a relatively early interest in the subject paralleling the 
contemporary and noting the influence of the eighteenth century debate on the 
feature of metaphor as being a critical part of language and thought. 
Mueller is quoted by Leatherdale as expressing the modem view, in which far 
from being regarded as being a merely literary embellishment, metaphor is seen 
as key to understanding or at least 'easing the expansion of understanding' 
beyond its current limits. Mueller puts it this way, 
'It was completely impossible to grasp and hold the outer world, to 
know and to understand, to conceive and to name, without ... 
fundamental metaphor ... Metaphor in this sense was much less the 
carrying over of a wordfrom one concept to another than the creation of 
a new concept by means of an old name.' [Leatherdale, op.cit. 
pI2619]. 
Another view of metaphor stresses the significance of metaphor in promoting an 
'interanimation' of one field of thought with another. This interesting notion is 
put forward by lA.Richards [1936]. In the latter's rook, "The Philosophy of 
19 From W. Urban, Language and Reality, New York. 1939, Chapter 9.] 
101 
, 
Rhetoric', he argupd for a conceptualisation of metaphor in which the 
importance is described as, 
'We all live and speak only through our eye for resemblances ... As 
individuals we gain our command of metaphor just as we learn whatever 
else makes us distinctively human.' [op.cit., p93]. 
Richards' view on metaphor evolved following his rejection of the eighteenth 
century assumption made by writers on rhetoric. It suggested that metaphor is 
something special and exceptional in the use of language, a deviation from its 
nonna! mode of working. Richards goes on, 
' ... metaphor has been treated as a sort of happy extra trick with words, 
an opportunity to exploit the accidents of their versatility ... In brief a 
grace or ornament or added power, not its constitutive form.' 20 
Richards' interest was in showing metaphor to be an omnipresent principle of 
language and that this principle could be established through observation. He 
said that, 
'We cannot get through as much as three sentences of ordinary fluid 
discourse without it even in the rigid language of the settled sciences we 
do not eliminate or prevent it without difficulty'. [Ibid. p92]. 
The mechanism of metaphor is especially fascinating because it implies that 
what we take as flXed words are somehow shifting in their senses. Richards 
describes it in its simplest fonn such that when we use a metaphor we have two 
thoughts of different things active together and supponed by a single phrase or 
concept whose meaning is a result of their interaction. 
Richards queries the traditional theory of metaphor which describes only a few 
of its multifarious facets and thereby has rendered metaphor a seemingly verbal 
issue whereas Richards stresses that metaphor is fundamentally a borrowing 
and intercourse of thoughts and a transaction between contexts. To paraphrase, 
'thought is metaphoric and proceeds by comparison and the metaphors of 
language derive therefrom'. 
Richards introduces two terms and a number of steps in which he attempts to 
reveal the complexities of the metaphorical configuration, see Figure 3.4.1a 
given below. 
20 Quoted by E.Partridge. 1963, Usage and Abusage, Penguin, Hannondsworth. p180. 
102 
IDEA 
(fenor) -
, 
UNDERSTANDING 
-
IMAGE 
(Vehicle) 
t=O 
, 
t=n 
FIGURE 3.4.18: Tenor, Vehicle and Understanding. 
Richards specifically introduces 'tenor' and 'vehicle' as the two ideas that any 
metaphor in eliciting conditions of co-presence supplies. Tenor and vehicle [see 
Figure 3.4.1a] were intended to tighten up the clumsy descriptions of the 
metaphorical process implied by the usual phrases of, 
' .•. the original idea & the borrowed idea ... 
... what is really being said & what it is compared to ... 
... the underlying idea & the imaginary idea ... 
... the principle & the resemblance .. . 
... the meaning & the metaphor .. . 
... the idea & the image ... 
... the tenor & the vehicle .. .' 
Given the above, the potential for confusion can be easily appreciated. In his 
objection to the view that metaphor was 'mere embellishment' or 'added beauty 
to the plain meaning', Richards insisted that the many important issues are 
raised by metaphor. He argued that the co-presence of tenor and vehicle 
resulted in a meaning clearly distinguishable from that of the tenor [that is a 
meaning, 'richer', 'subtler', 'fuller', i.e. in systemic terms possessed of 
emergent properties] than that of the tenor alone and that meaning is not 
attainable without an interaction with the vehicle. This applies equally to the 
concept of vehicle. 
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Overall, Richards suggested that our skill with metaphor in poetic, prosaic and 
literary thought is one thing, prodigious and inexplicable but that our awareness 
and understanding of that skill is quite another, very incomplete and distorted, 
fallacious and oversimplifying. Hence he claims the business of reflective 
awareness is to protect our natural skill from the interferences of our crude 
views about it. We can also note in this context the remarks made in Chapter 
One on the dangers of the ad hoc use of metaphor in systems thinking and 
methodology . 
In this respect we might funher consider the 'shifting senses' of words in 
metaphorical use. The issue is such that the first thing we notice about 
metaphor is principally that word meanings are not straightforward and 
invariant, as in the views on uses oflanguage in which words are taken in their 
'literal sense' only. This term 'literal', is defined by Leatherdale [op.cit., p98] 
as the unambiguous usage of a word which enables one to readily understand 
and act upon, or assent to or deny the truth of sentences in which the word 
appears. This is obviously a broad definition and collecti~sation of a whole 
range of issues in linguistic philosophy, but nevertheless a definition which will 
suffice for our illustrative purposes here. 
In the metaphorical use of language there is a disharmony between words and 
contexts. We are using language descriptively in unfamiliar ways and ascribing 
to words attributes, properties, nuances and relations that are not located among 
their literal meanings and which at first sight might seem inappropriate. 
Essentially this view implies that there is a mixing of contexts in which far from 
exhibiting a failure to communicate effectively, we strive to make sense and to 
maintain coherence in such situations. This is done by' ... trying to find some 
unity between discordant contexts ... ' and by exploring, in Leatherdale's words 
[op.cit., p98], •... the less immediate associations of imagery, sensual and 
physical experience and inference' or as Black [op.cit.] has it, (although he 
does not enlarge on how these might arise), Oft the basis of 'received 
commonplaces' • 
In this way Black [1979, p27] remarks that metaphor 'creates' novel insight, 
but this is, on reflection slightly misleading, since it appears to suggest that 
metaphor formulates 'something out of nothing', when there must be at some 
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level, however esoteric, some contextual parallel of similarity. The is a 
fundamentally analogical component. 
The tension between metaphorical and literal uses of language has caused some 
writers to express the view that, after Leatherdale, 
I ••• whether we are dealing with the novel perceptions 0/ poetry or the 
discovery 0/ some previously undesignated aspect o/things in science, 
the communication or expression 0/ a genuinely novel idea will require 
trespassing the boundaries and old literal meanings and there seem to be 
only two ways 0/ doing this. One by ostensive definition and two, by 
use o/metaphor or simile.2l' [op.cit., pl04]. 
The area of 'ostensive definition' is clearly problematic when we are attempting 
to introduce, communicate or express new ideas. Indeed the philosophical 
utility of ostensive definition has been illustrated by some writers as being best 
observed when one attempts to point out a bone to a dog. The dog merely 
responds by sniffing one's finger. Leatherdale [op.cit., pl07] further notes that 
it is characteristic of the learning process that early on, we begin to supplement 
mere indication by verbal exposition and this necessarily involves metaphor, 
which is shown to be an indispensable auxiliary to an ostensive process. 
Van Steenburgh [1965] has also suggested that literal and metaphorical usages 
of words can be distinguished in terms of ostensive definition and proposed that 
literal language could be identified by the fact that it is learned ostensively by 
observation and that metaphorical usages are learned otherwise. 
A rudimentary scan at the processes of learning and the accumulations of 
vocabulary by the individual and culturally, would seem to emphasise the 
predominant role of metaphor in this context. Consequently the etymological 
and philosophical claim that languages began 'literally' is clearly misguided, 
21 Metaphor and simile enjoy an intimate relationship but unlike a metaphor, a 
simile is usually characterised by a particular form of words, 'is ... as', for 
example since it is a clear comparison and uses the form appropriate to this. 
However this definition is not really sufficient to encapture all similes, which 
we should also note as being unusual, and non- 'matter of fact' comparisons, 
but ones suggestive of some novelty. The important point is to notice that 
similes differ from metaphors in that they do not elicit the 'fusion or absorption' 
of conceptual areas of comparison in the way of the latter and that throughout 
analysis similes maintain a conceptual distance between the objects of 
comparison which remain characteristically distinct. 
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because this would suggest that they were learned through ostensive defmition. 
Leatherdale illustrates the opposing point that literal language is in fact an 
'emergence' from non-literal uses with a set of conclusions taken from Barfield, 
[1960], 
'Literalness is a quality which some words have achieved in the course 
of their history; it is not a quality which theftrst words were born. And 
let us be clear about the consequences. We mean by 'literal' word or 
meaning, one which is not a vehicle with a tenor, or let me say one 
which is a vehicle without a tenor. But the vast majority of the words 
by which we today denote the objects of the outer world would have at 
some stage of their life been vehicles without tenor and if that is so, it 
follows that they began life as vehicles with a tenor.' [op.cit., pl06] • 
But if we take 'literalness' as an emergent feature of language we ought then to 
consider its relation, suggests Leatherdale, with science, principally because we 
often uncritically equate the literal with the scientific and vice versa, which is 
evident from our observations on the nature of science as made in Chapter Two. 
This is a view which is prevalent with writers and thinkers who tend to regard 
'common sense language' and 'material-object' language as 'literal' and 
therefore somehow more important [even perhaps more 'true'], in scientific 
terms, than metaphorical and hence by implication, complex language. The 
viewpoint serves to rather paradoxically reinforce an already discredited view 
that metaphors are parasitic and exceptional to language in its normal mode of 
working. It also leads to the confusion of the values of 'subject matter' and 
'style' of expression and while of course, certain styles might be pragmatically 
more suitable in certain contexts this assumption is dangerous, if accepted 'a 
. ., pnon. 
This is because again it reinforces notions that metaphor and poetry are in some 
way intrinsically distinguishable by means of their use of language [and in fact, 
in this sense, there is an implied ontological distinction] which is clearly 
divorced from scientific usage and literalness. Leatherdale reiterates this highly 
significant point, 
This goes with the equally specious but pernicious assumption that 
literature is merely 'jancy' talk and that science is 'plain' talk. While 
there may be important differences between the metaphors of science 
and those of literature, there is really no reason a priori why metaphor 
should not be appropriate to science and it is equally perfectly possible 
for literature to be literal.' [op.cit. p107] . 
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The links between metaphor and thought and thus language are an imponant 
influence on Max Black, whose famous book 'Models and Metaphors' [1962] 
contributed the following to the theory of metaphor. Firstly, that contextual 
tensions between the vehicle and tenor could not be resolved and hence 
'understood' without an awareness of the implications of the metaphor. This is 
a reference to the significance he attributes to the concept of 'received 
commonplaces' and hence he posits that a metaphor can be concerned with 
'systems of ideas'. This led him to suggest that [to paraphrase], the metaphor 
'selects', 'controls' or 'organises' features of the 'principle subject' [latterly the 
tenor, or as we shall see in the following chapter, the 'analogue set'], by 
implying statements about it that normally apply and refer to the secondary 
subject, [or vehicle]. Secondly, Black maintains that the system of 
associations, that is, the 'received commonplaces' need not be a 'natural 
system' but may be specifically 'constructed'. Black explains it this way, 
'Metaphors can be supported by specially constructed systems of 
implications as well as by accepted c01111'fWnpiaces, they can be made to 
measure and need not be reach me downs.' [op.cit. 1962, p40]. 
Black's view implies that models are in fact extended and systematic metaphors 
and this idea had also previously been developed by Hutten [1956], whose 
strong views on the integral relation between theories and models we briefly 
heard in the preceding section in connection with our discussion on the role of 
analogy. In this context, we might again stress that it is analogy which is the 
fundamental concept, supporting metaphor although the views on the 
relationship of metaphor with science can spring from a variety of perspectives. 
The diversity of origin is a result of that described earlier as two opposing 
views on metaphor and its relationship with language and thought briefly 
introduced earlier in this section. Ortony [1979] in his description of 
'Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem' updates and enlarges upon the 
eighteenth century view of metaphor as embellishment and the modern view 
presented through the description of Richards' interest in the area. 
Ortony [op.cit., ppl-19] labels the two sets of views on metaphor as 
'constructivism' and 'non-constructivism'. The division is based on the 
opposing views on the role of a scientific model whic~ was briefly described in 
the previous section. Ortony sets the terms for enlarging the debate on metaphor 
and its relationship with science, which appears to be high on the philosophical 
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agenda. He points out that science [as we were obliged to describe it in Chapter 
Two] is supposed to be characterised by precision and the absence of ambiguity 
and he makes it clear that the language of science is often thought to be 
correspondingly precise and unambiguous, in short, literal. We have broadly 
explored this theme but overall, it can be seen that scientific faith in literal 
language as the only adequate and appropriate tool for the objective 
characterisation of reality has manifested itself in many ways; culminating, 
Ortony suggests, in the 'heyday of logical positivism' in which the idea of a 
literal language reigned supreme. 
Ortony however goes on to suggest that another approach is possible and the 
central idea of this approach is that cognition is the result of mental 
construction, 
'Knowledge of reality whether it is occasioned by perception, language, 
memory or anything else is a result of going beyond the information 
given. It arises through the interaction of that information with the 
context and that knower's pre-existing knowledge.' [op.cit. 
Introduction]. 
This obviously parallels with the notions of 'analogical acts' which were 
described earlier and it is clearly a relativist position to adopt. In other words, 
Ortony is suggesting that the so-called objective world is not directly accessible 
but constructed on the basis of the constraining influences of human knowledge 
and significantly, language. This view hence provides no basis for a rigid 
differentiation between 'scientific' languages and other kinds, those of 
perception or imagination, for example. 
Thus the constructivist sees metaphor as an essential characteristic of the 
creativity of language, entailing an important role for metaphor in thought. But 
their concern is also to break down the distinction between the literal and the 
metaphorical. From the above quotation it is clear that constructivists evidently 
accept that meaning is constructed rather than merely 'read off reality and hence 
the meaning of non-literal uses of language do not constitute a special problem 
[for science]. Use and comprehension of language are essentially creative they 
maintain, and this means that the constructivist repudiates the distinction 
between the languages of the poet and the scientist. 
Meanwhile the non-constructivist sees metaphor as deviant and parasitic upon 
normal use of language and that if metaphors require an explanation then that 
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explanation will be merely in terms of violations of linguistic rules and 
conceptual frameworks. Thus metaphors characterise rhetoric and not scientific 
discourse, being fuzzy, vague, inessential frills which are not appropriate to 
objectivity. The two views clearly reflect similar objections to models raised by 
the modellists and the positivists/operationalists in the preceding section. 
One idea clearly in sympathy with that of the constructivists is presented by 
Buchanan [1962], whose underlying belief is that analogy, as a resemblance of 
relations, is fundamental to knowledge and understanding [notably in art or 
science]. It is by way of analogy that we have the related concepts of simile, 
allegory, poetry or symbolism of many other sons, [including mathematics, as 
Hawkins outlined]. Hence, 
'Analogical thought is so common that we are surprised ... any history 
of thought might begin and end with the statement that man is an 
analogical animal. ' [op.cit, p81]. 
Leatherdale goes on to give Buchanan's 'open' definition of analogy as 
follows, 
'It is the statement of the identity or similarity of at least two relations. It 
says in symbols, that the relation of A to B is the same as the relation C 
to D ... relations may be of any degree of complexity provided the 
identity or similarity is not violated ... I shall call this property of 
analogies their expansiveness.' [Ibid, p82]. 
The concept of expansion of analogy is central to Buchanan's conceptualisation, 
as it is to Black's view on the open-endedness of metaphor. As Onony has 
pointed out, there is no definitive answer to the basic question, 'what is a 
metaphor?' and he suggests that Black [1979], is 'not really concerned with 
establishing what a particular metaphor means'. Rather, he is interested in 
giving an account of metaphor that satisfies an intuition that many writers in the 
area have had, [see Mueller's remarks at the beginning of the section] that there 
is some special, emergent 'new thing' created when a novel metaphor is 
understood, something new that is attributable to the metaphor itself, rather than 
to the emerged novelty. 
Boyd [1979, pp356-409] presented what he dubbed as the three most widely 
held views on metaphor as the substitution, the comparison and interactive 
viewpoints which each form a broad framework for the putative solution of 
metaphorical statements. Black [op.cit.] has rejected the 'substitution view' of 
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metaphor which proposed that every metaphorical statement was equivalent to a 
'literal' statement, which here we have shown to be impossible. 
Black also criticised the comparison viewpoint, taking it as a special case of the 
former, since it entails notions which propose that successful communication 
via metaphor involves the hearer understanding the same respects of similarity 
or analogy as the speaker. We can, incidentally, plainly see here the 
identification of metaphor as principally a 'verbal' phenomenon. 
Instead, Black adopts the 'interaction' view of metaphor which suggests that 
metaphors work by applying to a principle [literal] subject [the tenor] a system 
of associated implications characteristic of the metaphorical [vehicular] 
secondary subject. Black's position rests mainly on an important distinction 
from the comparison theory. In contrast to the latter Black denies that 
successful communication via metaphor depends on the communication of quite 
definite aspects of either the vehicle or tenor and maintains that metaphors are 
open-ended. 
Another important divergence from the comparison theory is that Black also 
denies that any analysis, 'however elaborate' of an interaction metaphor in 
terms of making explicit the analogies between the tenor and vehicle, can 
capture the cognitive content that a metaphor is capable of conveying. 
Funher, Black suggests that in some respects it is revealing to understand 
metaphors as creating ['calling forth'] the analogies on which they depend. 
Black sees these features of metaphor as indicative of an important difference 
between metaphorical uses of language and those uses which have the features 
of explicitness characteristic of scientific usage. In this context, he remarks, 
'We need the metaphors in just those cases where there can be no 
question as yet of the precision of scientific statements. Metaphorical 
statement is not a substitute for formal comparison or any other kind of 
literal statement but has its own distinctive capacities and achievements.' 
[Black, 1962, p46]. 
Boyd suggests that his view implies that if metaphorical language is used in a 
scientific context then its function should lie in the pre-theoretical [,pre-
scientific', in the Kuhnian 1962, sense] stages of the development of a 
discipline. Or in the case of mature sciences it should occur in the realms of 
heuristics or in notably 'informal' exegesis. 
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In forming his view Boyd [op.cit.] found it useful to compare and contrast his 
understanding of scientific metaphors broadly with Black's account of 
metaphors in general. Boyd consequently suggests that there exists a class of 
metaphors which play an important role in the development and aniculation of 
theories in 'relatively mature' sciences. These are used to introduce theoretical 
terminology where none previously existed. [This point could clearly be 
included in the argument for the non-literalness of scientific language.] 
Such 'scientific metaphors' possess several though not all of the characteristics 
of what Black has called 'interaction metaphors', in particular their 'success' 
does not depend on them communicating specific areas of similarity or 
'analogy' but rather on the heuristic value of the conceptual 'fusion' they 
proffer across contexts. The open-endedness that Black sees as the most 
significant aspect of the interaction metaphor. is their contribution to scientific 
development 
Boyd thus argues that metaphors can be of significant importance in scientific 
development and the impression that the inclusion of metaphor must somehow 
involve a lack of precision and accuracy, rests on a mistaken view of the role of 
precision in science. We can reflect on Davies and Ledington's [1988] argument 
for the pragmatic inclusion of metaphor in SSM [Checkland 1981] here. Boyd 
suggests that the use of metaphor is one of many devices available to the 
scientific community to accomplish the task of the 'accommodation of language 
to the causal structure of the world'. That is. the task of introducing and 
modifying terminology so that we can establish terms of reference which 'cut 
the world at its joints'. 
What I see Boyd as suggesting here. is that the employment of metaphor in 
science and in 'reference fixing' [this relates to our points on literal and 
metaphorical uses of language] serves as a 'non-defmitional' mode of reference 
fixing. This is especially well suited to the introduction of terms referring to 
complex relations which we have not yet been able to approach by other means. 
Thus the employment of metaphor provides the basis for making explicit much 
of what is tacit and inexplicit in scientific work. 
Boyd goes on to describe a considerable spectrum of sorts of metaphor which 
he considers play a role in science or in the terms of his points on 'theory 
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change'. Firstly he parallels them [rather dangerously] in their exegetical 
context with aiding explication and teaching of theories which have 'non-
metaphorical' formulations. [This ascribed role for scientific metaphors runs 
dangerously close to the debate we introduced in terms of a similar role of 
models in theory development and it is difficult to see what could be gained 
from re-entering that quagmire save to notice the 'Warning' signs.] 
Boyd [op.cit.] gives the examples of the metaphors of'wormholes in general 
relativity' or that of an 'electron cloud' or the description of atoms as 
'miniature solar systems'. Boyd points out that while the first two examples are 
merely descriptive, the third example does betray a theoretical insight. 
Although in this example the theory does not arise from the open-endedness of 
the metaphor since Boyd argues that one could say 'literally' in what sense 
Bohr thought that atoms were like solar systems. [Nevertheless these examples 
do not discredit the role of scientific metaphor, since Boyd has noted Kuhn's 
conceptualisation of the establishment of fundamentally new theoretical 
perspectives rests significantly on persuasion, recruitment and indoctrination. 
Clearly then, a number of pedagogically effective and convincing metaphors is 
pertinent to development and progress.] 
The most interesting metaphors, he suggests, are those which constitute, if only 
temporarily an irreplaceable part of the linguistic machinery for a scientific 
theory. These metaphors are constitutive of the theories they express and are 
important for their contribution in expressing theoretical claims for which there 
is no 'literal' paraphrase. [Again this argument could be used to undermine the 
substitution theory of metaphor]. Boyd suggests that such metaphors are 
prevalent in young sciences and gives the example of 'the brain is a computer' 
as a theory constitutive metaphor for developments in cognitive psychology. 
Hence 'theory constitutive metaphors represent one strategy for the 
accommodation of language to as yet undiscovered causal features of the 
world', [op.cit. p362]. 
Leatherdale comments that in sum, Black's [and hence Boyd's work which was 
based to some degree on the latters1 influence on the metaphorical view of 
science is not at all straightforward. Black's contribution was to give, he 
suggests, accounts of both models and metapho~ [which were originally 
published separately] and which are very suggestive of their similarities. He 
comments, 
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'Certainly there is some similarity between the use of model and the use 
of metaphor- perhaps we should say of a sustained and systematic 
metaphor. And the crucial question about the autonomy of the method of 
models is paralleled by an ancient dispute about the transferability of 
metaphors ... Those who see the model as merely a crutch are like those 
who consider a metaphor as mere decoration or ornament. But there are 
poweiful and irreplaceable uses of metaphor that are not adequately 
described by the old formula of "saying one thing and meaning 
another". ' [op.cit. .• 1962. p236]. 
We have only briefly discussed the potential role for metaphor in science at a 
macro-level. We have already stressed that a fundamentally less complex 
concept of analogy. [less complex because it does not 'elicit fusion'. but co-
presence of contexts] is contained within it. Thus before closing this section I 
would like to make some further though brief remarks on the utility of analogy 
for science at a micro-level. that is. in hypothesis formation. 
3.5 ANALOGY AND HYPOTHESIS FORMATION 
In the previous chapter we had cause to note Gilben's remarks on the 'analogic 
suggestion of hypotheses' and now will pursue a brief discussion on the role of 
analogy with reference to hypothesis formation. Hypotheses are normally taken 
to form the structure of scientific research and govern the deductive observation 
of scientific models. As we have argued. there are dubious claims that scientific 
knowledge is true and we prefer to suggest that it is merely hypothetical. 
Hypotheses are sometimes formulated by way of induction. that is, as 
generalisations on the basis of a number of observations. Hypotheses may be 
arrived at by way of analogies, conceptual or mathematical. Bunge [1959. p68] 
suggests the former is illustrated by Huygens [1690]. who originally found it 
useful to compare waves of light. sound and water, 
'I call them [light and sound] waves from their resemblance to those 
which are seen to be formed in water when a stone is thrown into it, and 
which present a successive spreading as circles, though these arise from 
another cause and are only in aflat surface.' [op.citp4] 
Funher. the latter are exemplified by Maxwell's [1873] work in which he 
predicted the existence of electro-magnetic waves on the basis of a formal 
analogy between his field equations and the known equations of elastic waves. 
This also illustrates the imponant point that analogies in science are not limited 
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to the comparison of theoretical objects with more or less familiar objects from 
everyday experience. They might also evidently be derived from an analogical 
involvement between two theoretical objects or phenomena. 
Sometimes an investigator might be led by philosophical considerations 
influenced by analogy. This was how Oersted [1820]22 proceeded, deliberately 
seeking a connection between electricity and magnetism on the a priori 
conviction that the structure of every existent is polar, and that the forces of 
nature are organically linked. A similar philosophical conviction that there is no 
limit to the complexity of nature also led Bohm23 to speculate about a sub-
quantum mechanical level, on the basis of an analogy with classical Brownian 
motion. 
Hypotheses are arrived at, in short, in a number of ways. Many heuristic 
principles are at work, the sole requirement being that it should be in some way 
'testable'. The nature of the test and the direction from which it is approached 
highlight a variety of interests. Logicians would stress the validity of the 
hypothesis as a basis for inference to general and singular propositions. The 
psychologist would be concerned with the process by which the exploration of 
hypothesis-testing yields somehow creative models. The methodologist with 
the development of the appropriate test and the philosopher with the nature of 
the framework generating the hypothesis. 
Our interest in analogy regarding the process of hypothesis formation is, at this 
juncture, in the initial stages of the perception of an analogy, that is, 
'observation' and subsequent 'supposition'. We have already discussed the 
perception of an analogy as an 'analogical act' and it may also be described as a 
secondary step of supposition in that moment when the investigator regards the 
observed analogy as having an heuristic utility. So what conditions, then, bring 
about this transfer from mere observation to a level of supposition which is to 
become a hypothesis, and how do these conditions come into existence? 
22 See S.F. Mason, A History of the Sc~nces. London Routledge Kcgan Paul. 1953, p386. 
23 D. Bohm, A Proposed Explanatioll of Quantum Theory ill T~rms of Hiddell Variables at a 
Sub Qualltum Mechanical Level. in Colston Papers, London, Butterwonhs, Scientific 
Publications, 1957, 9, p33. 
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De Groot [1968, p29] suggests that in such a translation in the social sciences 
there is always a substratum of 'fact'. But we have already discussed that this 
cannot be said to be the case with analogical mcxlels or any other form of mcxlel 
based on assumptions concerning 'literalness' of science to which 'fact' must 
be seen to refer. The substratum of fact is taken to result from either direct or 
processing of, observational data which is then said to form a factual 
underpinning as an empirical resource base for the investigator. 
Turbayne [1962] has observed, 
The attempt to re-allocate the facts by restoring them to where they 
'actually belong' is vain. It is like trying to observe the rule, 'Let us get 
rid of the metaphors and replace them with the literal truth'. But can this 
actually be done? We might just as well seek to provide what the poet 
'actually says' ... we can never know what the facts are ... We cannot 
help but allocate, sort or bundle the facts in some way or other.' 
[op.cit. p 64] 
Turbayne is pointing out that whatever the apparently empirical basis, it is 
always being viewed [in the processing of observational data] from a particular 
angle, i.e. in relation to the problem with which the investigation is concerned. 
This point is of a wider scope than the mere explanation of 'given facts', since 
the inductive ideal must be to generalise. There is evidently a theoretical 
framework in which we are working and the theoretical framework in this 
procedure provides the terms of reference for any 'data' observed and is of 
common significance to traditionally empirical and analogical investigations. 
Further de Groot points out, 
' ... one clearly discernible characteristic of the formation of a new 
supposition {hypothesis} is that it is based on a new interpretation of the 
factual data within the theoreticalframework'. [Op.Cilp 29]. 
Turbayne concludes that science is irreducibly metaphoric and that the only way 
to remedy the situation is by working to develop ever more effective and 
powerful metaphors, but always with the knowledge that we are using 
metaphOrs and hence analogies. 
Leatherda!e describes convincingly a corollary to Turbayne's claim that the 
unwitting use of analogy in its complex form of metaphor is more widespread 
than we might reason, even to the stage where it has already penetrated 
scientific method. [The argument that metaphor is a more complex form of 
analogy is persuasive, since it is not only based intrinsically on the latter but 
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even when bisected by the criteria of analogy, then as Black has suggested, we 
still are not able to predict its full implications.] 
In the second chapter, we discussed, under section 2.4 'The Nature of Science' 
the powerful influence of the mechanistic world view and its implications. 
Leatherdale [op.cit. p13S] goes on to suggest an article by Laudan, 'The Clock 
Metaphor and Probabilism' [1966] contains an argument to show how the 
metaphor of a clock and its invisible mechanism has effected English 
methodological thought. 
In general Laudan claims that Descartes was instrumental in introducing an 
attitude towards science in England that regarded theories as hypothetical, 
conjectural and probable rather than the 'true' 'certain' conclusions derived by 
induction or rational deduction. He concludes that Descartes suggested that the 
scientist must be content with hypothetical principles and conjectures rather than 
true and valid inductions/deductions and this has been an important stimulus. 
He illustrates his point by quoting from Descartes, 
We can propose mechanisms for how the internal parts of the watch 
might be arranged, though we can never, ex-hypothesi, get inside to see 
ifwe are right. Because the watch might be constructed in any number 
of ways, it is sufficient if we outline some possible arrangement which 
would account/or its external behaviour .. : [op.cit., pSI]. 
Also Campbell has argued that a theory consists of a hypothesis and a 
'dictionary' and that the 'propositions of the hypothesis must be analogous to 
some known laws'. He goes on to say, 
The hypothesis gives the real meaning of the theory and involves 
analogy which confers on it value: and the dictionary uses the analogy 
and the propositions contained in it are usually suggested by the 
analogy .. .' [op.cit., p133]. 
The significance of analogy to hypothesis formation has been briefly illustrated. 
In the framework of analogy to be presented in the next chapter we will develop 
the connections between processes of analogy and the exploration of 
hypotheses further. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have drawn out two main points. Firstly that analogy 
is a form of comparison that has traditionally been conceived as a loose 
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identification of resemblances, but which can also be shown to be 
rigourous and vital to theory development. Secondly, that the validity 
of the argument from analogy, which has much concerned 
philosophers, can be assessed in tenns of an argument relating to any 
fonn of model, since models are vital ways of developing appreciations 
of theories and concepts. 
The following chapters will hence consider two main areas; What is a 
useful model of analogy for systems thinkers? When is an argument 
from analogy a valid argument, that is, under what circumstances can 
the practical explorations of analogy be useful for theoretical 
development in systems theory? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A MODEL OF ANALOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding section we have established the potential value of 
analogy as a concept. In this and the following chapter we will take the 
study further by developing an explanation of how a model of analogy 
can be conceptualised. In the development of the model we will 
consider particular implications of three types of analogy, 'positive', 
'negative' and 'neutral' analogy in Chapter Five. The objective of the 
chapter is to introduce a model of analogy for systems thinkers. 
4.2 WHY MODEL ANALOGY FOR SYSTEMS? 
We noted in the fIrst chapter that systems and cybernetic research has drawn, 
and continues to draw, upon the concepts analogy and metaphor. General 
Systems Theory, for example, was built upon an analogic/homomorphic 
framework [see, for example, Bertalanffy, 1968]; cybernetics has traditionally 
been based on mechanical and biological analogies [Flood and Jackson, 1988] 
and is itself of a metaphorical nature. When using Soft Systems Methodology 
[conceived by Checkland, 1981], Atkinson [1984], Davies and Ledington 
[1988], Stowell and Allen [1988], all draw upon the concept metaphor. We 
have already suggested that the use of these concepts has been inadequately 
discussed and that the debate ranging from philosophical to practical issues 
must be explored further. 
The aim in this chapter is primarily to present a case for these concepts on 
philosophical grounds and by developing a model of analogy, also uncover 
some principles by which they may be incorporated into practical efforts. A 
commentary on these matters will be presented in the concluding Chapter 
Seven. 
The structure of the discussion in this chapter is as follows. Initially a formal 
distinction between analogy and, metaphor will be drawn, for purposes of 
developing a conceptualisation of use to systems thi~ers. Turning attention to 
analogy for a while, we will briefly consider its relationship to General Systems 
and Cybernetic Theories, uncovering the relevance to systems thinking of the 
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underlying principles of analogy and of analogical modelling. This provides the 
basis for our argument for analogy as a meta-concept which in processes of 
analogical reasoning, can overcome the difficulties of inductivism and 
deductivism. 
We will then tackle some 'more on metaphor' and discuss at once metaphor and 
analogy within the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. The lessons of this 
debate provide the basis for considering analogy and metaphor, under the 
umbrella of interpretive tenets, to be on one spectrum from the 'creative 
metaphor' to a more formally modelled approach of analogy. 
4.2.1 Distinguishing Analogy and Metaphor For Modelling- A 
Starting Point. 
From the broad discussion of 'analogy and models' and 'analogy and 
metaphor' in the preceding chapter, we might now distil a concept of analogy 
into that of the Oxford Dictionary of Current English; hence ·an analogy may be 
firstly defined as 'agreement, similarity (to, with, between) parts' [AI]; 
secondly as 'a process of reasoning from two parallel cases' [A2]; thirdly, 'a 
resemblance of form or junction in entities essentially different' [A3]; and 
fourthly, 'an inflexion or construction of words, in place of others', [A4]. 
Additionally, metaphor can be understood as; 'an application of name or 
descriptive term or phrase to object or action where it is not directly applicable' , 
[MI]; and that 'figure of speech' in which 'a name or descriptive term is 
trans/erred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is 
properly applicable,' [M2]. 
These apparently straightforward defmitions are somewhat circular, i.e. the 
term 'analogous' appears in the defmition of metaphor. We have already 
argued for a conceptualisation in which the concepts of metaphor and model are 
understood to implicitly contain the simpler, binding concept of analogy, and in 
which the latter represents a fundamental mechanism. In the origins of the 
word, there is a notion of 'transference' in the sense of one word to another 
[Partridge, 1973], which is also circular since in d~finition [A4] above, for 
analogy, we find construction of words is a central notion. A completely 
different method for uncoupling these concepts is therefore required for systems 
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thinkers. In other words, the linguistic issue of the 'literal' and 'metaphorical' 
use of language has again become apparent and must be dealt with before we 
can consider modelling analogy. 
On a pragmatic basis, one clear distinction that does arise and is evident across 
disciplinary literature is the predominant use of the notion of analogy in the 
'sciences' and metaphor in the 'arts'. We have already remarked in Chapter 
Three that the distinction between these two areas has much to do with the role 
of analogy and particularly metaphor in language. But even at an arguably 
superficial level, it is noticeable that 'analogy' is more widely found at the 
methodological level in science. Analogy has been used as a means of 
constructing models and theory, often through diagrammatic and equational 
representation. In this respect we may think of the process of 'analogical 
reasoning', 'manifest' and 'imponed analogy' as forming a broad framework in 
which general discussions of aspects of similitude, dissimilitude or identity 
between phenomena may be postulated for, perhaps, empirical research. 
By contrast, our description showed metaphor to involve 'fusions' of 
conceptual areas and in the open-endedness of interactive metaphor, a 
'perceptive struggle'. Metaphor is thus more acceptable and indeed, more 
commonly found methodologically in the 'arts', where such issues are seen as 
of central importance to the effectiveness of poetry, plays and so on. There can 
be no doubt that a fruitful study of Shakespeare revolves around the use of 
metaphor and additionally its importance in terms of rhetoric has been well 
documented elsewhere [see Richards, 1936]. 
At a conceptual level pertinent to systems thinking, we can propose that 
metaphor be thought of as a dynamic 'act of comparison', taking place within a 
'framework of analogy', but that is not to imply that it is always enlightening to 
distinguish metaphor as a 'subset' of analogy. Rather, metaphor is 'romantic', 
in Atkinson's [1984] sense of being 'imaginative' and 'visionary' although it 
can also be analysed in terms of more formal theory-based considerations, [in 
terms of the linguistic theory of reference for example]. This notion of 'formal 
theory', 'romanticism' or an 'analogy-metaphor' perspective, constitute the end 
points of a spectrum. This conceptualisation has some suppon in the work of 
Kuhn [1979], who has written, among others, on the ~levance of a higher level 
transference of concepts in terms of 'Metaphor in Science'. In this paper, Kuhn 
argues for an investigation of a 'metaphor-like process in science', and one 
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which accepts Black's [1962] important contribution of the 'interaction' view. 
Kuhn places much significance on the assertion that, 
.... however metaphor works, it neither presupposes nor supplies, a list 
of the respects in which the subjects juxtaposed by metaphor are 
similar.' [op.cit. p409]. 
Such an assertion might easily cause consternation among scientists who are 
more sympathetic to the formal explications of analogy. In addition, Kuhn adds 
further fuel by suggesting that the open-endeness or inexplicitness of metaphor 
has an important and precise parallel in the process by which scientific terms are 
introduced and thereafter deployed. The issue is clearly most intimately 
connected with the theory of reference to which we have alluded previously in 
our discussion on truth, [in Chapter Two] and the assumed 'literalness' of 
language developed in scientific usage [Chapter Three]. 
There are a few additional points to note on this issue at this stage. Kuhn 
[op.cit.] stresses that, as in the case of Black's interactive metaphors, the 
juxtaposition of examples in science call forth the similarities upon which the 
function of metaphor depends and the establishment of referents for scientific 
terms relies. Further, the 'end-product' of the metaphorical interaction between 
examples is nothing like a defmition, nor a list of characteristics exclusive to 
that term alone. No list of that sort is possible, suggests Kuhn, although this 
does not lead to a loss of functional precision. Thus, 
' ... natural kind terms and metaphors do just what they should without 
satisfying the criteria that a traditional empiricist would have required to 
declare them meaningful.' lop cit., p143]. 
Kuhn's points are clearly commensurate with analogy and metaphor 
conceptualised in terms of a continuum. Further, this conceptualisation can 
bypass, to a limited extent, some important philosophical considerations of the 
so-called theory of reference that romantic metaphor [in terms of its qualities of 
fusion and 'visionary' aspects] could be accused of ignoring. In this I am 
referring to linguistic arguments to establish meaning terms and the ways in 
which we described metaphor as soliciting the 'shifts in meaning', outlined in 
the previous chapter. The significance of the theory of reference is illustrated in 
the following passage: 
121 
'Juxtaposing a tennis match with a chess game may be part of what is 
required to establish the referents of game, but the two are not in any 
usual sense metaphorically related. More to the point, until the referents 
of game and other terms which might be juxtaposed with it in metaphor, 
have been established, metaphor itself cannot begin. The person who 
has not yet learned to apply the terms 'war' and 'game' correctly can 
only be misled by the metaphor, "war is a game" or "Professional 
football is war" " [Kuhn, 1979, p413]. 
Additionally, we must also note that concepts of 'natural kind terms' to which 
Kuhn is linking metaphor in his argument, are also significant. Kuhn takes 
metaphor as an essentially more complex version of the process by which 
'ostension' enters into the establishment of reference for natural kind terms. In 
this way he stresses the actual juxtaposition of examples of games allows the 
term 'game' to be applied to nature. The metaphorical juxtaposition of the terms 
'game' and 'war' highlights other features, ones whose salience has to be 
reached in order that actual games and wars in nature can be conceptually 
separated. Kuhn refers us to Boyd's point that nature has 'joints' that natural 
kind terms aim to locate. Hence Kuhn suggests that metaphor acts to remind us 
that another language might have located different joints and cut the world up 
another way. 
This matter is the crux for enthusiastic systems methodologists keen to adopt 
metaphor in practice. Fundamentally, that even a pragmatic use of metaphor 
must inevitably pay court to some sort of referential theory is clear from Kuhn's 
example. In our discussion we will take the spectrum extremes of metaphor 
being the romantic, and analogy as formal or documentary, within a framework 
of analogy which can at a 'meta-level' discuss the aspects of similarity that a 
particular metaphor may call forth or, as Black [1979] suggested, 'create'. In 
some respects this taxonomy also deals with the issue of defmitional circularity 
between concepts of analogy and metaphor experienced earlier. 
Some other practical points are worth a mention here. Metaphors and analogies 
are not uniform in the 'insight' they might elicit, some are illuminating and 
others obscure, or incongruous, or what is otherwise called 'dead'. 
Significantly, it must be pointed out that the continuum described in Chapter Six 
between formal analogy and 'romantic metaphor' is not one which parallels 
'effectiveness' but merely the sliding scale of 'analyticity'. As Leatherdale has 
pointed out most lucidly, in metaphor, 
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, .. between the quick and the dead there is no degree of transience or 
intermediacy. Asfar as metaphors go, they are either alive or dead and 
there is an end of it'. [op.cit p 110f]. 
Additionally, Boyd [1979] has emphasised that literary metaphors/analogies 
tend to reside in a specific work of a specific author. If the same metaphor is 
used by another author, a reference to the original source and use is usually 
implicit When applied often, by a variety of authors or under minor variations, 
a metaphor becomes trite and hackneyed, or frozen into cliche. In other words 
literary metaphors tend to lose their insight and creative worth through overuse. 
In fact some writers would claim that when such uses reach a certain stage [of 
'overuse'], the words are not metaphorical at all, they are now literal. 
Wheelwrightl, gives the example in this context of the term 'skyscraper'. 
By contrast, scientific metaphors or analogies, if 'successful', as in terms of 
providing useful insight become the property of the whole scientific community 
and variations may be explored by many without their interactive quality being 
lost. The wide usage encourages the discovery of new features of both the 
primary and secondary subjects and new understanding of the theoretically 
relevant aspects of similarity and or dissimilarity between them. This is 
specifically relevant to the interest to develop a model of analogy for systems 
thinkers. 
At this juncture, then, we will consider metaphor as a dynamic intercourse of 
thoughts expressed in speech and/or written words which gives rise to new 
thought images and directed perceptions. Analogy will be considered as an 
intercourse of thoughts based on observation, expressed in diagrams and/or 
equations (and/or other language and non-language structures) that gives rise to 
new formal theories/models and enhanced understanding and knowledge. The 
contrast of the 'looseness', (or as Black puts it,) the 'open endedness', of 
metaphor with the more formal nature of analogy presented here will be 
examined later in the chapter. 
Using the understanding developed in the preceding chapter and above, we will 
now consider analogy as participating in a 1ramework of analogy' and later 
metaphor in that framework. 
1 Wheelwright, P., 1960, Semantics and Ontology, in: Metaphor tWJ Symbol. L.e.Knights 
and B.Cottle. 008, London, 1960. 
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4.2.2 Analogy, General Systems and Cybernetic Theory 
The definitional assumptions [AI-A4] offer a basis for scientific model building 
but they are also a conceptually attractive 'method' to General Systems theory, 
which takes as its goal the notion of a 'unified science'. We may note in this 
respect, Peter Caws '2 address to the Society of General Systems Research on 
this theme and especially his emphasis that the form the goal of a unified science 
might take remains unresolved. Similarly cybernetics, which also purports to 
favour a self-contained set of concepts that are equally applicable across 
disciplines, has had recourse to turn to biological and mechanical analogy. 
The idea of analogy or metaphor as a basis for legitimate inference is, as we 
have noted, contentious on both philosophical (in a general discursive sense), 
and practical grounds. The pernicious influence of their poor status in 'factual 
science' and the importance of these issues to a broad class of systems thinking 
make natural enemies. The battle has penetrated systems thinking to the point 
where analogies have lost their status as suitable models in the investigation of 
General Systems Theory and their premises have been used as the basis of 
criticism, not only of the concept of analogy, but in an area of their use, General 
Systems, also. In fact a so-called 'devastating attack' on General Systems 
Behaviour Theory by Buck [1956] was based on this view. Buck's case was 
cited by von Bertalanffy [1972] as follows: 
' ... its essence is the 'so what' argwnent. Suppose we find an analogy or 
formal identity in two systems, it means nothing. Compare/or example, 
a chessboard and a mixed dinner party; a general statement expressing the 
alternation 0/ black and white squares on the one hand and 0/ men and 
women on the other can be made. If one is tempted to say, "Alright so 
they're structurally analogous, so what ?" My answer is "So nothing ... " , 
This so-called devastating attack, however, is hardly devastating. We can all 
identify weak analogies [see Bunge, 1979], so what! Buck's argument merely 
represents a superficial understanding of analogy, clearly limited to that of mere 
manifest analogy, which we have discussed and largely dismissed in the 
preceding chapter. Skill and courage is required in identifying useful analogies 
and we might also note in this context that von Bertalanffy [1972] also stressed 
2 Caws, P., 1967, Science and System: On the Unity and Diversity 0/ Scientific 
Theory. Presidential Address to the Society for General Systems Research, 
December 1966, at Washington, D.C. Reprinted General Systems. 12:3. 
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that Buck had missed the point of a 'general theory of systems science', Its 
basis is not more or less hazy analogies but the establishment of principles 
applicable to entities not covered in conventional sciences. 
Less wryly amusing than Buck, but more enlightening, is the critique of 
General Systems Theory as conceived by von Bertalanffy, by the Soviet 
authors Lektorsky and Sadovsky [1960], 
'Bertalanffy emphasises the idea that GST is not an investigation of hazy 
and superficial analogies ... analogies as such have little value, since 
differences can always be found among phenomena as well as 
similarities. Bertalanffy declares that the kind of isomorphism with 
which GST is concerned is a consequence of the fact that in some 
respects corresponding abstractions and conceptual models can be 
applied to differentfields.' 
If analogy is to maintain credibility in our argument, then the concerns of 
Lektorsky and Sadovsky will have to be answered. We mentioned in our 
preceding discussion that in certain circumstances, perception of analogy in 
science had proved 'too recondite for any but exceptional. minds.' If we are 
now going to attempt to use analogy, without assuming the privilege of an 
'exceptional mind', our model must specifically address at least two issues. 
Principally, that, 
a) the danger of hazy analogies requires identification of principles by 
which analogical models must necessarily be constructed; and 
b) the approach adopted must represent the concept of analogical 
reasoning as a means for identifying 'the kind of isomorphism' by 
which corresponding abstractions and conceptual models can be 
applied to different phenomena. 
These concerns are discussed below, 
4.3 PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING A MODEL OF ANALOGY 
Later in the chapter the two concepts metaphor and analogy will be drawn 
together to fOIm the basis for a single powerful addition to systems 'problem 
solving' methodology. Yet there is much to clear up before we reach that happy 
position. For now we will continue to explore analogy and metaphor in 
separation. 
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Essentially, we have established that analogies involve a set of objects or 
entities real or imagined which are familiar. We will label these 'the analogue 
set'. In the preceding chapter we suggested that this conceptualisation might 
map onto Leatherdale's conceptualisation of 'topic analogue'. In the sciences 
the analogue sets are typically associated with a theory [or hypothesis]. This 
marks a clear development of a model of analogy and separates the use of 
analogy in this context from analogical argument in 'the ordinary sense', which 
I take to refer to the quasi-formal structure outlined in Chapter Three. The role 
of theory and hypothesis in this model directs the analogy although remains 
principally heuristic. We might again refer to Leatherdale's confidence in the 
utility of analogy in science, 
'/ have argued that the basis o/progress in science is not an analogical act 
in the ordinary sense, but an analogical perception which involves the 
importation 0/ analogues/rom discrete areas 0/ experience into areas 0/ 
experience under investigation, [the role of theory or hypothesis is clearly 
evident here] with a resultant reformulation or re-ordering 0/ the area 
under investigation so that hitherto unremarked analogies are seen and 
novel inferences suggested'. [op.cit. p32]. Brackets added. 
The above quotation is illustrative of the particular interest we. as systems 
thinkers. are assigning analogy. The passage and the model explicitly introduce 
and emphasise the matter of theory extension across domains as facilitated by 
the use of analogy. 
It is not being suggested that scientific development rests solely on the 
exploitation of analogy and analogical thought and that induction and deduction 
are not additionally important in their contribution to the model. It is proposed 
that the theory and the analogue set together in this model constitute the 
necessary ingredients for a 'type o/inference' from the analogue set to another, 
'real' or imagined. set of objects or entities. 
In the analogical model. we will label this set 'the new domain', and the type of 
inference, analogy. It is suggested that Leatherdale would name the process of 
analogical iteration and the new domain together, the imported analogue because 
he finds it unnecessary to separate out the specific analogical process and the 
area of the new domain. It is preferred in this discussion. that these two areas 
be delineated. as we have established above the requirement to make clear the 
process of analogical modelling for systems thinkers and also to meet the 
concerns of Lektorsky and Sadovsky cited. This does not infringe on the 
acceptability of Leatherdale's conceptualisation of the dynamics involved in a 
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model of analogy. In this thesis the delineation is marked to stress the 
dynamism of analogies. This is crucial to the theoretical exploration of 
analogically juxtaposed domains and rationalities discussed later in the thesis. 
Leatherdale stresses, 
'One reason/or the critical place which I assign to the analogical act in 
science is that it does have potentially a multi-dimensional simultaneous 
scope which embraces the fields 0/ both topic and imported analogues. 
How much or how little is contributed by the imported analogue can and 
does vary. It may be merely, in the case 0/ a topic analogue which 
already has a settled system 0/ concepts, a purely abstract new relation 
among the existing concepts that the imported analogue is, as it were, 
called upon to provide. Sometimes more extensive demands can be made 
upon it and it is able to introduce descriptive and causal detail into the 
imported analogue. Sometimes, as in the case 0/ a scientific revolution, 
the imported analogue comes trailing metaphysical strings .. .' 'lop.cit., 
p22]. 
This passage implies several features on the model of analogy we are to develop 
for systems thinkers. Firstly, that in optimising the contribution which the 
imported analogue [I use here Leatherdale's term because I am referring to the 
concatenated analogical act] is to make, then we must make explicit the areas in 
which we hope to learn by developing the analogy. Further, Leatherdale talks of 
'a new relation' and this in our model is identifiable in the framework of the 
'central theory/hypothesis'. The latter links analogue set and new domain, 
although because of the 'expansiveness of analogy', the investigation is not 
restricted by the paradigmatic implications of the theory/hypothesis itself. [This 
is a matter of rationality and will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter]. 
Lastly, Leatherdale also talks of 'new descriptions and causal details' with 
which systems thinkers, in developing their systems world view are naturally 
concerned, and again this will be specifically pursued in the following chapter 
on 'Analogy and Rationalities'. For the moment we may very simply state that, 
in this conceptualisation, a model of analogy will contain three elements; a 
theory, an analogue set, and a new domain. 
Clearly, a model of analogy may perform in a variety of ways. Carloyle, 
[1971] suggests that analogies operate within what he calls a range of analogy; 
(a) as revisions of the new domain; 
(b) reinterpretation of the associated theory; 
(c) a basis for inference to new facts about the new domain 
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(d) a mediation between the analogue set and the new domain 
(e) as a result of (a), (b), and (d), the extension of the theory to the new 
domain.' 
In other words analogy may work 'forward' to revisions of, or to new relations 
or thereby 'facts' about, the new domain, or under certain circumstances, I 
would also suggest the analogue set. It is also hence possible analogy to act in 
such a way for re-interpretation of the associated theory to result. In a similar 
context, Leatherdale has commented, 
' ... the use of imported analogy ... is likely to be concerned with analogy 
of relation and hence with comparatively abstract properties and relations 
and with mathematics in particular.' [op.cit., p32]. 
In a broader sense analogies mediate between the theoretical language, and the 
observation language initially used to describe the new domain. This, it is 
suggested, is a fundamentally important aspect to the utility of analogy in 
systems sciences. It is at such a stage that it becomes quite clear that in 
mediating between 'theoretical language' [we might assume such to be taken as 
literal] and observations taken in an unfamiliar domain, metaphorical use of 
language will be inevitably involved. We have previously argued that the use of 
metaphorical language in science inherently involves using terms in new ways 
leading to novel insights and interpretations and the extension of vocabulary and 
also subsequently, conceptual boundaries. Nevertheless, for now the imponant 
result is the 'extension of theory'. With this notion of extended theory we have 
made an important distinction between models and analogies. 
Within the listed functions of analogical models just presented two aspects 
warrant further discussion. First are the principles which are used in analogical 
model building, discussed in the next section. Secondly, obviously, concerns 
the grounds on which we are asserting that analogical models promote theory 
extension into new domains [discussed in the three sections following the next]. 
4.3.1 Principles 01 Analogical Modelling. 
We have already identified the following three components of analogical 
modelling quite simply; the analogue set, the theory/hypothesis and the new 
domain. It is suggested that the analogue set and the theory are to fonn the 
128 
basis of iterative inference to the new domain. Such iteration in analogical 
modelling is shown in Figure 4.3.1a. The following commentary on that figure 
explains in detail the principles of analogical modelling. 
a) By processes of deduction and induction postulates of the theory 
allow the initial deduction of the analogue set. 
b) From the analogue set, properties of positive, negative and neutral 
analogy are induced to the new domain. 
c) Investigation of the new domain identifies areas of positive, negative 
and neutral analogy induced from the theory and the analogue set 
d) From the investigation, the infonnation concerning the new domain, 
and by analogical reasoning also, the theory and the analogue set may be 
deduced allowing extension of the theory in the form of a new 
hypothesis/postulate. 
The process may begin again from the postulates of the extended theory. It is 
therefore iterative. 
Figure 4.3.1a appears on the following page. 
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extended theory 2.Theory extended theory 
(re.I) (re.3) 
Neulral Analogy 
Positive Analogy 
Negative Analogy 
(iii) Theory extended 
by analo~cal 
reasonmg 
'Analogical Reasoning' 
Figure 4.3.18: Iteration in an Analogical Model. 
4.3.2 Analogy As A Metaconcept: Overcoming Difficulties Of 
Deductivism 
One function of analogical mode~s, discussed above, concerns their role as a 
mediation language between those of observation and theory used initially to 
describe the new domain. In systems terms this function suggests that argument 
from analogy may be a type of meta-argument [reasoning], i.e. analogy is 
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reasoning of a higher order, in which propositions of inductive and deductive 
reasoning may be discussed. This may be taken as a fairly radical proposal 
since the principles of deduction have a sound base in logic and one in which 
critics of analogical models have established their arsenal. The essence of this 
notion of meta-language is captured in Beer's [1981] understanding of 
metasystem which is; 
' ... a system over and beyond a system of lower logical order and 
therefore capable of deciding propositions. discussing criteria, or 
exercising regulation for systems that are themselves logically incapable 
of such decisions and discussions ... because metalogic is inaccessible to 
the systems logic .. : [op.cit pS7]. 
We need only to replace the word 'system' with 'reasoning', and 'regulation' 
with 'theory extension' to fmd the passage reading as follows, 
' ... a reasoning over and beyond a reasoning of lower logical order and 
therefore capable of deciding propositions, discussing criteria or 
exercising theory extension for reasoning systems that are themselves 
logically incapable of such decisions and discussions .. : 
By such an interchange the implication is that we are proposing analogy can 
operate over and beyond induction and deduction. But note, the 'dependence' 
of analogy on induction and deduction, is made clearly evident in the systems 
viewpoint, which would emphasise that analogy cannot exist without induction 
and deduction [Le. the necessary support of a lower order system]. In this 
context Hesse [1966] reflects the same point when she noted that it is not 
possible to extend theory to a new domain by deduction only, since no 
theoretical term links the axioms of the theory to the terms describing the new 
domain. 
4.3.2.1 Grounds Of Theory Extension 
Those who agree with the significance of analogy as a basis for the inference of 
new facts about the new domain, take the so-called argument from analogy as 
their supporting evidence [suggests Carloyle, 1971], i.e., what we have 
identified as the pseudo-syllogistic inductive inference from one set of 
particulars to another. Usually the premises assert that a set of observed 
instances have certain common properties that presumably are identified by the 
role of theory in the analogue set Conversely different properties may also be 
taken as of interest under certain circumstances. 
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A scientist may work on the notion that an ascribed domain exhibiting some 
aspects of similarity with the analogue set could have the other features also. 
Hence the probability of the conclusion being true is exclusively detennined by 
the conditions of parallel identity of properties. [or conditions of 'positive 
analogy', which will be fully discussed shortly]. 
This view clearly pre-supposes that the basis of inference from the model to the 
new domain lies only in the identity of properties between the new domain and 
the analogue set. In this argument I would be inclined to support Carloyle's 
position. by contrast. which in emphasising 'similarity' of properties. is 
necessarily more concerned with analogy of relations. The argument from 
theory to new domain. in this model of reasoning, is a modification of the 
'classical argument from analogy', covered earlier. 
We can usefully discuss iteration of this analogical model further by considering 
Campbell's view [also analysed by Hesse, op.cit.Chapters 1&2] on whether the 
utility of analogy holds for theory extension. Campbell's illustration is the 
linking of water, sound and light phenomena through the concept of 'wave'. 
In this discussion it is sufficient to concentrate on water and sound only, since 
the intention is to show what happens when we attempt to make use of the 
known theory waves in the 'analogue set' of water, and the putative analogical 
relationship with the 'new domain' of sound. The process of analogical 
reasoning summarised in Figure 4.3.1a will be drawn upon in the example of 
Figure 4.3.2.1a. Here we see the generalised model on the left hand side. and 
our example on the right, where features of water have been taken for the 
analogue of sound. The theory of waves in water is used to reconceptualise 
sound. i.e. the formal theory of water waves is extended to those assumed of 
sound. 
The diagram is given on the following page. 
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THE NEW DOMAIN 
ExtcndcdThcory THEORY ExIClndcdThcory 
DEDUCE 
THE ANALOGUE SET 
The Empirical Bvidence of Domain: 
'SOUND' 
INDUCB 
PnIquency 'w A VE' Loudness 
Amplitude CONCE7 Pitch 
DBDUCB INDUCE 
The Empirical Evidence or Domain: 
'WATER' 
Figure 4.3.2.1a: An Analogical Model of water and sound. 
By looking at the water wave theory, the analogies would suggest that sound is 
produced by the motion of air particles propagated in concentric, spherical 
waves from a centre of disturbance. We know that increasing the central 
disturbance of water will give rise to higher waves and so the analogy suggests 
that the greater the disturbance of gongs, hammers and so forth, the 'louder' the 
noise produced. Hesse [op.cit.] supports Campbell's assertion that it is then a 
'short step' to identify the loudness of sound with the amplitude of sound 
waves and empirical experiences with strings of various lengths to persuade us 
that 'pitch' of sound waves could be mapped to the frequency of sound waves. 
In other words, frequency and amplitude, part of our analogue set, were not 
initially reflected in the theoretical concept of sound wave [which would be 
derived from empirical evidence of water]. Significantly, a re-description of the 
original analogue set is shown as necessary for empirically based theory 
extension to the new domain, i.e. in terms of sound phenomena. This example 
is hence clearly illustrative of the introduction of the metaphorical use of 
language, facilitated and guided by the model, and a divergence from the literal 
meaning of the terms 'frequency' and 'amplitude' into metaphorical senses of 
'loudness' and 'pitch'. Re-description thus requires a 'shift in the meaning' of 
these terms, which is the particular feature of metaphor as outlined in part with 
reference to I.A. Richards, in the preceding chapter. Although in the context of 
the argument being developed in this chapter, this is clearly evidence of meta-
reasoning or analogical reasoning. 
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We ought to consider the criticism, rooted in that expressed by Duhem [op.cit] 
who suggests that such a presentation of the model glosses over the issues 
centring on matters of observation, since he would raise the point that the 
'disturbance' of air particles are eminently less 'observable' than the disturbance 
of water. Hesse [op.cit.] cites what she dubs a 'Duhemist' viewpoint as 
follows, 
To 'observe' a similarity between the behaviour of ripples at the edge of 
the bath and the behaviour of sound in a mountain valley is far from a 
superficial observation ... It requires a very sophisticated framework of 
physical ideas in which, for example, the phenomena of echoes are 
described in terms of a train of physical causes initiated by a shout rather 
than in terms of an imitative spirit of the mountains: [Ibid]. 
While we were exploring notions of analogy in the previous chapter we noted 
that although the utility of analogy might appear to come 'in a flash' or to be in 
some way 'intuitive', it very often depends on a great deal of preceding 
research. Preceding work is not altogether negated by the sudden insight the 
perception of an analogy can facilitate. But more importantly, the Duhemist 
position can be used to add clarity to a point we have raised to some degree 
already. Campbell uses the criticism to highlight the important philosophical 
point that contrary to what empiricist philosophers seem to maintain, 
observation statements are not written on the face of events to be transferred 
directly into language. Instead, they are already interpretations of events and 
the kind of interpretations they are, depends on the assumptions of a language 
community. 
In other words Campbell is going so far as to posit that there can be no 
descriptive statement which does not go beyond what is given in the act of 
observing. He is implying that language is inescapably metaphoric, a view we 
too have been unable to avoid elsewhere. 
Further, there are more aspects to emerge from noticing that the observation 
language of the analogue set [of water] refers to observable properties which 
cannot be derived visually in the domain of sound. Hence, in some way a 
correspondence between the observable properties of the analogue set and those 
properties being investigated in the new domain of sound has been set up. One 
might easily see this as evidence that it is the analogy of relation, rather than that 
of property, which should take precedence. 
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Indeed, Campbell's suggestion that, at this point, we are then in a position to 
test the mathematical theory of water waves as a theory of sound supports this 
view. Any subsequent tests will show or not show that the theory is 
satisfactory. The importance point is not that the use of analogy can lead us to 
an infallible theory but that it can be most useful in suggesting areas to be 
investigated. 
The theoretical component 'wave' has been seen to promote the re-visualisation 
of sound as waves and as a result, the fonnal theory of water waves may be 
extended to that assumed of sound. This is significant in that the argument also 
indicates that some of the characteristics of, for example, frequency and 
amplitude have been abstracted away through induction to a more abstract and 
idealised level [which is also typical of systems conceptualisation] in order to 
describe the new domain and hence expand the theory. 
To return briefly to Duhem's line of argument, he would suggest that the theory 
of water waves, for example, was arrived at by making an hypothesis about the 
effects of a disturbance in the medium The investigator then expresses this in 
mathematical language and deduces from it the observed properties of water 
waves. In other words, there has been no mention at this juncture of models or 
analogies. 
Hence in the case of sound, a one-to-one correspondence between properties of 
water and properties of sound could be set up and then the mathematical wave 
theory is transferred to sound. The Duhemist would suggest that this might be a 
way in which theories are anived at in practice, but that nothing in this example 
shows that reference to the water model is essential, or that there is any 
difference in principle between the relations of the theories and observations in 
each case. This assertion attempts to undermine the quality of re-interpretation 
of theory by analogy that we have been striving to establish. 
Put another way, the Duhemist line is such that if we had never heard of sound 
waves, we would still be able, with our collection of observations in the sound 
domain, to obtain the same result. The 'information' obtainable is derived from 
the observed production of 'sound' by the collisions of solid bodies, the 
relations between the magnitude of these collisions. and the loudness of the 
sound, and between lengths of string and pitch of note, echoes and 
'reflections'. The Duhemist would then suggest that all of these observations 
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could be deduced from a mathematical wave theory with the appropriate 
interpretation and without any reference or mention of the water wave model, 
and without supposing that there is any connection between the transmission of 
sound and ripples in a pool. 
Hesse [op.cit.] proposes that Campbell at this stage would make an imponant 
point in defence of models in general and suggest that the reason for this 
apparent lack of necessary 'mappings' was not that there is no wave model at 
all, but merely that ripples are the wrong wave model. This highlights what 
many [e.g., as we have seen in the context of General Systems Theory, Buck 
1956], consider to be a most dangerous side to building theory with the aid of 
analogical models. Namely that reference to a model is not part of the logical 
structure of an explanatory theory and not even always a useful device in 
deriving such theories because it can positively suggest the wrong theory. 
It has already been suggested that analogy and inferences made on the basis of 
analogy are among the most basic judgements that we make in distinguishing 
between objects; that is, we identify similarities and dissimilarities between 
them. In this vein, Bunge [1979] has noted, 
'Judgements of analogy underlie a number of other types, in particular, 
collecting or grouping and inductive generalisation.' [op.cit., p21O] 
Bunge also suggests that a danger of analogy is such that although initially 
stimulating, reliance on analogy can 'block' further research. Hence, 
We tend to remember only the fruitful analogies. The list of misleading 
analogies, ifit could be drawn, is likely to be more impressive.' [Ibid.] 
Of course, this assertion need not take us by surprise and does no more than 
reflect the superficial understanding of manifest analogy. It is typical of 
criticisms which, quite rightly, are directed to the unstructured exploration of 
analogy, which at best can be said to lead to a growth of knowledge based on 
circumstances of coincidence and at worst to a highly chaotic research 
programme. [It is also in some ways appropriate to the adoption of analogy and 
metaphor by systems methodologists.] Bunge goes on to point out that the 
significant contribution of analogy rests on a strict adherence to the developed 
concept of analogical inference rather than mere analogical 'judgements'. 
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In fact, if anything, this criticism is more appropriate to the syllogistic fonnat in 
which analogies have often been examined in the past. Analogical inference, 
although involving analogical judgement goes beyond the latter, 
' .. .from the fact or assumption that two objects are alike in some known 
respects it 'concludes' that they may be analogous in some unknown 
respects also.' [Ibid, original emphasis]. 
Naturally, the clear danger in analogical judgements, because of their syllogistic 
format, is that logical and 'rational' implications are in danger of being taken 
wholesale from one domain to another. With this in mind we can examine an 
example given by Bunge, who asserts, 
' ... organicists, likening society to the human body conclude the 
workers, being the muscles of society, ought to obey the brains of 
society, namely its ruling class. And Copernicus, likening the solar 
system to a monarchy, argues Just as the monarch is surrounded by his 
vassals and courtiers so the sun must be at the centre of the solar 
system.' [Ibid.] 
Bunge argues that these analogies are 'faulty' because they rest on 'wrong 
analogy judgements'; society is not like an organism and the solar system is not 
like a monarchy. These he gives as 'implausible analogy judgemeats'. By 
contrast Bunge cites Aristotle's classical analogy, 'GUls are to water what lungs 
are to air' and suggests that this is an example of a 'plausible' analogy and 
therefore fruitful, because it rests on a 'genuine' analogy; lung-gill, water-air. 
It is suggested that Bunge's attempt to identify 'genuine analogies' or to 
distinguish between 'plausible' or 'implausible' analogies both imply a literal, 
realist position untenable with the description of analogies given here and not 
helpful in developing a useful model of analogy for systems thinkers. Rather it 
is much more valuable to examine Bunge's examples of 'implausible' 
analogies. We can note that in either case a form of interpretation of the analogy 
has been carried into a new domain without making clear the rationality that held 
the interpretation to be useful in the original analogue set. The syllogistic 
format is shown to be quite unable to identify or penetrate the rational basis for 
interpretation in either case. It is in this context which we will be examining the 
systems view of analogy and rationality in the next chapter. 
We might leave this point for now and reiterate Bunge [1979] whose remarks 
hint at the role of rationalities in the interpretation of useful analogies. Thus, 
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The fruitfulness of an analogy depends not only upon its degree but also 
on the problem at hand and the brain that uses it. Many people had noted 
the analogy between man and other primates,· in the middle ages it was a 
common belief that monkey was afallen man. However it took a Charles 
Darwin to use this analogy to place man and ape in an evolutionary 
perspective.' [1979, p213]. 
Similarly, from Leatherdale 
' ... it required the talents of a Galileo to perceive for example, the 
analogy between ship and projectile motion. Obviously Galileo's 
analysis is not in terms of any ordinary properties or relations. The only 
resemblances between the ship and any other objects which Galileo 
concerns with are resemblances of motion and these in turn are analysed 
into resemblances of change and motion and relative directions in space 
and even more abstractedly still, into a number of relationships or 
geometric ratios.' [op.cit., p25]. 
We evidently need to further discuss the roles of models, specifically analogical 
models in issues concerned with the establishing the grounds of theory 
extension. Clearly, the problems outlined by the Duhemist perspective reflect 
the relationship between theory and model. Therefore we will return to 
Campbell's description of the role of the billiard ball analogy in the development 
of the kinetic theory of gases, flJ'St mentioned in the preceding chapter. 
Campbell in his analysis, introduces a 'range of analogical conditions' which 
illustrate the potential to explore an 'imported analogue' in terms far more 
insightful and complex than ordinary forms of inductive inference. In systems 
terms, the concepts indicate the emergent potential of adding analogical 
reasoning to a traditional inductive and deductive basis. Campbell posits, 
'Let us call those properties which we know belong to billiard balls and 
not to molecules, the negative analogy of the model. Motion and impact 
on the other hand, are just the properties of billiard balls that we do want 
to ascribe to molecules in our model and these we can call the positive 
analogy. Now the imponant thing about this kind of model thinking in 
science is that there will generally be some properties of the model about 
which we do not yet know whether they are positive or negative 
analogies and these are the interesting properties. because as J shall 
argue, they allow us to make new predictions. Let us call this third set of 
properties, the neutral analogy'. [Quoted by Hesse, op.cit., Chapter 
One]. 
Campbell asserts that the terminology of positive, negative and neutral analogy 
avoids ambiguity in the iteration of an analogical model. I will suggest that the 
contribution made by these three concepts goes somewhat further than this for 
systems thinkers in the next chapter on Analogy and Rationality. For 
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Campbell, the delineation of these concepts, mark a point of distinction between 
analogue and theory so that should the investigator conceptualise of a mooel of 
gases, s/he can distinguish between billiard balls, and the 'picturing of gas 
molecules as ghostly little objects having some but not all the properties of 
billiard balls'. In other words in referencing the theory, we can distinguish 
between the model and the theory itself. 
Additionally, the need to introduce a discrete terminology illustrates an attempt 
to control the 'shifts in meaning' in the use of language in this field. Campbell 
stresses the importance, at times, of using the words to give a meaning to the 
mathematical symbols. His principal concern, as we saw in the preceding 
chapter, is in making theories interpretable. Hence, for Campbell the 
importance of the mooel is such that under certain circumstances the words then 
derive their meanings from the position of corresponding symbols in the 
deductive systems. It is a peculiar account of meaning giving an indirect 
meaning to any word that can be inserted in a deductive system. 
The Duhemist commentary on the point is to suggest that for any theoretical 
term to have scientific meaning, it must occur in a deductive system which has 
many observable features. The identification of the nature of the 'observable 
features' of a deductive system is entirely a question for empirical research and 
not one for the logician, so that a theoretic term has meaning only in terms of an 
empirical interpretation and that meaning cannot be logically formalised. 
This arises because the Duhemist stresses there are cases where the theory may 
not be describable in terms of models at all and hence in order to assert the 
existence of a theoretical entity, we must either coin new words or give old 
words a new significance by the method of indirect meaning ... The concept 
'aether' was adopted and given significance in this way; there were some 
physical theories which 'the aether' had a defmed place in a deductive systems 
and hence apparently observable, empirically testable properties. This assertion 
could be interpreted to serve either side of the argument I Either for the 
necessity of analogical models to facilitate the introduction of metaphorical 
language, or for their dangerous consequences. The Duhemist position appears 
rather paradoxical. 
But again. we fmd ourselves discussing the nature of observability which we 
have already discovered is interpretable only through a framework and hence, 
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we can argue, quite clearly capable of continually shifting its ontological and 
epistemological boundaries. In this context we are obliged to ask ourselves 
whether concepts founded in solely in empirical, experiential frameworks are of 
particular interest in systems inquiry. Bunge [1959], in this vein notes that; 
The scientist isfully entitled to speculate about non-uperientialfacts, 
that is, facts that at a given level in the development of knowledge be 
beyond the scope of human experience, but then forced to point out what 
experience warrant the inference of such unobservable facts, that is he is 
obliged to anchor his factual statements on experience somehow 
connected with the assumed rransempirical facts.' [Chapter One]. 
We should also, after Bunge note in this context, the theoretical and practical 
value or consequence of a few distinguished 'unobservables" such as 
consciousness, history, class struggle and public opinion. 
We can further elucidate Campbell's position in the following way, by looking 
more closely at the conceptualisation and definition of model in tenns of Modell 
and Model2 introduced in the previous chapter. Hence, Campbell asserts that 
when we speak of a model in its primary sense, [MIl that is, we are not 
speaking of another object which can, as it were, be built or imagined alongside 
the phenomena we are investigating. 
The idea of an analogical model is not one of a more or less imperfect 'copy'. 
We are thus expurgating from philosophy, the unwanted legacy of the concept 
of analogue inherited from the physical sciences. Rather, Campbell's view on 
the utility of analogical models is generally that they are a way of imagining the 
phenomena'themselves'. In other words Ml is the imperfect copy [the billiard 
balls, in the analogy discussed above] minus the known negative analogy, so 
we are only considering the known positive analogy and the probably open 
class of properties about which it is not yet known whether they are positive or 
negative analogies. 
This stance will bring us to a point of contention with Campbell's analysis of 
the utility in theoretical development of conditions of analogy. Campbell in his 
conception of an analogical model places most emphasis on positive and neutral 
analogy and goes so far as to suggest; 
When we consider a theory based on a model as an explanation for a 
set of phenomena, we are considering the positive and neutral analogy, 
not the negative analogy which we already know we can discard'. 
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This suggestion will be disputed later in the following chapter. It concerns the 
utility of analogy in making distinctions between 'theory' and 'model' and the 
tendencies of Duhemist critics and metaphysical philosophers to, after 
Campbell, use the term 'theory' to cover [only] what is called positive analogy. 
This, it is suggested, leads to neglect of the potential of the neutral analogies in 
a model to serve as growing points in a theory and heightens the necessity to 
consider, as we shall, the additional validity of negative analogy. The thrust of 
the argument rests on a conceptualisation of theory as in perpetual cycles of 
growth and development, not as static and fonnalised theories corresponding 
only to known positive analogies across domains. 
A further point in this context can be emphasised if we return for a moment to 
how we described analogies as behaving as a mediation language between those 
of observation and theory used initially in describing a new domain. From this 
came the argument that analogy may be a kind of meta-argument, that is a 
reasoning of a higher order in which the propositions of inductive and deductive 
reasoning might be discussed. An important point in this context is the 
distinction between theory and models which analogies facilitate. The word 
'theory' is used by Duhemists to cover quite a wide field, especially the fonnal 
deductive systems which have only partial interpretation into observables. 
Clearly, analogical models are mechanisms to ease this process, because they 
offer at least two sources of information to allow theoretical development. 
Firstly the observed or investigated properties of the phenomena in hand, [the 
explication of the analogue set dictated by the hypothesis] and secondly, the 
observed/investigated properties of their analogies. The philosophical appeal to 
observable events is a matter which must be addressed at a further level and its 
exploration would be a task well beyond the context of this thesis. 
The issue is significant, however, in that Hesse [Op.cil] and indeed others have 
stressed that analogies may not be noticeable until they are 'spelt out' and it is 
unlikely that this would be possible without rendering some properties at least 
observable in some sense. But when analogies have been pointed out, no 
esoteric insight, no specific scientific knowledge is needed to recognise that 
they exist. 
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But matters are different for the Duhemist and is evidently not the case with 
mathematical formalisms since obviously in these areas 'background 
knowledge' is prerequisite. The point to notice is that while trigonometric 
knowledge might be required to understand a mathematical theory of water 
waves, there is no intrinsic difficulty in comprehending the terms 'height of the 
water', 'frequency of the waves', into which the mathematical symbols are 
interpreted. It is in this sense that it can be said that the mathematical system in 
this example is about or has its interpretation in terms of observable events. 
But the principles by which analogies are identified in this way remain fued and 
are concerned with the attempted construction of a one-to-one correspondence 
between the 'observable' properties of sound and those of water waves. [This 
is the role of the theory/hypothesis in the formal analogical model...]. At that 
stage it becomes possible to test the mathematical theory as a theory of sound. 
Hence the process of testing will show or not show that the theory in that 
domain is satisfactory. And again it is necessary to seriously note that it is not 
claimed that the use of analogy can lead to the development of an infallible 
theory, all that is claimed at this stage, is that it is of value in the formulation of 
hypotheses. 
Hence in an analogical model, the implication is that there are at least two types 
of theory extension going on. Firstly theory extension as in explication of the 
analogue set in particular and secondly in the iteration of the analogical model in 
general. Horizontal expansion of theory to the new domain was shown in 
Figure 4.4.2. The development of theory along the horizontal plane in the 
model represents information resources released by drawing an analogy 
between two domains. The supporting argument, however, suggests a vertical 
shift in theoretical terms to a more abstract level and this represents theory 
development along the vertical plane of the model. This kind of theory 
extension describes the [metaphoric] 'shifts in meaning' of explicated theoretical 
concepts to accommodate an increased domain of appropriateness in the 
'universe of applicability' for the theory or hypothesis explored via the 
analogical model. 
Analogical models maintain their integrity in this 'two dimensional' shift only if 
we introduce the new concept of neutral analogy, that is, in addition to the 
classical view that analogy comprises only positive and negative aspects. Hesse 
142 
[1966] argues for this theoretically important concept to provide a proper basis 
for inference. 
' ... the properties on which the inference is based are neither the same, 
nor different, but similar.' 
Until the model has been confirmed as a basis for inference. which. for 
instance. Buck's [op.cit.) manifest black and white analogy could not, 
significant analogical 'resemblance' cannot be classified as either positive or 
negative. and must therefore be considered neutral. We can thus support 
Carloyle [1971] in linking these points with Dewey's thesis that identification of 
properties is based on their evidential role in inquiry rather than the notion that 
they are an ontologically prior fact. It a further point to establish language as 
inherently metaphoric. 
Therefore we might sum up this section by asserting that analogical models. 
then. are able to support an interpretation of theoretical terms which 
acknowledge their referential function. Additionally analogic~ models can cope 
with the difference in logical [or more broadly 'rational'] character across the 
logical gap, by co-ordinating and guiding the revisualisation of the analogue set 
and hence the expansion of the theory by analogical meta-reasoning. 
As we have seen. the argument is supported in Campbell's [1957] theory of 
models in which he tackles the deductivist's view of the structures of scientific 
theories. We have noted that for Campbell, a theory must contain two things. 
First, the 'dictionary' correlating some [but not necessarily all) of the concepts 
with empirical terms. Secondly, a model for the theoretical statements of a 
theory so that its hypothetical subject matter may be imagined to be like in some 
[but again not all] respects the 'real' empirical subject matter of some field that 
is already known. This is unequivocally analogical in approach. 
Campbell [1957] inevitably, also sees the 
' ... driving force of science as the exploitation of analogies in new fields 
without which neither theory, nor the range offacts could grow nor the 
language in which to express them develop'. 
Essential to this view is the idea that for a range of phenomena [say, 'E'] to 
have occurred, the relationship between E and the theory [say, -T'] must be 
supplemented and informed by another relationship, i.e. analogy, rather than 
deduction. It is through analogy that we render T intelligible to ourselves, i.e. 
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models have something irreducible to the experiences they are, in some way, 
intended to embroider or explain. 
The above discussion has looked at some of the grounds for theory extension in 
a model of analogy and outlined some inadequacies of deductive reasoning. We 
will now focus our attention on the associated difficulties of inductivism. 
4.3.3 Analogy As A Metaconcept: Overcoming Difficulties of 
Inductivism 
Traditionally, analogies have been recognised as a part of inductive procedures 
akin to generalisations, that is, induction by simple enumeration. Bacon 
[op.cit.], whose view of analogy we discussed in the preceding chapter, was 
opposed to the use of generalisation on the basis of their uncertainty, which 
rests on the smallness of the sample, compared to the infinite sample of all 
possible cases, although one might suggest that this objection has more to do 
with the problematic nature of induction. 
We proposed earlier that the classical positivist view insists that models may 
only be regarded as heuristic devices, i.e. they are inductive. This is refutable 
because analogue models cannot be replaced by generalisations from instances. 
In analogy, there is only one instance referred to in the premises and hence the 
probability of the conclusion being 'true' is determined by the conditions of the 
analogy only. Returning to Carloyle [1971], 
7/ there is a causal connection between the positive analogy observed to 
be common to premises and conclusion on the one hand and the 
remaining propenies in/erred to hold/or the conclusion, the probability 
is increased.' [op.cit p562]. 
In this sense analogies may be presented as superior to generalisations in the 
attainability of a higher degree of certitude for their conclusions. 
Agassi [1964] follows this argument to a point, but prefers instead to examine 
analogies as either 'generalisations proper', perhaps higher level ones, or ad 
hoc. His examination suggests that analogies are not seen as 'more certain' 
than generalisations but are equally legitimate. This line of argument is worth 
some further examination. We have seen that induction plays a significant part 
in the iteration of the analogical model we have described, indeed it is intrinsic 
to the processes which take us from the analogue set to the new domain. 
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Traditionally, however, extensions of known observation repons to unknown 
cases are taken to be of two kinds. Firstly from the sample to the whole 
'ensemble', and Agassi [op.cit.] takes these to be 'generalisations proper'. 
Secondly, the extension is from the sample to the next case to be observed. 
Agassi hence notes, 
' ... all intermediate terms between these two extremes are possible, but 
inductive philosophers have hardly paid any attention to them. The 
reason may be this: the principle of paucity of assumptions leads us to 
reject the generalisation, i.e., the extension of an observation report 
about the observed terms to the whole ensemble in favour of a less bold 
extension. The least bold extension is not to report at all ... but as this 
will not do, the extension to the next case to be observed is advocated as 
a second best: [op.cit.p351]. 
This line of argument, if we think of it in terms of Carloyle's comment above 
serves to show the usefulness of modelling by analogy. Agassi himself 
suggests the mode of thinking he has described is erroneous and that any 
assertion about the 'next case' should be interpreted in the following way. 
Broadly, the next case to be observed will agree, or as we would suggest, 
correspond with the sample on the basis of the hypothesis that the sample is 
representative. In terms of our model of analogy, this is the same logical basis 
by which the analogue set was initially selected, [deduced]. 
A standard example given to illustrate the problematic nature of induction 
concerns the 'whiteness of swans'. This example can also be used, however, in 
the context of supporting Hesse's assertion given earlier on the linking of 
axioms of the theory to the new domain. Although Hesse's point referred to 
deductive axioms, it also indicates the problems inevitably associated with a 
model of this son, that is one geared to theory/hypothesis extension, based on 
inductive and deductive processes only. Hence, in attempting to establish the 
whiteness of swans, the hypothesis that the next swan to be observed will be 
white, cannot be an extension of the hypothesis [that 'all swans are white']. 
Rather it is a disjunction among infinitely many conjunctions about all the 
unobserved swans in the universe, and about our luck with the next 
observation. Agassi enlarges on the issue, 
'... if we do not claim that all unobserved swans in ,he universe are 
white, and if we deny that our next encounter with a swan is of any 
special cosmic significance, then we cannot but ascribe the whiteness of 
the next swan to mere chance: [op.cit., p3S2]. 
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The iteration of the analogical model, however clearly avoids the arbitrary 
extension of the theory by 'mere luck or chance', The processes by which we 
might range over the analogue set and new domain are formalised in tenns of 
the heuristic exploration of concepts of positive, negative and neutral analogy, 
concepts which rigourise the processes of analogical reasoning, as we shall be 
discussing at some length shortly. 
Interestingly, in this context, Agassi makes a further point in favour of the 
utility of analogy over generalisation, although I do not think it is deliberate. 
He suggests, [op.cit.] that generalisation is often claimed to be more reliable 
when certain conditions are met. Although he admits that these conditions 
might change from author to author, he distils three conditions which he claims 
are 'traditional'. Firstly, that a sample should be taken at random, [a]. 
Secondly, that it should be relatively large, [b] and thirdly that the en sembled 
populations be characterised by a stringent set of properties, [c]. 
Agassi goes on to argue when the second condition is met, we tend to speak 
[loosely] of generalisation. Additionally, when the third condition is met, we 
would tend to speak of having recognised an analogy, although we would have 
emphasised by contrast that the relations of analogy playa more significant role 
than that of properties. But lastly, the most important point to note, is that we 
can never know that any sample is taken 'at random', Agassi suggests, 
'In any case, the/orm o/a generalisation which meets [b] more readily 
than [c], is the same as the/orm if one goes the other way. Hence, one 
cannot ascribe more reliability to the one or the other and objections 
validly applicable to one are equally applicable to the other'. [Ibid]. 
It is strongly suggested that because condition [a] is intrinsically problematic, 
the validity of apparent generalisation derivable from [c], with the caveat that 
analogy of relation is more significant than analogy of property. is of a higher 
order than inductive generalisation based specifically on the requirement that a 
sample is [relatively] large, whatever compromises that might mean or 
empirically involve. 
According to the inductivist, science starts with observation since observation 
apparently supplies a secure basis on which to build sCientific knowledge. i.e. it 
is derivable from observation by induction and described by literal use of 
scientific language. We have already argued that science is more than the 
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collection of observable fact and in this context we are obliged to ask at the 
rudimentary level whether the principle of induction can be justified? 
Inductivists themselves attempt to show that it can in two ways, by recourse to 
logic and by appeal to experience. 
In the first instance, inductive arguments have a dubious connection with logic. 
Repudiation of this naive inductivism is well documented. As we described, 
Agassi [1964], for example, highlighted the difficulty by referring to the 
whiteness of swans. The inductive statement that the next swan observed will 
be white, because all swans so far observed are White, was seen to be too 
arbitrary, giving ad hoc a special significance to the next observation. 
On the second account of appeal to experience, repudiation is equally simple 
since the argument purporting to support inductivism is, in itself, inductivist. 
In systems terms we could say that it is the inaccessibility of the metalogic to the 
systems logic which causes this problem. 
There is also a further difficulty in determining the number of observation 
statements that are required but on more complex grounds than merely deciding 
what constitutes a 'relatively large sample'. For example we must also consider 
the variety of contexts to be explored, before an inductive inference can be 
derived. It is here that analogical modelling can contribute to the inductive 
method. Chalmers [1978] suggested that we could overcome this expansionary 
difficulty [that is, in making decisions about interesting phenomena] inherent in 
induction by appealing to our theoretical knowledge of the situation. To do this 
however would be to admit that theory plays a vital role prior to observation. 
Such an admission would be alien to inductivism but is explicitly recognised in 
the analogical approach. 
4.4 INITIAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
DEBATE 
The preceding sections have shown how analogy may be used as a method of 
meta-reasoning, which is important for the development of systemic ideas while 
a model of analogy retains the advantages of induction and deduction. 
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It is further suggested, however, that such an argument requires a 'new 
paradigm' to accommodate a different ontology and premises. There is, for 
example, an interpretative view that refutes the notion of 'real' structure and 
form in social contexts and hence might be fruitfully examined through the 
framework of analogy. Thus the whole process of analogical modelling may be 
used, not only in 'real world' thinking but also, in the abstract world of systems 
thinking, a point to which we will necessarily return. This latter area is meta-
disciplinary and therefore lends itself to meta-reasoning. 
Another key point that emerges is that the role of theory is greatly emphasised 
and if we consider this in the context of the systems paradigm then the theory 
extension, the broad unifying goals of cybernetics and General Systems Theory 
must take the fore [Flood and Robinson, 1989]. 
We are therefore interested in metaphor in systems thinking, and this will be 
discussed in the next section. Following that discussion we will move on to 
consider analogy and metaphor outside the functionalist paradigm [next but one 
section]. 
4.4.1 More On Metaphor For Systems Thinkers 
In the preceding chapter we introduced a helpful discussion on metaphor and its 
relation with analogy, drawing upon the work of Richards [1936]. Therein, 
we were informed that much of our everyday life is metaphorically based. We 
all live and speak only through our eye for resemblances. As individuals, he 
suggested, we learn our command for metaphor in the same way that we learn 
whatever else makes us distinctly human. 
Metaphor was described as a borrowing and intercourse of thoughts, a 
transaction between contexts; thought is metaphoric and proceeds by 
comparison whereupon 'meaning' is achieved. The metaphoric mechanism of 
meaning transference, as we saw, is a source of complex theorising in recent 
years and there is evidently an important contribution to be made by the systems 
concepts of 'emergence' and 'syn~rgy'. Additionally, there is support for the 
idea of metaphor as a meta-concept, working in the. same way as analogical 
reasoning. Further, metaphor reflects Campbell's points made earlier on the 
role of models for theory development and may be analysed as the 'language' 
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required for the exploitation of analogies which he saw as the 'driving force of 
science'. 
For our purposes, metaphors can be distinguished into two classes; 
a) those that work through direct resemblance and 
b) those that occur through some common attitude. 
These involve an act of comparison. There are many different conceptions of 
comparison, of which, four are presented below; 
a) putting together of the two ideas to let them work together; 
b) a study of ideas to see how they are like and how they are unlike; 
c) process of calling attention to likeness of ideas; and 
d) a method of drawing attention to certain aspects of one idea through 
the co-presence of another idea. 
At one extreme there is likeness, at the other extreme there are striking clashes 
where two remote ideas are forced together. This may be somewhat 
exaggerated, however, in terms of Burrell and Morgan's [1979] recognition of 
'radical change' such disparity may be appealing for systems and cybernetic 
'problem solving'. 
4.4.2 Metaphor And Theory Change 
At several earlier points we identified a contrast between the 'loose', open-
ended structure of metaphor with the more formal features of analogies. Having 
demonstrated how the construction of analogical models can contribute to 
theory extension, some discussion here on the ways that metaphor may 
similarly act is appropriate. 
In this context, Boyd [1979] proposed that there exists an important class of 
metaphors, that is, 'theory constitutive metaphors' which playa role in the 
development and articulation of theories in relatively mature sciences. Such 
metaphors may be used to introduce theoretical language where none previously 
existed and their success does not depend on their Conveying quite specific 
respects of similarity or analogy. 
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This is suggestive of some important relationship between the concepts of 
metaphor with neutral analogy. In this way metaphors can act rather differently 
to analogies by using theoretical terms explicitly with reference to the secondary 
subject [the 'new domain 1. Analogical models, by contrast, were 
demonstrated as seeking evidential support, prior to a possible reinterpretation 
of the theoretical concept. 
Typically users of this kind of scientific metaphor are unable to precisely 
specify the relevant respects of similarity [Le. aspects of positive or negative 
analogy] and the utility of these metaphors in theory articulation and change 
depends very much on this 'open-endedness'. 
The initial open-endedness, or looseness, necessary in scientific metaphor does 
not mean that they may permanently resist complete explication. Such 
explication would indicate conversion of aspects of neutral analogy to positive 
or negative analogy and be seen as the essential consequence of successful 
research. The significance rests in the operational rationality. It is suggested 
that such conversion indicates when a scientific metaphor has become a 
scientific model. 
Boyd further suggested that the most interesting metaphors are those which, for 
a time at least, constitute an 'i"eplaceable part o/the linguistic machinery 0/ a 
scientific theory'. These are the metaphors which are not merely exegetical but 
constitutive of the theories they express, those which scientists use in 
expressing theoretical claims for which no literal paraphrase is known. Theory 
constitutive metaphors may be seen as fundamentally pre-theoretical, yet as he 
has argued they are prevalent in new sciences. 
We have also noted that scientific metaphors of this sort undergo the public 
articulation and development uncharacteristic of literary metaphors. They do 
share one thing, however, there is general agreement that their utility does not 
depend on the even tacit availability of an explication; in science their 
importance rests on the fact that they provide a way to introduce terminology for 
features of the world whose existence seems probable, but many of whose 
features fundamental properties have yet to be discovered. To paraphrase 
Boyd [1979], theory constitutive metaphors repre~ent one strategy for the 
accommodation 0/ language to as yet undiscovered causalfeatures of the world. 
In this respect, metaphors are a necessarily creative complement to the formality 
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of analogical models, preceding their construction yet incomprehensible outside 
the framework. 
In this sense, too, metaphor and language development offer us a means by 
which the soft systems language of the interpretive paradigm may be formally 
developed, [as called for by Flood 1988 and to some extent answered by Flood 
and Robinson, 1988]. 
4.5 INTRODUCING RATIONALITY 
By now it is hoped that the reader will be sure that analogy and metaphor are 
themselves similar in their developmental processes, yet traditionally different in 
their application domains and that they represent useful tools for systems 
thinkers. 
It has also been suggested that the traditional theoretical grounding in the use of 
analogy was a fundamentally functionalist framework. On this basis, analogy 
was thought to be concerned with the identification of parallel properties across 
domains, and its potential for development has evidently been made ridiculous 
by an over-preoccupation with manifest analogy. As an understanding of 
analogy has emerged, these assumptions have been shown to be questionable. 
In this subsection we can introduce the notion of developing parallel rationalities 
in exploring analogy and metaphor in systems thinking and in the remainder of 
the chapter work towards bringing together analogy and metaphor through, for 
the moment, interpretivist and/or radical humanist world viewpoints. 
Traditionally, systems and cybernetic research was developed within the 
functionalist paradigm. Briefly, this is defined by Burrell and Morgan [1979] 
as assuming; 
a) a realist ontology, (in systems terms, 'what is, is systems'); 
b) a positivist epistemology (how we can represent and disseminate 
knowledge about those systems); 
c) nomothetic methodologies, (investigated by systematic means/end 
approaches to systems identification, representation and 
implementation); 
d) a deterministic systemic ('machine-like' metaphoric) view of the 
'nature of man'. 
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Management cybernetics, incorporating as it does the fundamental notion of 
'black-box' (which is, of course, itself metaphorical), has been criticised for 
treating (through analogy) man and organisations as if they were machines. i.e. 
where there are externalised control parameters and deterministic elements 
[Flood and Jackson. 1988]. 
To some extent Beer's [1979. 1981, 1985] Viable Systems Model overcomes 
these difficulties. that is, in principle people may be involved in democratic 
decision making [Flood and Jackson. 1988]. This does not, however, answer 
Checkland's [1980] critique where he asks whether organisations cannot 
legitimately be seen as a social grouping, an appreciative situation or a power 
struggle, also discussed in Morgan's 'Images of Organisation', [1983]. Each 
of Checkland's points can be examined metaphorically after Morgan [1980] 
under the auspices of. for example the 'theatre metaphor', which highlights the 
fact that organisational members are essentially human actors engaging in 
various roles and other officiaVunofficial 'performances'. Alternatively, he 
proposes that the 'culture metaphor' may approach aspects of an appreciative 
situation, since it draws attention to the symbolic aspects of organisational life. 
and the way that language, rituals, stories, myths etc., embody networks of 
subjective meaning which are essential for understanding how organisational 
'realities' are created and sustained. Lastly, the metaphor of a 'political' 
system emphasises the conflicts of interest and the role of power in 
organisations. 
These latter ideas work towards the development of an interpretative view or 
rationality in drawing analogies or metaphors. Briefly this is defmed by Burrell 
and Morgan [1979] as having, by contrast, to the functionalist framework: 
a) a nominalist ontology (claiming that reality is a product of individual 
consciousness, a product of one's own mind or of individual cognition; 
and hence onto such perceptions systemic frameworks can be mapped. 
but they cannot be mapped onto an 'external world'); 
b) an anti-positivist epistemology (such that knowledge is 'soft', 
subjective. based on experience and insight and hence essentially of a 
personal nature); 
c) ideographic methodologies (which investigate the world by 
facilitating an understanding of the wayan individual creates, modifies 
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and interprets the world in which understanding is obtained only by 
acquiring first hand knowledge of the subject under investigation); and 
d) a non-determinate view of the nature of man. 
By using the functionalist or interpretivist world viewpoints. but de-
emphasising regulation. a radical rationality may be found. There is a particular 
interest here with human radicalism. which draws upon the interpretative ideas. 
although it extends them to deal with the need for change where inequalities of 
power are evident and where human emancipation could be called for. 
The debate on analogy to date. however. and as stated a little earlier. has been 
restricted to the possibility of physicaVstructural. process ural and form 
similarities. that is variations of manifest analogy. We surveyed some of them 
in Chapter One but more broadly. this also reflects the 'unified science' vision 
of von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory and the earlier. prodigal 
cyberneticians. If it is true that there is form and function to know. then the role 
of analogy is supposedly to help us fmd those relations which allow us to 
understand that form and function. Looser concepts of imported analogies 
however can be explored via a model of analogy as has been suggested in this 
chapter. In this. we are able to translate the modelling rationality and in social 
contexts by concentrating on the relation of analogy. it is proposed that analogy 
can also be of use to the interpretivist systemist who would rather uncover 
many perspectives and conceive of these through a systemic form. 
From an interpretivist's viewpoint. therefore. there is a necessity to reformulate 
the classical [by this I refer to its assumed functionalist character] role of 
analogy. So let us reconsider how a radical adaptation of the classical view can 
be shown to be of use to the interpretivist. 
Of the four definitional components of analogy presented at the outset. only 
[A2] and [A4] are suitable to interpretive thinking in social contexts- [AI] and 
[A3] referring explicitly to physicaVstructural similarities. Neither [MI] or 
[M2] are suitable defmitions since both refer to (concrete) objects. Overcoming 
this. we will 'combine' the two distinct concepts. metaphor and analogy, as 
defined at the end of the section 'DISTINGUISHING ANALOGY AND 
METAPHOR- A STARTING POINT in the following way, alluding to 
methodology and forming the basis of the 'framework of analogy' spectrum. 
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Let us look more closely at the latter. In general in an analogy, we have a 
process of reasoning from two parallel cases, through inflexion or construction 
of words, diagrams and so on. In systems thinking the process of analogy 
takes place in terms of holonomics, in order to develop new images and/or 
theory and/or models that enhance our understanding of situations and thus 
promote the basis for well-reasoned intervention. 
Holonomics refers to the laws of wholes. With this nominalist viewpoint, the 
possibilities for analogy and metaphor to be used by the interpretivist and other 
'soft' researchers has been opened up within a theoretical framework. But 
finally, we ought still to recall Bunge's [1979] warning that it is; 
' ... necessary to assess the respect and degree in which an analogy 
holds, and to check the conclusion of an analogical argument.' 
This spirit must be adhered to whether it is structure and form, or issues, to 
which we address our attention in discussing relations of analogy in the 
framework of analogy. 
We have now discussed aspects of analogical modelling and the use of 
metaphor within the field of systems and cybernetic research in philosophical 
and theoretical terms. This discussion has raised several issues. Most 
important is that the significance of analogies to systems thinking suggests that 
they be reconsidered according to the principles outlined, and further, that 
metaphors be valued as offering some potential to 'see' phenomena in ways 
eluding traditional empirically based methodologies. For the future, some 
methodological analysis will be required in order to establish how the ideas 
presented here on metaphor and analogy can translate into practice. Some early 
efforts in this respect are documented in the appendices although it is intended 
that such analysis could also be concerned with the practical development of 
metaphor and analogy in terms of a soft and critical systems language. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have drawn out three main points. Firstly we have 
described and discussed .a model or method of exploring analogy. 
Secondly we have shown that rigour can be established and that there is 
a potential for further analysis of the framework by developing the 
concepts of positive, negative and neutral analogy. Thirdly we have 
clearly distinguished between analogy and metaphor although 
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suggesting that the framework of analogy represents a continuum from 
analogical isomorphy to romantic metaphor. 
In achieving this, we have stumbled upon a very important characteristic 
of the framework of analogy, that the three types of analogy, positive, 
negative and neutral analogy can be in fact related to types of rationality. 
In the following chapter we will be exploring this further. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALOGY AND RATIONALITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we introduced imponant characteristics of the 
framework of analogy for systems thinkers. Those are the concepts of 
positive, negative and neutral analogies. We will now discuss the 
suggestion that they reveal possibilities for exploring different and 
contrasting rationalities; these issues will be discussed looking at the 
relationship between analogy and rationality and in this context the 
validity of the argument from analogy. The objective of the chapter is to 
increase understanding of the relationship between the model of analogy 
and different rationalities with which it might be explored. 
5.2 EXTENDING AND EXPLORING ANALOGY 
It has been established that analogy and metaphor have a significant role in 
systems thinking and the historic perspective was surveyed at greater length in 
the fIrst chapter. We have considered a model of analogy which has potential 
utility for systems thinkers and at the end of the preceding chapter we argued 
that the profile of analysis in this area has enjoyed a boost since systems 
thinkers began to think interpretively. In this context, it has been previously 
noted elsewhere that, 
•... interest in either of these sister concepts (analogy and metaphor) 
was hardly noticeable until a quite natural revival occurred in the new 
epistemological position of soft systems thinking. Such an interpretive 
mode of reasoning attaches importance to communication and 
understanding that metaphor might contribute to. A conceptual-
metaplwrical component does potentially offer a means of raising 
relative positions and developing mutual understanding, key principles 
of a theory built on a notion of human subjectivity.' [Flood, R.L. & 
Robinson, S.A. Unpublished Paper, 1989]. 
Nevertheless, exploration of analogy and metaphor has tended to concentrate on 
the potential areas of pragmatic methodological usage, without, it has been 
argued, sufficient analysis on the potential to develop these concepts for specific 
use in systems thinking. Overall. the broad utility of these sister concepts of 
analogy and metaphor has been demonstrated and discussed increasingly in the 
last few years as we have noted in the work of Davies and Ledington [1987]. 
Atkinson and Checkland [1988]. and Flood and Robinson. [l989a, 1989b]. 
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In this chapter we will be considering the process by which. having based our 
studies on variations of the 'open system' concept, systems thinkers then 
project the 'metaphor of the open system' across the variety of domains which 
sustain the interest of systems thinkers. It will be argued that the fundamental 
concept which facilitates this process, is the relationship of analogy. 
It was stressed in the previous chapter that this research has been an analysis. 
not of 'hazy and superficial' analogies in themselves, but much more 
specifically how analogies are observed and made useful, how 'analogical 
hypotheses' are derivable and in this process, the emphasis has been theoretical 
looking at how theories can be developed. 
In this context, it has been stressed that using analogies implies intrinsic notions 
of looking at phenomena afresh. re-interpreting old ideas and of trying to think 
in new ways. It is hence a very appropriate tool in the systems framework since 
the systems thinker will necessarily be concerned with deriving processes to aid 
reconceptualisation and the recognition of processes of development and 
change. 
The core of systems thinking is representative of a driving necessity to develop 
theory and methodology from an ontological/epistemological world view that, 
even at its most compromising. can only be said to treat 'reality' as if in a state 
of 'dynamic equilibrium'. In this sense it could be argued that systems thinkers 
and philosophers are particularly sensitive to the difficulties inherent in any 
attempt to deal with the shifting nature of 'reality'. In Chapter Three we noted 
the importance of differentiating between analogy and the associated concept of 
'analogue', the latter representing as Leatherdale suggested, those things or 
phenomena which are related by a relationship of 'analogy'. This distinction 
was also made evident in the model of analogy which shows both an 'analogue 
set' and a relation of 'analogical reasoning'. 
Taking into account the dynamic systemic viewpoint, it is rather disappointing 
that systems thinkers have understood and accepted the concept of 'analogy', 
merely in tenns of a one-dimensional concept of 'analogue'. The situation could 
be taken to represent an unwanted present or 'white elephant' from the factual 
science paradigm. As a result we might further note that systems thinkers have 
undervalued analogy in the wild goose chase for isomorphisms [see section 
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1.2.2.1. Analogy and Isomorphism] across domains that were apparently 
promised by General Systems Theory and consequential to a narrow systems 
understanding of analogy in terms of analogues. 
This matter is reflected in the main exertion to develop systems theories that will 
establish the attributes of the 'open system' metaphor in terms of identities and 
similarities across domains. An example of work at the forefront of this aspect 
of the systemic endeavour is that of Troncal [1988] who has attempted to 
establish nomic isomorphism in various areas of natural science. However. the 
thinking behind the interest in indicating isomorphisms of this sort is static and 
isolationist. because it is concerned with developing a 'literal' defmition of the 
characteristics of a principally metaphoric notion of system and we have already 
noted that this is not useful. nor arguably. possible. Vickers [1972], showed 
his concern for the matter in the following way, 
'The view of entities as both systems and constituents of systems raises 
intriguing questions about identity and continuity. When does 
something, or somebody, retain its identity and continuity through 
change? When does it cease to be its old self and either vanish or 
become something new and different? The question is notfrivolous or 
metaphysical but may be of great practical concern.' [Op.cilp20]. 
The concept of analogy entails ideas of structural and systematic similarity and 
this points to the theoretical significance of different kinds of analogies apparent 
in different frameworks, such as material (,manifest'] and conceptual 
['imported'] analogies. Additionally. exploring the concepts of positive. 
negative and neutral analogy pointed to the potential to explore differing 
rationalities in the context of the framework of analogy. 
Analogy explored via 'the framework' notably reflects a transition from 
considerations of possible analogues for a systemic concept in the 'real world'. 
to the dynamic analysis of analogical relationships. Oearly this development 
parallels a similar transition from 'hard' to 'soft' systems thinking and 
potentially beyond this to involve this model of analogy with a dialectical and 
critical scope. 
In describing an analogy. what needs to be borne in mind is the identification of 
the analogical relationship which we have already argued we are in danger of 
fruitlessly pursuing in a potentially inexhaustible number of domains. The 
validity of the model. and the goal of theory development must be carefully 
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tested and guarded in order to avoid the explorations of 'merely trivial 
analogies'. This requirement behoves us to make clear what we, as systems 
thinkers, consider as 'analogical', and how we intend to model it. 
S.2.1 More on Positive, Negative Ilnd Neutrlll Anlliogy 
We have previously noted that an 'analogy' represents a comparison of one 
thing with another, in order to indicate similarities [although with a difference] 
and differences [although in the context of a proposed similitude] between them 
and thereby to increase the understanding of the lesser known of the two. 
Bunge [1979], in his discussion of analogy stresses that there are several ways 
of developing an analogy. Verbatim, Bunge is attempting to 'exactify' analogy 
which, in this analysis, we would not consider a useful objective. But, for 
Bunge, one way in which an analogy might be explored involves modelling of 
the analogous objects as sets. 
In this case one can elucidate, he suggests, a number of analogy strengths, 
ranging from 'mere some-some correspondence to homomorphism to 
isomorphism or perfect similarity,' [1979, p211]. Alternatively, a second way 
is to count the number of properties shared by the analogous things and lastly 
he suggests that a third way is possible when the things concerned are 
'systems'. In Bunge's terms a system is defmable 'as an object with a definite 
composition, environment and structwe.' [Ibid]. 
In the latter case Bunge goes on to argue that two systems can be modelled for 
comparison in tenns of their composition environment and structure, each of 
these components themselves constituting a set. Bunge develops his argument 
thus, 
'In comparing the ... two systems we compare sets (of components, 
environmental items or relations). Therefore we must start with the 
concept of similarity or analogy of two sets. We stipulate that two sets 
are similar with respect to a third set if they overlap with the latter. 
More precisely, if A, Band Care nonempty sets, then A is similar to B 
with respect to C if, and only if, A 1\ C = 0 and B 1\ C = 0.' [Ibid]. 
[Where A='Intersects']. 
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On this basis Bunge also derives descriptions of two systems being 
'substantially analogous'. if their compositions are analogous. Or they might 
be 'environmentally analogous' if their environments are similar or they might 
otherwise be 'structurally or formally analogous' if their structures are 
analogous. Further yet, by quantitatively modelling these criteria of similarity 
Bunge comes up with a 'degree of total analogy'. Hence. 
'Finally we can inven the process to obtain the qualitative concepts of 
analogy in terms of the quantitative ones: Two systems are (a) 
analogous if! (that is, 'if and only if), their degree of total analogy is 
greater than 0,· (b) weakly analogous if! their degree of total analogy, 
though non-vanishing is close to 0; and (c) strongly analogous iff their 
degree of total analogy is close to 1.' Ibid. 
Bunge, in arguing this comer, is implying that in an analogy, it is possible to 
formalise a degree of logical 'truth'. although we have already argued in the 
second chapter. and by implication in subsequent chapters, that this 
conceptualisation of truth is at best a chimerical notion. Bunge maintains that the 
judgement of an analogy will be 'superficial' if the systems in question are 
weakly analogous: or that the judgement will be 'deep' if they are strongly 
analogous. 
The modelling of analogy in this way fails to develop an understanding of 
analogy in any but one dimension. In Chapter Three, we discussed Bunge's 
points on 'plausible and implausible' analogical inference and noted that Bunge 
argued that certain analogies are 'faulty' because they rest on 'wrong analogy 
judgements'. We have described here Bunge's method of identifying and 
modelling 'genuine analogies' and clearly his view reflects a realist view which 
quite naturally, a systems thinker, viewing the world interpretively would find 
hard to accept. 
It was previously suggested that a predominant difficulty with this realist view 
of analogy is such that different possible forms of interpretation of an analogy, 
are not incorporated into Bunge's method and thus it is possible to view the 
model of the analogy, in terms of only one rationality. 
The paradoxical nature and the limitations of this realist conceptualisation of 
analogy are summarised by Bunge himself. who in offering two methodological 
rules for the use of analogical reasoning, admits the necessarily significant role 
of interpretation. Hence, 
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'Because the fruitfulness of an analogical inference depends on the 
actual degree of analogy as well as on the imagination of the user, there 
can hardly be a general theory of analogical reasoning. The most we 
can do is to formulate some weful methodological (not logical) rules, 
such as: 
Rl Use only deep analogies-i.e. make sure that the degree of 
(substantial, environmental, structural and i/possible Iotal) analogy is 
significantly greater than O. 
R2 Regard all analogies as heuristic devices that may have to be 
discarded eventually.' [Op.CiL, p213]. 
The first rule is 'obvious' without being helpful and the second, proposes by 
implication that an 'analogy is no substitute' for investigation of the peculiarities 
of the thing of interest. Not only does this second rule rather defeat the point of 
Bunge's stt'Uggles to derive a realist description of analogy, it also neglects the 
vital contribution that analogies might make, namely that they allow the 
investigator to speculate in areas which are as yet unexplored by discussing 
matters which are rather more familiar. 
Overall, we have argued that in philosophy and in practical terms, an 'analogical 
relationship' is a relationship of likeness or similarity, but with the implication 
that the likeness in question, is systematic or stt'Uctural. 'Positive' analogy is 
that case when similarities are found across domains and it should be noted that 
as we have seen, usual conceptualisations of analogy inherently favour the 
quest for 'positive' analogy. Hence in this sense, to 'identify'. 'recognise' or 
even propose an analogy is actually to make an inference of a quasi-inductivist 
nature. It is the inference from the fact that if one thing is in some respects 
similar to another, the two things will also 'correspond', [that is, have aspects 
of identifiable similarity] in other, as yet unexamined, respects. 
As an example of positive analogy. we can consider Bunge's [1959, Chapter 
One] discussion of this phenomenon. Bunge clearly defmed analogy in the 
terms of positive analogy. by suggesting that an analogy may be said to exist 
between two objects by virtue of their common properties. We can consider as 
an example. he proposed, an analogy between the Earth and the Moon. Both, 
to variable degrees, are large solid, opaque, spherical bodies receiving heat and 
light from the Sun, revolving on axes and so on. These are the areas of 
commonality. 
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Yet, although large, the Moon is smaller than the Earth, it revolves but it does 
not rotate, it has no atmosphere, water, nor vegetation. These are matters of 
dissimilarity, or as we in our terminology would say, properties of negative 
analogy. 
Having identified these two sorts of relationships, Bunge argued, the most 
interesting part of assigning them 'positive' or 'negative' analogies between the 
Earth and the Moon, is the subsequent inferential basis from which we could 
explore a hypothesis that human beings could exist on the Moon. At Bunge's 
time of writing, this was of course, a most intriguing and highly speculative 
matter. 
By taking such principles further, the intention is to use the inferential basis of 
analogies between domains to derive hypotheses and consider the possibilities 
for theoretical development. It is suggested that from our analysis of analogy 
so far, the potential for the development of theory in an analogy is of at least 
two types. 
In one way, by investigating unknown territory on the basis of making 
analogical judgements with 'conceptual weaponry' developed in an already 
familiar field, we cannot help assimilating information at a basic identificative 
dimension. In this way, it is inevitable that a 'fund of observational 
knowledge' will be accumulated in the new domain, in terms of a specific, 
though not always explicit, rationality. 
Additionally. in a second way, as we gather knowledge, it is then suggested 
that a further dimension of theory development is added, enabling us to assess 
the appropriateness of the original concepts in a new theoretical environment. 
In making this assessment, the rationality of the analogical model, or the form 
of interpretation it is given will evidently play an important role. 
While this, to a degree, is in common with Bunge's [Ibid.] assertion that in the 
process of exploring an analogy, it is the common properties which are of most 
interest, other areas of concern must also be scrutinised. There is a danger that 
a concentration on the positive analogy will limit the investigation and that it will 
develop into a search for analogues. Therefore, the 'positive' emphasis 
imposes inhibitions on the second of the potential utilities inherent in exploring 
analogy outlined above. This is caused by the fact that in concentrating merely 
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on commonalities, the power of the model to penetrate 'cross paradigmatic' 
implications of theories and hypotheses is neglected. 
Therefore in this inquiry, it is maintained that there is much more of interest in 
an observed analogy than merely common properties. By introducing other 
conceptual frameworks with which to view analogical phenomena it is more 
likely that the utility of analogies implied, even at the 'common sense' level, in 
'seeing things afresh' will be formalised to lead to theoretical development. 
Hence a commentary on the value of neutral and negative analogy as rational 
frameworks with which to view analogical relationships is appropriate. 
We have established the any basis for inference in science must be closely 
scrutinised. The process of reasoning in this model as we have seen principally 
relies on the introduction of the three concepts, those of 'positive', 'negative' 
and 'neutral analogy'. To reiterate, the flI'st refers to common propenies of 
'similitude', and the second, to properties of 'difference'. 
The introduction of the third concept of neutral analogy was Originally made by 
Campbell [1920] and quoted in the preceding chapter. Neutral analogy is that 
concept which allowed the exploration of areas of similarity in which it was 
thought possible to pursue two contexts of theoretical investigation, the vertical 
and horizontal, in the analogical model given here and illustrated in its complete 
format below. 
Therefore, we can consider theoretical development by taking seriously Black 
[1962] and Toulmin's [1953] claim, summarised by Carloyle [1971], that, 
' ... models are used in ways similar to the use o/metaphor in ordinary 
language ... models help scientists to see things in new ways by 
changing the perception 0/ the thing ... Unguistically this is expressed 
by describing the perceived thing in language not ordinarily appropriate 
to it.' [op.cit., p563]. 
Figure 4.3.la is reproduced on the following page to add clarity to the 
developing argument 
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3.New Domain 
~~ 
extended theory 2. Theory extended theory 
(re.I) (re.3) 
Neutral Analogy 
Positive Analogy 
Negative Analogy 
(iii) Theory extended 
by analopcal 
reasorung 
'Analogical Reasoning' 
Figure 4.3.1a: Iteration in an Analogical Model. 
Referring again to Figure 4.3.la we can note that the development of theory 
along the horizontal plane in the analogical model represents information 
resources Jeleased by means of drawing an analogy between two domains; that 
is, the I1rst kind of theoretical development described here. Theory 
development along the vertical plane of the model is that of 'the second kind'. 
By this, I mean theory extension in the full sense, siqce it describes the 'shifts 
in meaning' of explicated theoretical concepts to accommodate an increased 
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domain of appropriateness in the universe of applicability, for the theory lor 
hypothesis explored in the analogical model. 
Hesse [1963] followed Campbell, [op.cit.,] in arguing for neutral analogy as 
'the proper' basis for inference in reasoning by analogy. This argument rested 
on the idea that the most theoretically profitable concepts were those which were 
neither the same, nor different but similar across domains. The basis of 
similarity of properties means that the argument from the analogue set to the 
new domain is based on a modification of the traditional argument from analogy 
which relies on conditions of positive analogy, implying 'identities'. Carloyle 
[1971] has also held that this condition of 'resemblance' has hitherto been 
identified as the most significant aspect of an analogy; 
'Clearly the neutral analogy 0/ the analogue set is the key to the 
mediating function 0/ the analogue modeL. Hence it is intermediate 
between the exactness o/the theoretical language and the more indefinite 
inexactness 0/ ordinary observation terms.' [op.cit. p569]. 
It is prescriptions of exacUless and inexacUless in theoretic and observation 
languages which belie a set of metaphysical assumptions by which concepts are 
being identified and the nature of the methods of their explication are being 
developed. Here it is evident that these metaphysical notions are based 
fundamentally on processes of 'abstraction', intended to provide theory with an 
exacUless. The conflict inherent in abstraction as a literal or metaphorical tool 
makes this area wrought with difficulty. Hence 'metaphysical abstraction' 
particularly in attempting to provide a literal exactness, will necessarily render 
concepts 'static'. From abstract concepts, metaphysicians propose theories can 
be built although in the very process of abstraction they will stand in isolation, 
indifferent to the experiences the theories themselves are somehow intended to 
embroider or explain. 
In this way, it is evident that the metaphysical procedure of abstraction is 
residual from a philosophy of science rooted in reductionism. Intuitively, it 
must be seen as wholly inappropriate in the systemic world view which cannot 
recognise dissociated, static concepts as of significance to, or indeed 
reconcilable with, the contrasting systems conception of the flux and interplay 
of interpreted reality. 
It is therefore postulated that the emasculation of concepts by abstraction is not 
useful, or indeed possible, in a subject whose conceptual core is characterised 
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by notions such as 'emergence', 'equifinality', 'communication', 'autopoesis', 
to name a handful reflecting the systemic concern with development and 
change. As such, the theoretical core is representative of the driving necessity 
to develop problem-solving approaches integrating theory and more imponantly 
methodology, in an ontological world view that, even at its most 
compromising, can only be said to treat reality as if in a state of 'dynamic 
equilibrium'. Analogy, with its intrinsic concept of 'multi domain theoretical 
development' and in metaphor 'cross paradigmatic semantic shifts' is not only 
suitable for discussion is clearly highly significant in the development within 
Systems Sciences. 
Analogical relations, of course can only have a potential utility if the argument 
which springs from them can be shown to be 'valid'. And this raises the 
question; 'When is an argument from analogy ... a valid argument?' 
5.2.2 The Validity 0/ the Analogical Argument 
Carloyle has suggested that those who agree with the significance of analogy 
usually take as their evidence the 'philosophic argument from analogy'. This is 
usually described as having the form of an inductive inference from one set of 
particulars to another. The premises of such an argument would assert that a set 
of observed instances, having certain common properties, prompt the scientist 
to assume that if an ascribed domain exhibited some aspects of the positive 
analogy, the domain might usefully be probed for others as well. 
The validity of the basis for reasoning rests on the combination of the three 
types inherent in the model. Principally the three types, deductive, inductive 
and analogical reasoning, work systemically and via the structure of the 
framework to some degree systematically. Deductive reasoning works to allow 
the identification of the analogue set, inductive reasoning in part accounts for 
the projection of the hypothesis into the new domain. Lastly, we invoke what 
we have called 'analogical' reasoning to suggest that analogies can be observed 
and acted upon to allow theoretical development 
The introduction of 'analogical reasoning' is a necessity because we have 
acknowledged Hesse's note that it is not possible trio extend theory to a new 
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domain by deduction only, since no theoretical term links the axioms of the 
theory to the terms describing the new domain. 
The logical problems associated with inductivism and deductivism have been 
well documented elsewhere and it would be profitable to consider whether the 
addition of analogical reasoning does anything to salvage this model from 
criticisms levelled at the aforementioned methods of argument. 
Significantly, the model of analogy presented has the advantage of being 
distanced from the usual inductive arguments concerning the validity of 
generalisations. This is because we have argued that the probability of an 
assertion being true is determined by the conditions of the analogy only. In 
other words, we are concerned principally with the 'singular' at the 'object 
level' although potentially with the 'universal' at the methodological level. In 
this case most concentration in the investigation should be directed towards the 
validity of the model of the conditions of the analogy. 
Bunge [1959], placed a far greater emphasis on conditions of positive analogy 
than we are prepared to accept in this thesis, although he also stressed that the 
validity of the argument from analogy depended on two factors. Firstly, he 
suggested that validity in an argument from analogy is a function of the extent to 
which a positive analogy excF a negative analogy. Secondly it depends on 
the relation between the new property, that is, the predicate of the hypothesis 
and those properties alreadYJ known and attributed a 'positive' or 'negative' 
status. In other words, BunFe is implying that the Validity of an argument 
from analogy also has something to do with the utility of the heuristic element in 
the model, the neutral analogy. 
But we might also think of the introduction of negative analogy as a fonn of 
systemic dialectic. This thought follows the adaptation of the classical argument 
from analogy which requires that the basis for inference be in the identity of 
properties between the domain and the analogue set. In this, and Carloyle's 
position, the emphasis is in perceived similarity, giving within the goals of the 
thesis, more importance to the theoretical rather than methodological angle. 
We have previously noted that both analogies and metaphors, [the latter 
conceived as a subset of the former] can be readily incorporated in 
methodology. Davies and Lcdington, [1988] as we saw specifically use 
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metaphor to enhance the conceptual processes of the Soft Systems 
Methodology. I have argued that the introduction of metaphoric material in a 
methodology and attempts at implementation in an unreflective, randomly-
driven fashion, can only give a methodological illusion of problem solving. It 
is not possible to derive in this way a theoretical explanation of the utility of 
metaphor which can be used for a transference of utility beyond the immediate 
context. The metaphors are used to facilitate creative 'revelation' and without a 
fuller development arguments derived therein cannot be seen as having a valid 
status. More can be said to justify this position. 
Analogies and metaphors used in methodology carry with them their own 
dangers, by virtue of their apparently ubiquitous utility. I would also give as an 
example, the 'problem-solver' using Soft Systems Methodology who is often 
encouraged [Checkland, 1981] to think of himself in the role [this is itself 
analogical] of a 'therapist'. The situation has some parallel with Laing's [1968] 
points on how the 'problem of madness' is treated in psychiatry. 
'I started to try to see through the dense opacity of social events from 
the study of situations and not simply of individuals. It seemed that the 
study... was arrested in three principal ways ... in the first, the 
behaviour of such people ['the mad'} was regarded as signs of a 
pathological process that was going on in them, and only secondarily of 
anything else. The whole subject is enclosed in a medical metaphor 
... f conditioning} ... the conduct of all those who were enclosed by it, 
doctors and patients. Through this metaphor the person being isolated 
from the system could no longer be seen as a person. If one does not act 
towards the other person as a person, one depersonalises oneself.' 
[op.cit ., p28.] 
In other words, Laing is indirectly pointing out a methodological danger. We 
have previously noted in chapter three that some commentators argue that much 
of 'reality' is itself governed by metaphor, in this instance a metaphor which 
elicits behaviour in the form of 'role playing'. Hence any problem solver with 
an interest in using metaphor [or analogy] in methodology to facilitate 
'understanding', must pay strict attention to processes by which these tools 
operate, to avoid pasting one metaphor over another, introducing many layers 
of consciousness. 
The necessity to penetrate processes of analogy and metaphor is evident in this 
passage. It is further suggested that until these are explicated, any 'revelation' 
brought forward by analogic or metaphoric methodology is theoretically non-
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productive in any but the most contrived circumstance. because it can do no 
more than 'abstract' and 'isolate' the processes of most interest. i.e. 
methodological processes accounting for analogical and metaphoric 
illumination. In such isolation the concepts and processes are eminently 
unsuitable for inclusion in methodological intervention. 
What is plainly required is a tool which will supersede the processes of 
abstraction inherent in the reliance for inference on conditions of neutral 
analogy. The tool should also be developed in such a way as to approach the 
persistent impetuosity of the reality in which we are attempting to communicate, 
to intervene and most urgently, in which to learn. Hegel [1892] most eloquently 
put a case for a method of inquiry that will be considered in some detail here, 
'wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything 
is carried into effect in the actual world, dialectic is at work. It is the 
soul of all knowledge which is truly scientific.' [Sec. 8Iz pI48]. 
Dialectic is not unfamiliar to systems thinkers. Churchmanian dialectics derived 
from the cyclical Hegelian concept of a heroic struggle between thesis/antithesis 
for synthesis has been developed methodologically in the Strategic Assumption 
Surfacing Testing methodology [Mason and Mitroff. 1981]. 
This methodology was seen by Jackson and Flood [1991] as suitable for ill-
structured problem contexts where differences of opinion over which strategy to 
pursue are preventing decisive action being taken. The methodology works by 
confronting problem owners' 'most cherished' systemic assumptions with 
plausible counter assumptions; this adversarial trial leading, in due course, to a 
synthetic agreement concerning the systems goals and implementation of agreed 
changes can proceed. The cyclical process of the dialectic means however that 
any manufactured agreement that is sustained is purely temporary. 
Bryer [1979] criticises the basis of the Hegelian conception on the grounds that 
it implies. 'the absence 0/ any real structure in the wlwle'. Jackson stresses that 
Churchman'S methodology is therefore regulative. since his process of 
dialectical inquiry is a continual adjustment of ideological consensus. 
These ideas of 'continual ideological adjustment' and the fleeting nature of 
'synthetic agreement' represent a rather narrow apprtclation of the process of 
dialectic itself. Both criticisms are directed at an end state. in the first case a 
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misplaced perception of a literal 'structured whole', [which as we have argued 
is entirely metaphoric, in any case] and a state of ideological consensus which is 
not appropriate with regard to a continually shifting process with synthesis 
becoming thesis imperceptibly as the cycle rotates. 
In the discussion of the formal analogical model. however. it is proposed that 
the concept of 'negative analogy' may be usefully evaluated as a heuristic device 
in iteration of an analogical model. The emphasis is in the processes of learning. 
derivable from the juxtaposing of domains, since the dissimilarity identified by 
conditions of negative analogy are clearly representative of a dialectical, rather 
than an abstracted, metaphysical world view. In other words in the exploration 
of a negative analogy, we are conducting our inquiry by the criteria of an 
entirely different rationality. 
In the 'Republic', Plato presented 'the Analogy of the Divided Lines', in which 
he proposed dialectic as a procedure of rational disputation which, by careful 
consideration and resolution of opposing arguments, works to attain what he 
regarded as the highest form of knowledge, the 'F orrn of the Good'. Although 
we will no doubt find it necessary to make the distinction between the Platonic 
realism of the Theory of Forms and the non-universal nature of systems 
epistemology, the process of dialectical inquiry is still of significant interest. 
In the nineteenth century, Hegel adopted the view that reality itself is dialectical; 
that opposing rational views, a thesis and an antithesis, resolve into a synthesis 
which then becomes the thesis of a further dialectical process and so on. For 
Marx, the dialectic was made material and the process seen in terms of the 
strUggle between material and economic forces towards their resolution in a 
'better society'. 
Of the Platonic, Hegelian and Marxian conceptions, the view which most 
represents a current interpretivistic climate in systems is that of Georg Wilhem 
Friedrich Hegel, who believed that 'Mind or Spirit' was the ultimate 'reality'. 
Significantly this position is connected with our discussion on analogy, 
especially the dialectical basis for inference which it is suggested as supplying. 
Hegel was also a philosophical monist positing that everything is interrelated 
with one vast complex system or whole. He called this the 'Absolute' in which 
seemingly distinct parts have reality only in so far as they were parts of the 
whole. 
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The proposition is that analogy may be considered a form of dialectic, and to 
avoid challenges on the grounds of pragmatism, we must clarify several points; 
1) the relevance of dialectic to the development of systems; 
2) the status to be accorded to insights derived by a process of 
analogical dialectic; 
3) the potential and limitations of 'analogical dialectics' should be 
outlined. 
Approaches which seek to explore reality by juxtaposing different domains of 
inquiry are not new to the systems movement. Checkland [1972] is aware of 
the potential it offers and strongly delineates his methodology into the arenas of 
'real world' and 'systems thinking'. Thomas [1980] suggests that this 
separation represents an early systemic attempt to generate a tension between 
'what is' and 'what might be'. This is done in order to perform analysis and 
conceptualisation in parallel and that the 'tension' precipitated will form a source 
of creative change. 
Thus, the conceptualisation developed here parallels the interest in generating 
tension. But tension of a very specific type represented by identification of 
negative analogies across domains. There will not be an excursion into a 
metaphysical abstract, since it is suggested that such analogies will betray the 
conditions for a dialectical analysis. Dialectics rest apparently paradoxically on 
'the law of the unity of opposites'. This notion is postulated by dialecticians as 
' ... the fundamental law of the universe ... [operating] universally, 
whether in the natural world, in human society, or on man's thinking. 
Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and 
struggle, and it is this which impels things to move and change.' 
Zedong, [1961, p91]. 
Dialectic has at least one property in common with systems science. Its 
propositions are easy to state, but not so easy to grasp and understand. This is 
partly explainable by the fact that dialectical logic and systems science attempt to 
deal with things at their most general level and to provide the most universal 
principles of thought 
Also, it is worth noting from Norman and Sayers (1980) that, 
' ... the dialectical way of seeing things seems to fly in the face of all the 
traditional philosophy and common sense. The idea of contradictions 
existing in things seems absurd and impossible -a metaphysical and 
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mystical extravagance and the very opposite of scientific and rational 
thought.' [op.cit .• p2]. 
Hence, what fundamental view of the world does dialectic represent? 
Norman and Sayers [op.cit.,] discuss the dialectical method as a philosophy, a 
logic and a way of seeing things. In other words we have introduced a 
supplementary layer in the procedures of reasoning intrinsic to our model of 
analogy, explicitly denoting a conflict between two rationalities, the dialectic 
and in this case what may be called the 'metaphysical world view'. The latter is 
best summarised by Bishop Butler's gnomic phrase. 'Everything is what it is 
and not another thing', [1736]. 
This view is presented as a formal logic which isolates 'obvious and evident 
truths' about the nature of reality concerning issues of identity. Butler's phrase 
is compounded by the implied philosophic truth of 'A=A', i.e. that everything 
is identical with itself. Hegelian dialectic does not deny this apparently rather 
trivial position as an imponant starting point for philosophers attempting to deal 
with the shifting nature of 'reality'. Significantly, neither do systems thinkers 
hesitate to contemplate the issue of identity, and have considered the immanent 
importance of denoting identity as a fundamental starting point. We have 
already noted Vickers' [1972] timely concern with this matter; 
'The view of entities as both systems and constituents of systems raises 
intriguing questions about identity and continuity . ... The question is 
not frivolous or metaphysical but may be of great practical concern.' 
Hegel meanwhile sums up the metaphysical view of identity as 
The subsistence or substance of anything that exists is its self identity, 
for its want of identity ... would be its dissolution. But self identity is 
pure abstraction.' [1807 B, P 113; M p33]. 
Notably, this initial point on identity can be used to illustrate the potential of the 
formal analogical model in the context of exploration of the dialectical world 
view. The model is, by virtue of the deduction and induction of set and domain 
principally concerned with the expansion of the theories used to identify the 
analogue set. This is done via analysis of the 'meaning' of concepts, terms or 
interpretations in a variety of contexts, that is the new domains. Thomas 
[op.cit.,] has noted that problems in using systems models to pnerate tension 
for constructive change arise because generating tension is difficult, due to the 
fact that the two sides of a comparison must be far enough apan without making 
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an 'unbridgeable gap'. This difficulty is clearly avoided in the formal analogical 
model in which analogue set and new domain are linked by processes of 
reasoning as outlined, and additionally by the nature of the heuristic inquiry 
being explored under a hypothesis. 
We could go as far as to suggest that the processes which precipitate metaphoric 
or analogic revelation, as previously mentioned will be made apparent in explicit 
exploration of properties of negative [and to a lesser degree neutral] analogy. 
Conditions of self identity, evident in positive analogy, cannot aid explication of 
a conceptual hypothesis on the vertical plane of the model, although they are 
able to contribute to horizontal expansion. [please refer to the Figure 4.4.1 a for 
clarity]. 
Norman and Sayers [op.cit] have stressed the significance of the dialectical 
view and their discussion precipitates a renewed consideration of dialectic in the 
systems movement. Analogies. as we have noted throughout the thesis. 
prompt reconceptualisations. We can also see how the most contemporary 
issues in systems; methodological validation, penetration of organisational 
culture and panicularly those raised by Critical Systems theorists, for example, 
Flood. [1989c], Ulrich, [1983] discuss matters of subordination, subversion. 
inequalities in communication and power relations. which are approachable by 
dialectic. Hence. 
'Everything has self-identity, being-in-itself, but the matter does not end 
there, lor nothing is merely self-identical and self-contained, except 
what is abstract, isolated, static and unchanging. All real, concrete 
things are pan o/the world o/interaction, motion and change,Jor then 
we must recognise that things, are not merely subsistent but exist 
essentially in relation to other things.' [Norman and Sayers, op.cit., 
p3]. 
Before interpretivist systemists respond to descriptions of concepts being 'real' 
and 'concrete' as anathema, an explanation of the specific meanings of these 
terms in either context is most urgently required. They, like all terms existing 
within a given rationality carry panicular interpretations there which are not 
altogether externally visible. In other words, what do dialectic philosophers 
mean by 'concrete?' Superficial analysis implies abstraction, but the notion is 
not fundamentally metaphysical nor is that the original rationality. As we have 
noted in that arena, Plato regarded objects considered in-themselves as 
abstractions, the perfections of the 'Forms' at the core of the 'Theory of 
Forms'. Hence, an object regarded 'of itself and in concen with Hegelian 
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dialectic, is abstracted in the literal and precise sense that it has been tllken out of 
context, and is viewed in isolation. 
Thus in the metaphysical rationality, terms are considered merely in themselves, 
merely as what they are, as static and subsistent, a view arguably impoverished 
in approaching the complexity of the real world. In treating things as isolated, 
all movement and development especially in terms of theory itself is arrested, 
merely a 'given', indifferent and inactive in relation to all other tenns, 'things' 
and theories. 
Dialectical thought proposes, by stringent contrast, that real and concrete things 
cannot be abstracted in this way. Rather they are fundamentally embedded in 
the world and essentially related to other objects and in perpetual interaction 
with them. Hegel's monism is implied clearly here, 
~ determinate, afinite being is one that is in relanon to an other, it is a 
content standing in a necessary relation to another content, to the whole 
world,' Hegel, [Science of Logic, 1929 p86]. 
Hence usage of the word 'concrete' carries a particular meaning in discussion of 
dialectic, that is, that all concrete things are in a process of movement, of 
becoming and of developing and change. Essential to all concrete things, is that 
' ... we are aware that everything isfinite, [but} instead of being stable, is 
ultimately rather changeable and transient'. [Hegel, Ibid, p442]. 
The metaphysical view that abstracted concepts are somehow pure and 
unchanging has generated many useful models for the advance of science and 
other fonns of human knowledge and experience, [we may, arguably consider 
religion here]. But its inflltration as a residuum in systems thinking is stifling. 
Its presence in philosophic and scientific inquiry is so deeply involved, that 
processes of abstraction have been accorded a status virtually impenetrable to 
challenge. 
To the dialectical inquirer t the ascribed status of metaphysical abstraction 
presents a situation of some wry irony. In fusing questions of philosophy and 
science into the hybrid area, 'philosophy of science', we have done nothing but 
reinforce the isolationist procedures of the metaphysi~ and perpetuated the 
conceptual, rather than historicist emphasis in philosophy. This also allows, of 
course, associated ethical concepts, 'Justice' or even the nature of 'Human 
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Rights' to be defined and treated as somehow unchanging and static. In 
considering their nature 'out of context' as abstraction demands, very urgent 
ethical issues demanding attention right now, can be comfonably relegated to 
the attention of further generations of metaphysical philosophers. Hence one is 
in serious danger, metaphorically, of contemplating the state of the stable door, 
after the horse has bolted. 
Further. a logical progression of introducing 'abstraction' as a starting point. is 
the subsequent effect is that 'reality' too. comes to be regarded as abstract, 
unchanging i.e. metaphysical, not in this case dialectical. We can identify 
evidence in our own nonsensical and pre-emptive attempts to establish the literal 
features of the 'open systems' metaphor. Additionally this tendency has 
clouded systems thinkers sensibilities and sensitivities, presenting us with 
epistemological and indeed ideological problems. Among others, the tendency 
to abstract within a one-dimensional rationality has presented us with a 
disturbing phenomenon. Namely the pervasive 'common sense' views that 
'you can't change human nature', or that 'human beings are naturally 
competitive'. This view fails to see that it is the dominance-of certain kinds of 
prevalent social relations. that produce, and are required, by certain kinds of 
social behaviour. I will say a little more on this in the context of general 
systems theory in the next chapter. 
Abstraction of this sort is also a feature of investigations into the explanations of 
the architecture of our language. The philosophical problem is not with 
clarifying the effects of abstraction but with accounting for them. The point is 
seen in the question of how far meanings are forced in us by the nature of our 
experience or by the requirements in this context of 'successful 
communication'. Ayer [1969]. puts it like this, 
'We cannot detach ourselves from every point of view. If we abandon 
one, we have to occupy another. The idea that we could prise the world 
off our concepts is incoherent for with what conception of the world 
should we then be left?' [op.cit. p67]. 
In his analysis of the problems of the social sciences in the thinies. Lynd 
[1939]. makes a point that has a resonance in the development of the systemic 
view today. 
The time outlooks of the scholar-scientist and Of practical men of affairs 
who surround the world of science tend to be different. The former 
works in a long leisurely world in which the hands of the clock crawl 
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slowly over a vast dial,' to him, the precise penetration o/the unknown 
seems too grand an enterprise to be hurried and one simply works ahead 
within study walls relatively sound proofed against the clamorous 
urgencies 0/ the world outside. In this time universe 0/ the scholar-
scientist, certain supporting assumptions have grown up, such as 
impersonal objectivity, aloo/nessfrom the strife of rival values, the self 
justifying goodness 0/ new knowledge about anything big or little. 
Such a setting has tended to impart a quality of independent validity and 
self sufficiency to the scholar-scientist's work. The practical man of 
affairs, on the other hand, works by a smQlI time dial over which the 
second hand o/immediacy hurries incessantly. HNever mind the long 
past and the infinite future ... but do this, fo: this now, before tomorrow 
• H , [ • 7] mormng.... op.Clt., p . 
It has been taken for granted that there has been no need to synchronize the two 
time worlds of Lynd's 'scholar-scientist' and the 'practical man'. Immediate 
relevance has not been normally regarded as so important as the 'ultimate' 
relevance, whatever that should be or mean. 
Necessarily, dialectics confronts the uncomfortable and difficult thesis that all 
dynamic and concrete things are contradictory. There are tensions and conflicts 
within all things and in relations between things. A distinction must, however. 
be made between the dialectical conceptualisation of contradiction and the 
conceptualisation used in formal logic. In a nutshell, dialectical contradiction is 
a 'concrete contradiction', existing not just between ideas or propositions but in 
things. It is in strict contrast to the metaphysical view. in which things are 
regarded as self contained existents, indifferent to other things, after Hegel, 
The different diverse things are each individually what they are, 
unaffected by the relation in which they stand to each other. The 
relation is therefore external to them." [I 892, sec.117, p216]. 
Dialecticians, indeed systems thinkers are fundamentally unable to recognise 
this vision of reality as representative. It is the nature of binding. perhaps 
'existential' relations, that the systems thinker looks for support of the truism 
that 'the whole is more than, and less than, the sum 0/ its parts'. In the 
rationality of these dialectic relations, we uncover forces of opposition and 
negation, leading to development and change. It is not a case of mere 
connection but of constant processes of conflict and pro-active interaction. 
Hence, dialectical reason, 
' .. sharpens the blunt difference of diverse terms into essential 
difference, into opposition. Only when the manifold terms have been 
driven to the point 0/ contradiction (i.e. by identification of negative 
analogies) do they become active and lively towards each other, 
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receiving in contradiction, the negativity which is the inherent pulsation 
of self movement and vitality.' [Science of Logic p.442.] Brackets 
added. 
It is hence suggested that this accounts for the potential of the analogical model 
to comprehend things in their movement, that is. 
' ... contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality,' it is only in so 
far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge 
and activity'. [Ibid p.439.] 
'Contradiction' in the dialectical sense then, is emphasised in the development 
of notions of negative analogy for two primary reasons: 
a) to stress that concrete things are not indifferent to one another, but 
rather in interaction and conflict with each other, i.e. a thing is 
determinate and has its own identity only by maintaining itself distinct 
from, by opposing, other things. 
b) Contradiction is required as a concept in order to stress that concrete 
opposition is not external, accidental, but essential and fundamental 
'opposition within a unity' The dialectical conceptualisation of 
contradiction is that of a 'concrete unity of oppositions'. 
The law of contradiction applies, as its rationality dictates, to all things; and its 
neglect is perhaps attributable to the revolutionary enigma it represents in 
Marxism. Duhring, a critic of the process of dialectic. but particularly of the 
concept of contradiction. is quoted by Engels [1962]. 
'Contradiction is a category which can only appertain to a combination 
0/ thoughts and not to reality .... contradiction accepted as reality in 
itselfis the apex of absurdity'. [op.cit., pl64]. 
As a logical defence against the tenets of dialectic. metaphysical philosophers 
propose. almost ironically. 'the law of non-contradiction'. That law states. 
according to Popper [1940] • 
.... no self contradictory proposition or pair o/propositions can be true, 
that is, can correspond to the facts. In other words, the law implies that 
a contradiction can never occur within the facts, that facts can never 
contradict' [op.cit, p416]. 
What is said. by critics of dialectic, is that the concept of contradiction is 
unacceptable and that conditions of opposition do not, yield significant insight. 
The basis of the criticism. in point of fact, rests ori a misconception of the 
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notion of concreteness as it has been outlined here, and can be largely dismissed 
in the following way. 
Metaphysically rooted criticisms of dialectic are based in an understanding of a 
condition of 'self identity' [or a rationality recognising self-identity or positive 
analogy in the formal analogical model] As we have seen, this is static and 
indifferent to 'existential relations' and further one in which an object or thing is 
taken out of context. The criticism exhibits a gross shortfall since the 
assumption is made that attempting to express a contradiction is a 'self-
annulling' proposition, characterised by the capacity to imply anything and 
everything and thus able to assert nothing. Popper [op.cit.,] summarises the 
point, 
'From two contradictory premises we can logically deduce anything and 
its negation as well. [The formal analogical model is founded on 
principles of induction, deduction and analogical reasoning]. We 
therefore convey with such a contradictory theory - nothing. A theory 
which involves a contradiction is entirely useless, because it does not 
convey any sort of information.' [Ibid]. 
But a simple defence is readily available in making a rationality-based 
distinction between formal and dialectical conceptualisations of contradiction. 
The former is indeed such that a contradiction represents 'self-annullment', a 
formal impossibility and hence able to assert nothing. In other words if a 
theory of 'A' is simultaneously, and of itself, a theory of 'not-A', it is no more 
than a failed theory. Alternatively, formal contradiction can be considered as a 
mere assertion; if a theory of 'A' is simultaneously, and of itself, a theory of 
'not-A', then it is an assertion of anything and everything as regards 'A'; in 
other words, an absolutely indeterminate theory. Thus, in sum, formal 
contradiction is an indeterminate and abstract assertion. a condition of which 
Hegel was well aware, in 'Logic', where he stated. that whatever has only 
abstract and indeterminate being, is pure nothingness. 
Dialectical contradiction, as has been demonstrated, must be seen to represent 
not formal, but by the terms of its own rationality 'concrete contradiction'. 
From the analogical model. negative analogies offer potential for 'theory 
expansion' on the grounds that the juxtaposition of the analogue set and any 
number of 'new domains'. force a re-interpretation or re-conceptualisation of 
the initial hypothesis/concept. as the cycle revolves. '. 
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This chapter has attempted to discuss a number of points. firstly the value of the 
formal analogical model presented initially. in terms of an heuristic in systems 
thinking. The argument has presented a case for a theoretical model of analogy 
to be explored via notions of positive, neutral and negative analogy in three 
modes, as a method of abstraction, as an heuristic device and as a process of 
dialectic respectively. In discussing the shortfalls of processes of 'metaphysical 
abstraction' implied by neutral analogy, we could pinpoint the contemporary 
interest in 'ethical methodology'. In introducing negative analogy in a dialectical 
context we can add to thoughts in the field on the value of juxtaposing domains 
as adversaries in the critical mode. Additionally it is hoped that each of these 
modes clearly offer the potential to develop in both analytic and particularly 
although not at this juncture, methodological terms. It is hence suggested that 
the initial intuitions of the analogical and metaphorical basis to the systems 
approach retain much to offer the systems movement as it continues its 
development 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have drawn out two main points. Firstly that it is the 
case that characteristics of analogy, the positive negative and neutral can 
indeed be shown to lead to different rationalities. Secondly that this may 
have implications for systems sciences in terms of different rationalities 
which may interpret systemic and other concepts. for example a pluralist 
rather that isolationist position. 
The consideration of a rigourous approach to analogical reasoning in 
these last two chapters was pursued following the establishment of 
some optimism for analogy as a concept. We have now seen in detail 
how analogy can work and that we must recognise, through this 
conceptualisation the importance of differing rationalities. We are now 
in a position to consider analogy specifically in the domains of systems 
thinking and systems practice. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
USE OF ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS THINKING: UTILITY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
We have established that systems thinking should not shy away from 
explicit use of analogy, but we now need to show how analogical 
reasoning can be drawn upon in systems thinking as well as 
highlighting some ways in which it should not. The objective of this 
chapter is to illustrate how we can use the framework of analogy to re-
conceptualise systems concepts. 
6.2 ANALOGY AND SYSTEMS THEORY 
Any neglect of theory, specifically ontology and epistemology in the 
theory/practice relationship in systems activities will lead to much confusion. 
There are various, although familial, conceptions of 'system' which could be 
said to form an embryo of 'systems theory', but more noticeably there has been 
a proliferation of aspiring systems methodologies. This rapidly expanding 
body of methodology has been attaching itself in an increasingly vague manner 
to a proportionally diminishing theoretical 'core'. This thesis considers that this 
situation should be a matter of some concern. 
Therefore it is of interest that theoretical issues on the matters of what 
constitutes our 'research programme', in a general sense, both within systems 
science and by drawing upon theoretical lessons from elsewhere [Flood and 
Gregory, 1989] be raised. This will contribute to the development of 
ontological and epistemological stances to establish overall consistency, 
credibility and integrity and the importance of different aspects of this debate 
can be found elsewhere, [Flood, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c]. 
The preoccupation of 'self-reflection' in the systems movement has tended to 
concentrate on methodology, together with some tentative forays into 
metaphysics [De Vries and Hezewijk, 1978] and aspects of our apparently 
ideological nature [Lilienfeld, .1978]. The methodological emphasis is 
understandable. It is a natural consequence of the ~nefits that basic systems 
concepts offer as a supplement to the methods, and concepts, of the 
objective/reductionist natural science paradigm and its 'crisis' in the face of 
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'complexity'. In other words, systems practice tends to concentrate on 
methodologies for contemporary societal difficulties. 
Further, incorporation of systems ideas in methodologies in practice is 
fundamentally easier than considering how these ideas might change our views 
on reality. Mattesich [1978], among others, makes it clear that the 
methodological disposition should not be seen as the most fruitful one and he 
makes a strong call for theoretical development, 
The excessive worship of short run needs and the failure to see that in 
the long run the theoretical is the most practical is symptomlltic for the 
mood of our immediate past. Such an attitude hardly falls short of killing 
the proverbial goose that lays the golden eggs.' [op.cit., p6]. 
We have already noted in the Preface that discomfort with the current situation 
shows a second face. Systems practitioners such as Eden and Graham [1983] 
have complained about the lack of guidance that systems theory offers them. 
They have even suggested that an 'unnatural' stress on systems theory has 
been to the detriment of methodologists working in practical, transactional 
worlds. To reiterate, 
'Theory tells ... about the nature of complexity but the tools presented 
for handling it do not seem related to the theory.' 
Further that, 
'Systems assertions are often understandable, undeniable and mIltters of 
fact. The substantive difficulties for the practitioner arise in establishing 
the relevance of any particular systemic description of a problem as 
being relevant to the issue under consideration.' [op.cit., p723]. 
It is acknowledged that there is a weakness in systems theory and the thesis 
contends that this is at fault, rather than the stress on being theoretically 
referential. Vickers [1970] has drawn a parallel with the so-called fate of the 
social sciences, lamenting the lack of substantive theory to which practitioners 
can turn. 
We must conclude, therefore. that a prior neglect of theory has led to much 
confusion in the systems community. Even worse perhaps, is the neglect that 
the systems community suffers as a consequence of this [Mattesich. 1978. 
suggested that this is true, for instance, in the case of philosophers of science]. 
The unique turn, then, that challenges systems and cYbernetics is to show the 
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way toward practically relevant theory, combining social and systems theory 
and practice [Flood. 1989c). 
6.2.1 Using A Framework 0/ Analogy. 
The following question therefore arises- 'what can be done in this urgent 
situation'l' Mattesich points to one way forward; 
'If this notion f system] is something beyond a passing fad, it must be 
possible to relate it to the contemporary view about the structure of the 
universe. Thus the systems approach might be enhanced by giving it an 
ontological grounding (i.e. by stating assumptions about the existence 
of certain entities and events) and by showing the system notion as 
being rooted in thefoundations of science'. [Ibid]. 
The issue of ontology has, of course. arisen more usefully elsewhere. 
Checkland. celebrated systems methodologist, in referring to the theory/practice 
relationship has indirectly tackled ontological matters. Checkland [1985] 
suggested that; 
'A set of linked ideas in an intellectual framework F, embodied in a 
methodology, M. applied to an area of application. A. yield learning 
about F.M,A. Neither theory nor practice is prime, each helps create 
the other in a process which is groundless.' [op.cit.. p757]. 
It is Checkland's points on the 'grounding' of systems concepts within a 
groundless process which are interesting with respect to the development of 
systems theory and these philosophical issues can be surveyed at greater length. 
One relevant perception of theory is consonant with the Kuhnian concept based 
on historical and sociological evidence that theories may be thought of as a 
'structured whole'. Chalmers [1978]. however. stresses that another more 
general philosophical argument is closely linked with the theory-dependence of 
observation. It has been established that observation statements claiming to 
penain to facts must be formulated in the language of some theory. 
Consequently the statements and the concepts figuring in them. will be as 
precise and informative as the theory in whose language they are framed. There 
is clearly an implied role for analogy and metaphor in both of these 
conceptualisations of theory. 
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Such a point was declared by Suppe [1978]1, in his call to dismiss the 
Weltanschauungen conception of the development of scientific knowledge, but 
to retain an emphasis on language and theory. 
With a similar emphasis, the objective has been to devise a framework to tackle 
the issue of 'theoretical language' as it shifts in terms of rationality. The notion 
of the framework incorporates, implicitly, aspects of ontology, epistemology 
and other matters of theory. These require sensitive treatment since the 
important thing in philosophical inquiry is asking the right questions. It is an 
issue on which systems thinkers might usefully distinguish themselves. This is 
not only a matter of deciding what it is we want to know, but also of seeing 
what kind of inquiries make sense, how the problems or the questions may 
most usefully be posed and whether we are to acknowledge that there might be 
some things which it is just 'not possible' to know. All these maUers are 
inherently decided with reference to a given rationality. 
Additionally, a primary concern in formulating philosophical questions is 
having some idea about how to look for a suitable answer. This is treacherous 
ground which is why it must be dealt with explicitly. 
In this context Emmet [1964] has identified three sons of question. Firstly, he 
suggests there are a very large number of questions for which the appropriate 
methcxl of forming an answer is 'going and seeing'. These are questions about 
the world around us and we attempt to answer them by looking at the 'facts of 
experience.' Answers to this sort of question are generally empirically testable 
and we have already discussed whether these are the sorts of question in which 
systems thinkers are interested. I do not ~ that they arc. 
Secondly, there are other questions which are best answered by a process of 
argument, deduction and putting together knowledge we already possess. These 
are questions more of interest to systems thinkers although I would not be 
happy with the emphasis merely on knowledge that we already possess, since 
this implies a reliance on past empirical collection. It has been previously 
suggested that there are other types of knowledge and equally other ways of 
collecting it than the traditional empirical methods. Thirdly, there are those 
questions which might be described as philosophical. 
1 Suppe (1978) made a damning IltaCk on the weltanschauung view of the history and 
progress of knowledge and in Ibis broke away from such theorists as Kuhn. 
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But some further qualifications are necessary to reinforce this point. Principally 
they concern the fIrst set of questions, those to which the answer is empirically 
testable. Significantly, although an answer may be empirically tested in 
principle, it may not be so in practice, either now or ever [although this does 
not, of course, necessarily render it metaphysical]. Emmet gives the example of 
trying to count how many people there are at a particular moment in Greater 
London. Although this is clearly possible in principle, it is evidently [almost] 
impossible in practice. 
Further, as we have discussed, when we ask questions about 'matters of fact' 
we normally have some idea about what sorts of answers to expect, that is, 
what sorts of answers would be 'acceptable'. These latter qualifIcations 
emphasise the theory-practice relation that, while common to all scientific 
activity, is especially important to systems. In pursuing an investigation we 
must have some idea of what it is we are seeking, for the nature of what is 
being sought is likely to determine to some extent the method of investigation. 
Emmet puts it rather well, 
' ... in Lewis Carroll's poem, it is a snark that is being hunted, thimbles 
and hope may be appropriate,' a nonsense hunt requires nonsense 
methods. Some people might suggest that metaphysical hunts in the 
past have sometimes had a snarkishflavour about them.' [op.cit., p64]. 
It is important then to consider, when questioning the 'grounding' of systems in 
a 'groundless process" what kind of question we are asking. Is it something 
that will be empirically testable? Should such testing be required in principle, in 
practice, or both? Or is it something we may deduce, reason by argument or 
confine to the realms of the 'unknowable'. 
The 'Framework of Analogy' is intended to incorporate factors of each of the 
stipulations given above in methodological development to approach matters of 
theory. In the 'model' questions of all three categories are asked. Incidentally, 
the descriptive term 'framework' is rather deceptive, it is more fruitful to 
conceptualise this as meth<X;iological, and in terms of sliding on a continuum, 
see Figure 6.2.1 a. 
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Figure 6.2.1a; 
The Framework of Analogy': A Methodological Continuum. 
At one end of the continuum we can find a Formal Analogical Model, the 
framework of which was explored in the preceding chapter. The Formal 
Analogical model is largely an ephemeral notion representing a highly unlikely 
'ideal case of analogy' consisting of nomic isomorphisms between analogue set 
and new domain, still explained through aspects of positive and negative 
analogy [it is unlikely that a fully expounded Formal Analogical Model, that is 
an 'ideal type' will contain neutral analogies]. At the other extreme we can see 
the proposition of 'Romantic Metaphor', [Atkinson, 1984] which lends itself to 
metaphysical explication and pragmatic heuristics of the type used by Davies 
and Ledington [1988]. 
In the intervening spectrum, we can conceptualise the analogical models based 
on aspects of positive, negative and neutral analogy using reasoning by 
argument [deduction and induction] and supplemented by analogical 
'metareasoning' with reference to rationalities exposed by the heuristic tools of 
the model. 
The idea of a Framework of Analogy can, as suggested above, be presented in 
methodological terms. We go so~e way towards this in the two examples of 
the use of the framework presented a little later in the ~hapter. As yet, however, 
a full methodological development has not been achieved and the case studies 
illustrated in the appendices necessarily present a rather broad perspective of the 
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use of analogy. But this factor should not surprise us since. as with Soft 
Systems Methodology [Checkland. 1981]. interpretively based reasoning of 
this sort is not a systematic procedure, nor is there likely to be a clear starting 
point. 
Other work in this area has also come across methodological difficulties. 
Clemson [1984] drew upon the somewhat systematic four stage approach of 
Beer [1966. 1968], adapted and illustrated in Figure 6.2.1 b. 
Insight 
Figure 6.2.tb; 
The Process of building a 'scientific' model of a 
Managerial situation [from Beer, 1966]. 
This initially involves insightful or metaphoric investigations into a managerial 
situation. then through perceptive and analogical reasoning a conceptual model 
is developed which leads to homomorphism and isomorphism in a more 
rigourous formulation, ending up with generalisations and a scientific model. 
Yet this is iterative and. although akin to systematisation, has led to some 
difficulties in practical usc. For .instance, Oemson says that when trying to 
explain the process to 'sharp, graduate students (it sqmehow) just didn't make 
any sense to them'. His way forward was simply to do it rather than explain it 
[the curse of the methodologist!]. 
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Clearly, although difficulties lurk in praxis the Framework of Analogy is 
intended to serve us for two practical purposes. One is as an aid to systems 
analysis in a practical context. Secondly, we are using it to re-conceptualise 
systems concepts in terms of theory, in order to revise theoretical systems 
concepts and to promote links to methodological developments and 
implications. An additional and related aim in this secondary context, is in 
using the Framework of Analogy and its associated methodological approach is 
to develop a substantive soft systems and critical language. 
Flood [1988c] has tackled the need for a substantive soft systems language, 
considering the translation of theory based concepts under groupings of 
ontological, epistemological, methodological and additionally those concepts 
relating to the nature of man. Lastly 'Type Z' translations were considered, 
these being a general grouping dealing with matters of misuse, abuse and 
ambiguity which emerged as a group encouraging clarity, and a more exact 
understanding of intended meanings. 
The Framework of Analogy is intended to deal formally with this matter of 
explication of inferable theory. Analogical reasoning in this sense can release 
certain systems theoretical concepts from paradigmatic 'entrapment' although 
also following the criteria of a Lakatosian [Lakatos, 1970] research programme, 
i.e. by protecting the 'bard core' and offering to some degree positive and 
negative heuristics. 
At this stage we can demonstrate the methodology in its re-conceptualisation 
mode with necessarily simplified examples. These relate to the area of the 
continuum where positive, negative and neutral analogy playa role. Reference 
to both theory and extended theory are made. 
6.3 TWO EXAMPLES OF THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
We will consider two examples; the concepts 'validation' [see Figure 6.3.1a 
which includes the general simplified framework from Flood and Robinson, 
1988b] and 'complexity' [see Figure 6.3.2&]. 
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6.3.1 Reconceptualising 'Validation'. 
In thinking about validation it is imponant to consider aspects of the 'theory' of 
validation. How can we set about exposing the paradigmatic implications 
which may need to be challenged or refined? Traditionally. the theory of 
validation resides in the functionalist paradigm. together with the objective 
empiricist characteristics this paradigm ascribes the concept. In other words. 
validation commonly expects demonstrable proofs carried out through empirical 
methods and functionalist criteria. 
LIMITS 
DEDUCE 
INTERPRETIVISM 
t ~UCE 
VALIDATION 
THEORY - -. 
! 1 INDUCE 
FUNCTIONALISM 
'participation' 
(full) 
( -) - 1Ill!UicUm 
( -) - n:plicatim 
(-) - DOmics 
Figure 6.3.18; 
Example 1; Reconceptualising Validation 
KEY 
(-i 'DeAative analOR)" 
(~ 'positive analogy' ;t, 
( 0) 'neutral analo&),' 
(-) - OOI.OIogicaI usumptims 
( +) - Iheoretic:is 
(0) - limits 
We can consider the properties attributed to the concept 'validation' by the 
rationality of the analogue set- functionalism. These are. principally, 
empiricism, limits. replication. theoreticism, nomics and cenain ontological 
assumptions, i.e. that 'reality is real'. By observation of the features of the 
paradigm we can use the concepts of validation and functionalism to infer 
features about the identified new domain. interpretivism. in the terms of 
positive. negative and neutral analogy since our intentions are heuristic. Within 
the rationality of the new domain we can identify empiricism. nomics and 
replication as aspects of negative analogy. This implies that there is strong 
disagreement on the imponance attached to these concepts in each paradigm, 
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Theoreticism in the model is described as a positive analogy, i.e. there is similar 
regard for the concept in both paradigms. Most significant, however, is the 
identification of 'limits' as a 'neutral analogy'. This conceptualisation would 
suggest that validation has meaning in the interpretive paradigm which requires 
revelation. Validation in this area could be understood at least in part through 
the notion of participation, and this does relate to the idea of limits, e.g. full or 
part participation. In this way we are examining a rationality which aims to 
validate with respect to the underlying assumptions of the interpretive paradigm. 
The essential notion is similar, i.e. validation is by satisfactory/unsatisfactory 
criteria. Validation is, therefore, seen to be extemalised in the functionalist 
paradigm which presumes to deal with 'real' entities and where 'proofs' are not 
only possible, but probable. Evidently, the concept of 'limits' is implicit in this 
analogical view of reality. 
Hence by contrast, in the interpretive paradigm, validation is internalised since it 
draws upon nominalist notions which cannot give weighting to any particular 
perception. There, reality has no ontological acknowledgement in that it cannot 
be conceived as having an existence independent of the observer. 
This notion of immanent validation extends to the critical paradigm which 
explicitly accepts the integrated nature of theory and ideology, this largely 
overcoming the lack of foundation of the interpretivists', by clearly stating what 
ought to be achieved [i.e. emancipation]. The practical relevance of 
methodologies can be assessed or validated in terms of the possibilities that it 
offers in bringing about desired change to the 'social order'. Here we are 
beginning to reveal the notion of validation in the critical paradigm which could 
be further explored with the Framework of Analogy. Evidently. the concept of 
validation must explicitly change in the process of modelling to be meaningful 
in either the analogue set or the new domain. It changes, of course, relative to 
the prevailing rationality. The initial concept cannot retain its integrity without 
appropriate reinterpretations. 
6.3.2 Reconceptualising 'Complexity'. 
A second example would be to consider the concept of 'complexity', through 
the analogue set, 'objectivity' and'the new domain, 'subjectivity'. 
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Figure 6.3.28; 
Example 2; Reconceptualising Complexity 
In this example we review the objective assumptions of the concept of 
'complexity'. These are notions of parts, relationships, 'real, external systems' 
[Le. complexity and systems are synonymous], which may'be understood by 
decomposition. The notion of 'problem' is readily acceptable here. 
The original concept complexity is understood initially in terms of the analogue 
set objectivity in which complexity reduces to numbers and types of pans and 
relationships. All other characteristics in this example are identified as 'negative 
analogies' since the concepts do not make meaningful transfer to the new 
domain 'subjectivity' which rests only on individual perceptions. Hence a 
concept such as the 'decomposition of problems' is logically possible only if it 
is taken with a parallel view of 'objective reality', that is within the criteria of a 
single rationality and which can give validity to a particular decomposition of a 
particular problem at any given time. Some broadly complementary 
characteristics of the 'SUbjectivity' paradigm have been illustrated in Figure 
6.3.2a. These evidently reflect the rationality of paradigmatic assumptions on a 
subjective, notional reality. 
In the iteration of the model we can, however, identify 'parts' and 
'relationships' as phenomena recognisable in terms of 'people' and 'culture' in 
the new domain. In this recognition we have identified a neutral analogy and 
hence a heuristic for the development of a theory of 'complexity'. This re-
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conceptualisation also supports Flood's [1987] notion of reconceptualising 
Weaver's [1948] famous three types of complexity. 
The example funher indicates analogical reinterpretation [and notably the 
mediation of the observation language) of analogue set and concept together, 
[Flood and Robinson, 1988b]. Here again the initial concept of complexity has 
explicitly changed. 
The long term intention in developing a methodology within a Framework of 
Analogy is to establish a grounding of systems theory and practice by attaching 
an explicit interpretation on the continuum. It is, hence, still possible to 
incorporate 'hard' and 'soft' viewpoints depending on whether the 
interpretations are in proximity to the Formal Analogical Model [realist 
isomorphism], or the area of Romantic Metaphor [nominalist romanticism]. 
Indeed the pluralist aspect is brought unavoidably to the fore since it is inherent 
in the framework of analogies' relationship with matters of rationality and how 
they come to be exposed through the exploration of the model. 
The most significant aspect of any emerging methodology is the potential 
methodological output. In the examples given above we have seen the explicit 
change in interpretation of the hypothesis which should, in a research 
programme, affect practice. With respect to paradigmaticl conceptual 'release', 
Checkland [1981] has remarked that he cannot 'validate' the output of Soft 
Systems Methodology. We are now considering that 'validation' is possible, if 
we change the conceptual framework it previously implied. The essential 
notion, however, remains similar. This also holds true for the conceptions of 
'complexity', where the similar notion is 'difficult to understand'. 
In the discussion of the foundations of a methodology that gene~tes output 
explicitly in tenDs of theory and practice, extending these ideas to 'work' for the 
newly emerging Critical Systems Thinking and methodologies thereof, is 
clearly a most promising opportunity. 
But because we have raised the issue of implied rationalities in a subject of 
investigation we must be aware of those views on the utility of analogy which 
are held here. Thus what range of views could philosophers hold of analogy? 
Philosophy aims at yielding knowledge and has niany branches and many 
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objects of study. We have argued that the empirical son is not the son we are 
interested in, but what else is there? 
The various directions from which philosophers approach their subject are 
described by Ayer [1973], who concentrates on the differing interests of each 
sub-group. Hence, metaphysics investigates the structure of reality, ethics the 
basis of rules of human conduct. The logicians investigate the canons of valid 
reasoning and the epistemologists consider the theory of knowledge not in 
fonning an encyclopaedia, but the criteria which may set the limits to what can 
be known. Philosophy hence has a lot to do with criteria it is concerned with 
the the standards which should govern the use of concepts. 
In this thesis I have argued for the utility of analogy principally on the grounds 
that analogical reasoning offers a potential framework for guiding investigation 
and re-conceptualisation of concepts and/or phenomena in diverse domains and 
that this is a contribution to systems sciences. Nevertheless. before we can 
move to summarise our discussion on the utility of analogy in the systems 
sciences we must also briefly point out some funher dangers inherent in 
neglecting to develop our understanding of the role of analogy and metaphor in 
the systems sciences further. 
6.4 ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS THINKING REVISTED 
6.4.1 Discussion. 
Analogy is an important structural feature in human language frameworks. The 
use of analogy and the implied ability to reason from two parallel cases is a 
fundamental feature of human language most obvious in child language in 
which children are apt to form plurals such as 'foots', 'mouses', 'mans' having 
heard the previous plurals like 'cats', 'dogs' and 'horses'. 
Metaphor too is a most important and influential factor in linguistic 
communication. Boyd [1979] Black [1961, 1979] and Lakoff and Johnson 
[1980] make the assertion that the 'open-endedness' or 'inexplicitness' of 
metaphor has an important parallel in the process by which scientific and other 
conceptual terms are introduced and thereafter deployed. Indeed metaphorical 
occurrences are probably the most easily identifiable of the features of analogy 
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and 'meaning asymmetry' with non metaphorical instances is obvious even to 
persons who have not yet found a way to describe them. 
In the complexities of linguistic theories, how contrasting possibilities within a 
medium take on expressive actuality we cannot even guess but we do fmd it 
useful to believe that what can be thought in words. like what can be said. is 
limited to the expressive capacity of the symbols. The expressive capacity of 
words can be modulated by new collations of words. that is. by differentiation 
[i.e. the concrete contradiction of the previous chapter]. In fact poets and other 
creative writers arrange words to exploit evolving capacity with new thought 
and this must account for why systems thinkers are interested in using metaphor 
creatively in methodology, although this thesis has additionally argued we can 
use the concepts of analogy and metaphor to take us much further than that 
In the following diagram the relationships between analogy [including the 
concept of metaphor] and diverse rationality are illustrated in an example 
showing suggested rational priorities or criteria guiding investigation across 
domains. The diagram [Figure 6.4.1 a] builds on the preceding examples of the 
re-conceptualisations of systems concepts this time emphasising the interests 
prevalent when analogical features across diverse domains are being identified 
as positive, negative or neutral analogies even though they are apparently linked 
by the neutral heuristic of the hypothesis. By confronting these notions and 
attempting to conceptualise in this way, a systems thinkers is clearly not 
operating one dimensionally in the manner implied by our discussion of factual 
science in chapter two. 
Figure 6.4.1a is presented on the following page. 
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On fll"St inspection, the polemics surrounding the linguistic significance of 
analogy did not seem to bear much relation to the role we assigned it in building 
models. We have attempted to face up to this debate in systems thinking and 
gain sufficient understanding to legitimately use these models for deriving 
hypotheses and considering subsequent possibilities for theoretical expansion 
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across domains. What in essence appeared to have been considered most 
urgently was the pragmatic exploitation of the 'analogical relation'. Therefore 
we have concentrated on developing theoretical rigours [and to some degree 
practical frameworks] to avoid investigating analogy in such a way as it 
appeared as merely an exploration of hazy and superficial analogy. Rather the 
dangers of hazy analogy demanded that we identify the principles by which 
analogical models could be constructed. 
The 'process of argument', that is, the procedures by which we are attempting 
to uncover what we will accept as 'systems knowledge' have been emphasised. 
because of the influences of inherent rationality in these kinds of decisions. In 
other words. we need to make clear the nature of the basic assumptions we 
make. especially in the face of a fundamentally dwarfish theory of what kind of 
knowledge constitutes 'systems knowledge'. We must face these 
discomforting issues because we have painfully little epistemology on which to 
base our postulates. Further, we have to question the prominent status accorded 
to methodology and this we have already queried. But also, Flood [Uberating 
Systems Theory, 1989] has stressed the necessity to do more than question or 
analyse, but to act, 
'In systems theory there is a need to develop a view on truth and 
meaning in order to promote coherent argumentation [dialectic] which is 
fundamentally satisfying and of general utility.' [op.cit.,] Bracket 
added. 
That area is problematic and it could be argued that it is made even more 
difficult by the analogical and metaphorical characteristics of our [small] and 
perhaps misunderstood, theoretical base. 
6.4.2 The Methodological Problem 0/ Abstraction 
The matter of abstraction is most pertinent to investigation into the methods and 
views of science. When we view culture and institutions as the behaviour of 
individuals, we claim we are able to assign a normal place to deviations from 
the normal way. But a chronic embarassment of social science theory is the 
explanation of exceptions to the general rule. Some of these exceptions are so 
egregious as to defy explaining away by such qualifying phrases as 'by and 
large' or 'ceteris paribus'. These are the sorts of deviations which refuse to 
cancel each other out and are such striking deviations from the assumed norm 
that they often become independent research enterprises. As a result, social 
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science is full of dichotomies composed of a 'norm' and a prominent deviation 
from it. Lynd [1930] gives many examples 'competition and monopoly', 
'voting and non-voting " 'lawfulness and crime " 'marriage and divorce " 
'employment and unemployment'. 
Even this overt recognition of departures from the nonn belies the situation. For 
the Aristotelian emphasis upon classes and paired opposites hides the fact that 
one is dealing not with two contrasted poles but with a distribution of 
frequencies ranging from one extreme to the other. It was for this reason, that 
is, in the attempt to circumscribe the methodological problem of abstraction that 
the framework of analogy has been presented on the continuum ranging from 
the formal analogical model to the perplexing vagaries of Romantic metaphor. 
The point of view is succinctly put forth in the opening chapter on 'Aristotelian 
and Galilean Modes of Thought' in Kurt Lewin's 'A Dynamic Theory of 
Personality', [1935]. Lewin speaks of, 
' ... the loss in importance in modern physics of logical dichotomies and 
conceptual antitheses. Their places are taken by more and more fluid 
transitions by gradations which deprive the dichotomies of their 
antithetical character and represent in logical/orm the class concept and 
the series concept: [op.cit.,]. 
What is now important to the investigation of the dynamics of systems thinking 
is not to lose potential knowledge in any methodological abstraction from the 
situation under investigation. [This implication does not carry implicit realist 
luggage as it may be confronted via notions of diverse rationalities across 
domains]. In other words, instead of a reference to the abstract average of as 
many historically given cases as possible, there is a reference to the full 
concreteness of the particular situations via a model of analogy. There is 
systemicity as well as systematicity. 
In embracing analogy and metaphor without sufficient theoretical consideration 
given to the full theoretical implications of such an encounter, systems sciences 
have another potential cuckoo in their nest; and clearly this is not a healthy habit 
for the development of indigenous offspring. The problems raised by this kind 
of behaviour are not isolated to the particular difficulties of appropriation of 
metaphor in systems methodology described in chap~er one. Rather, they are 
symptomatic of a problem that has been around a while longer. I would argue, 
for example, that there is a problem methodologically in systems abstraetion and 
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that a misdirected emphasis on abstraction has at times compromised systemic 
objectives. 
We have, for example, previously noted that systems sciences hold at their core 
concepts which attempt to acknowledge the flux and interplay of reality, hence 
concepts not appropriate to mechanisms of formalisation and abstraction. Any 
attempts to use them for this purpose can be seen as an attempt to rationalise or 
make literal concepts by one set of criteria across what are essentially 
paradigmatic [rationality] boundaries. This would only serve to take the 
concepts away from their meaningful context inhibiting, by reson to static and 
isolated formalisms, the possibilities of developing the dynamic epistemology 
of a systemic world view. Significantly, this metaphysical influence made 
manifest in attempts to 'abstract' is a feature of a number of rationalities. not 
least of which is the 'Hard Systems' paradigm. 
Metaphysics is concerned with reality as a whole. In some senses is in 
competition with the natural sciences in its attempts to deal with the 'underlying 
nature of reality'. While everyday experience and common sense teaches us 
that appearances can be deceptive, when we look more carefully at this assertion 
we find that there is fundamental conflict in the various appearances. Further 
that we have interpreted some observations in such a way that further 
observations do not follow. In a similar way, it is the differing interpretations, 
made with references to different frameworks and rationalities that make it such 
that, 
'Sometimes scientific /r.nowledge is disagreeable, often contradicts the 
classics, at times it tortures common sense and crushes down 
intuitions.' Bunge, [op.cit p32]. 
Further it is from this abstracted basis of metaphysics that criticisms have been 
levelled at the systemic world view represented by General Systems theory. 
Since it springs from the stable of philosophy, the metaphysical viewpoint is 
not always recognisable as merely one, of many possible angles, on reality. A 
metaphysical abstraction can in this way come to dominate, however, as the 
static and isolated model of the underlying nature. A given abstracted concept 
can become a defined area for analysis and exploration but also a sitting duck 
for criticism. We have, in systems thinking, fU'St hand experience of the latter 
with shots aimed at an arguably fundamental systems concept, General Systems 
Theory. It will be argued in the rest of this chapter that a dynamic concept of 
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General Systems Theory, if we release it from the unnatural shackles of 
metaphysical abstraction can be defended in terms of a systems rationality. 
6.4.3.1 A Defence of General Systems Theory 
The term 'General Systems Theory' disappeared from the name of the flagship 
organisation of the systems movement over thirty years ago. Almost as soon as 
it was established, the Society for the 'Advancement of General Systems 
Theory' became the 'Society for General Systems Research.' 
But in this context a neglected question is why the notion of General Systems 
Theory has since been largely abandoned by the systems community. The 
question is more philosophically based than might first imagine and in asldng it, 
we are also asking; 
1. Can the notion of 'General Systems Theory' be resurrected and 
defended now that we have acquired experience of more than thirty 
years of 'systems research'? 
2. Would it be useful for the movement to do so? 
Any progress toward answering these questions begins with an attempt to 
review how systems scientists think of GST. It is be suggested that while the 
common conceptualisation contains admissible flaws, the notion of General 
Systems Theory has been criticised and summarily dismissed, on the basis of 
clearly refutable, largely abstractive metaphysical criteria. As refutations are 
examined, it is hoped that the necessity to re-consider the conditions which 
prompted the historic apostasy will become apparent and the re-consideration 
itself will highlight new criteria against which to validate a conceptualisation of 
General Systems Theory. 
But what initially do we mean by 'General Systems Theory"? It suffers, in a 
way, from a surfeit of definition. Here we will only look at the most common 
views of what GST is supposed to be. It is not claimed that the discussion will 
lead to a literal defmition of what GST is, nor ~y including some views and 
omitting others, is it intended to 'weight' one against another. 
The name most commonly linked to GST is that of Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
who argued for [1962, 1968], 
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i) a development of a set of theoretical concepts based on simplified 
mathematics of systems, 
ii) and also on the assumptions of their applicability in various spheres 
of experience which, 
iii) could culminate in a unification of the sciences. 
Central to this set of concepts was Benalanffy's belief in isomorphisms. He 
interpreted the imponance of 'isomorphisms' in that the same laws would fmd 
expressions in different and apparently unrelated fields. On this foundation, 
GST then serves as; 
iv) an imponant regulative device in science. It will make possible the 
transfer of simplified conceptual models from one field to another and 
v) lead to parsimony in scientific research. 
vi) At the same time, by formulating exact criteria, GST will guard 
against superficial analogies which are useless in science and harmful in 
their practical consequences. 
Boulding [1956], went further in establishing a teleology ror GST, giving it a 
defmition and an objective. He perceived General Systems Theory as; 
'a body of systematic theoretical constructs discussing the general 
relationships of the empirical world. This is the quest of GST'. 
[op.cit]. 
Boulding pointed out that it was the contention of General Systems Theorists 
that since the 'optimum degree of generality in theory' is not always reached by 
the particular sciences, GST could fulm a role here also. Additionally, 
Boulding predicted that GST would develop something like a spectrum of 
theories- a system of systems which may perform the function of a gestalt in 
theoretical construction. Such gestalts have been of value in directing research. 
General Systems Theory, in Boulding's conceptualisation is clearly teleological 
and emphasises a theoretical output; 
'It is one of the main objectives of General Systems Theory to develop 
these generalised ears and by developing a framework of general theory 
to enable one specialist to catch relevant communicationjrom others.' 
[Ibid]. 
Later he hints, in defming a further objective of systems theorists, at the 
development of a philosophic framework; 
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'If the interdisciplinary movement is not to lose that sense of form and 
structure which is the discipline involved in various separate disciplines 
then it should develop a structure of its own. This I conceive to be the 
great task of general systems theory.' [Ibid]. 
Hence a structural development for GST was suggested by Boulding. One 
such way to meet this objective would be to look over the empirical universe 
and pick out certain general phenomena and to seek to build up general 
theoretical models relevant to these phenomena. This would be a 'G EN ERAL 
General Systems Theory'. A second approach would be to arrange the 
empirical fields in a hierarchy of complexity of organisation of their basic 
'individual unit' of behaviour and then try to develop a level of abstraction 
appropriate to each. This would be a 'SPECIFIC General Systems Theory'. 
For others, GST begins with a philosophical, almost metaphysical emphasis. 
To T. Downing Bowler [1981], General Systems Theory represents; 
a) the quest for relational universals that are true for systems in general, 
relational universals that emerge at new levels of complexity, and 
b) a model of the whole of existence as the interaction of entropic and 
negentropic processes.' 
Clearly we have dermed a number of different conceptualisations with different 
emphatic objectives [shown in italics] which should bode of the difficulties 
inherent in making literal a concept which like a metaphor, contains and 
promotes shifts in meaning. The strategic importance of General Systems 
Theory, its appeal and ambition, rests in this conceptualisation as fundamentally 
a dynamic description of relationships that may be represented by mathematics 
or other symbolic methods. 
Before looking at complex defences of the concept from philosophical and 
paradigmatic standpoints, we will begin with a brief resume of areas of 
criticisms of the notion of GST. 
6.4.3.2 Three Areas of Criticism 
Firstly, General Systems Theory suffers from criticisms launched from a 
position that is shared by many S(H;alled 'general theories' [Jones 1978], in that 
they are too vague, hard to prove, disprove or use in any practical ex' convincing 
way. Jones [op.cit], gives Freud's theory of psychoanalysis and Marxian 
economic theories as examples. While it is possible to use such general theories 
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to formulate specific, testable predictions, an outcome contrary to the prediction 
does not really shake the theory. lones explains, 
This is because both reality and theory are rich enough to allow for 
constant reinterpretation'. lop.cit]. 
Real world practitioners. however, commonly prefer more rigourous 
guidelines. It has often been said that GST somehow failed to bear the fruits it 
offered. In this respect however. we should decide whether such criticism 
pertains to the theory or the practice. Good theories have been rejected in 
favour of poor data in the past and as a heuristic, or possibly gestalt. General 
Systems Theory may still have something to offer. 
Secondly. from simple historical analysis it is clear that it was the practical 
offshoots of the notions originally heralded as the forbears of a 'GST' which 
took precedence. There is evidence that this is true of Information theory, 
Cybernetic principles. Organisation theory, Control theory, and even 
Management Science. Specific development of practical methodology was 
emphasised in these and other related spheres. 
It is further suggested that the pragmatic emphasis left these exemplary theories 
together with the possibility of a meta. 'General Systems Theory' 
philosophically immature. In this respect. General Systems theory as an 
abstract concept appeared ephemeral and of small relevance to practical activity. 
This view has been perpetuated; it is static and marooned. How many so-called 
'systems scientists'. for example, could give a satisfactory answer to even a 
casual enquiry as to 'What is General Systems Theory?' How many of us could 
specify with surety how the everyday business of 'systems science' differs 
from the longer term teleology prescribed to GST? 
Lastly, the full development of GST required that the torch be taken up by other 
disciplines. This has not been the case, and it has been lamented elsewhere 
although ultimately we have only ourselves to blame. Additionally. many other 
disciplines have taken GST as a platform from which to snipe at subsidiary 
systems activities [Ulienfeld, 1978]. 
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6.4.3.3 Reviewing Philosophical Criticism 
There have been three [at least] philosophical attempts to dismiss the concept of 
a General Systems Theory which we will consider here; 
a) an attempt by the positivists; 
b) an attempt by the neo-positivists; 
c) an attempt by the interpretivists. 
These three arguments, two functionalist, one evidently interpretivist, are 
relevant to the period elapsed since the formulation of the concept and which 
may be said to reflect paradigmatic implications for the systems rationalities 
during which GST has lain virtually largely dormant. 
Attack and criticism from the positivists is perhaps attributable, Peter Caws 
suggested in 1966, to the unwillingness of the Society for General Systems 
Research to 'dignify' with the label theory, a 'mere working hypothesis'. The 
tone reflects paradigmatic connotations concerning the rational basis for 
legitimisation of a notion of a General Systems Theory. 
To summarise the 'Positivist Attack', we may follow Ayer's [1971] criticisms 
of the positivist adoption of conclusive verifiability as a criterion for 
significance. Conclusive verifiability is taken as the logical framework for the 
rationality of positivism. Before looking at the propositions of GST in this 
context, it is helpful to look at how that rationality copes with the concept of 
other, more 'obvious', general laws. These may take a broad, syllogistic 
empirical form, such that 'all men are mortal' or that 'arsenic is poisonous'. 
With reference to the intrinsic rationality, it is in the very nature of these 
propositions that their truth cannot be established with certainty by any finite 
series of observations. This criterion, however, has already been 
accommodated by GST since it acknowledges that it is naturally impossible to 
describe all systems. General Systems Theory proposes to merely deal with a 
'typical' example in each class. Hence a 'phenotypic system' is likely to omit, 
of course, certain aspects found in the 'genotypic system', although the task of 
GST was to recognise this limitation and construct a ~eory that was a logically 
consistent set of propositions concerning a wide variety of systems models. 
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But the positivist, in pursuing his own argument, must acknowledge that if 
such 'general propositions of law' are designed to cover an infinite number of 
cases, then it must be admitted that they cannot, even in principle, be verified 
conclusively. Then, in adopting the logic of 'conclusive verifiability' as a 
criterion for significance, the positivist is logically obliged to treat any general 
propositions of law in the same fashion as they treat the statements of the 
metaphysician. 
This is clearly a most impractical position. In the face of this difficulty, some 
positivists have adopted the heroic course of saying that these general 
propositions are indeed pieces of nonsense, albeit an essentially important piece 
of nonsense. But the introduction of the qualifying term 'imponant' is simply 
an attempt to hedge and marks a recognition that the positivist view of any 
'general proposition' is philosophically paradoxical, without in any way 
attempting to deal with the paradox. 
The contention is then that no general proposition, apart from a tautology, can 
possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis. Conclusive verifiability 
as a criterion for significance cannot make distinction then, between the concept 
of a general systems theory, against other, clearly practical general 
propositions, such that men are mortal or that arsenic is poisonous. 
Secondly the 'Neopositivist' attack, along with its attacks on metaphysics, 
sought to impose restrictions on hypothesis formation. The neopositivist 
rationality saw this as a way to rule out, or at least to curb those broad, 
sweeping generalisations and 'explanations' in the sciences and humanities 
which defied what it considered to be the validating rigours of empirical testing. 
The roots of a neopositivist criticism of General Systems Theory lie in a 
conceptualisation and an proscribed imponance of, isomorphism. While we 
acknowledge that this is one of the areas requiring reconceptualisation in GST, 
diverting the neopositivist attack is still quite straightforward. 
An important facet of von Benalanffy's GST lop.cit,] rests in the concept of 
isomorphism. Indeed, the isomorphism found in different fields is based. he 
suggests, on the existence of general systems princip~es of a more or less well 
developed general systems theory. On the basis of the existence of 
isomorphism across disciplines, GST can hence be expected to play useful roles 
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in the meaningful ttansfer of models from one field to another, while weeding 
out the meaningless similarities. Von Bertalanffy has been criticised in this 
respect for not specifying the criteria by which general systems theory will 
distinguish the 'meaningful' from the 'meaningless' similarities. Such a task is 
eminently suitable for resolution by definitive abstraction. 
In pursuing their criticisms that General Systems Theory fails to distinguish 
between 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' statements, neopositivists made an 
inappropriate assumption pertaining to the status of GST as an abstract scientific 
theory. The assumption was inappropriate because GST in this respect it is not 
a scientific proposition, even by the criteria of falsificationism, which defines 
scientific statements as falsifiable in principle. Since this is not the case with 
General Systems theory, logically the principles of GST must move into the 
area of philosophy. 
Pursuing the falsificationists argument, after De Vries and Hezewijk [1978], 
Popper [1959] has been credited with showing the impossibility of the neo-
positivist attempts to demarcate 'sense' from 'nonsense' and hence the 
'meaningful' from 'meaningless' in philosophy. We have encountered this 
difficulty already insofar as it pertains to analysis of metaphor. Popper attributes 
their attempt meanwhile, to a 'naturalistic fallacy'. 
A separation of meaningful and meaningless should or would be coterminous 
with the distinction between science and metaphysics. Popper has satisfactorily 
shown that the difference between science and metaphysics is not of a 
naturalistic character. Instead, there are conventions, stipulating norms that 
may enable us to come nearer the ascribed goal of science [and in this respect 
GST], that is, explanation. This goal is of course, a normative convention, not 
given by nature as we considered in the second chapter. 
Once again the proposition of a General Systems Theory supports a refutation 
on these grounds, in that the strategic importance of GST, its appeal and 
ambition, rests in its conceptualisation as fundamentally, a description of 
relationships. From our discussion on analogy and rationality it is possible to 
recognise that other defmitions than Bertalanffy's could be constructed leading 
to another kind of GST. For'example, Miller's [1965] classification of 
generalisation suggests that there are at least two kinds, those pertaining to 
uniformities across a given class, and those pertaining to different classes. 
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Further even from within the systems movement, attack has been made by 
interpretivists who are paradigmatically unable to accept traditional concepts of 
isomorphism. 
General Systems theory rests easier by far within the context of the natural 
science paradigm, and notably it has not been seen to struggle here as 
elsewhere. This may be partially explained by the empirical emphasis in this 
area, together with the benefits this method of theory development offers its 
paradigmatic host. Hence serious problems first grated with GST when the 
attempt was made to 'transfer models' into the social sciences. The 
repercussions were felt throughout the systems movement [Hoos 1972]. In the 
social sciences the difficulties begin even in the identification of a 'system', 
which is then only acknowledged as an organising structure or conceptual tool 
to aid real world intervention. It is clearly impossible in this area to recognise 
any concept of nomic isomorphism. 
However, perhaps we have, once more, mis-represented the spirit of GST. 
General Systems theory has been previously conceptualised as referring to 
ontological 'matters offact', otherwise, so called real systems in a real world. 
We have, in this context, already established that no general proposition 
referring to a so-called matter of fact can ever be shown to be necessarily and 
universally true. It can, at best, be a 'probable hypothesis'. This is so, as we 
have seen, of all propositions which pretend to a 'factual' content. 
Although that argument failed to dispose of the possibility of a GST in the 
'factual', natural science paradigm, it appears that the criteria of that argument 
persist in the Interpretive paradigm despite the identificative condition that facts 
have no status in the second systems world view struggle. Funher. 
interpretivists and social scientists are arguably only justified in theoretically 
rejecting the notion of nomic isomorphism. In a GST description of a 'system' 
it is the business of the related methodology to demonstrate that these 
'phenotypes' are representatives of 'real systems' evidenced in empirical data. 
Since the naive argument that GST is only able to handle the 'real systems' 
evidenced in natural science is thus dismissible. why should it not be extended 
into perceptual or communicative systems. An awareness that there might be 
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such concepts as issue-based. 'contextual isomorphisms' might prompt 
interesting research. 
Therefore the vehemence with which GST has been denied by systems 
scientists is misdirected and the energy it takes should be perhaps concentrated 
on rooting out the metaphysical residuum we have unconsciously taken into our 
fold. As a result, everyday systems scientists who wholeheanedly accept and 
use the concepts and features of the open system metaphor; autopoesis. 
equifinality, feedback, and homeostasis, for example still find themselves 
unable to seriously contemplate the possibility of a metaphorical [i.e.non-literal] 
General Systems Theory. 
This peculiar and confusing situation is partly explainable as the side effects of 
the rationalities involved in some of the functionalist philosophical arguments 
described. Positivism largely precludes that statements can ever become 
logically certain and this conclusion must be accepted by every consistent 
empiricist. It is often thought to involve the positivist in scepticism and we 
have seen this scepticism in the fact that Systems scientists go so far as to 
shrink from general theory concepts. Examples easily spring to mind Ackoff 
[1963], Naughton [1981]. Lilienfeld [1978]. 
But in our world view this should not be the case. That the validity of a 
proposition cannot be logically guaranteed in no way entails that it is irrational 
for us to 'believe' it. What is irrational is to look for a guarantee where none 
can be forthcoming and to demand certainty where probability is all that is 
obtainable. 
In the interpretive paradigm we have acknowledged that 'system' is not a static 
thing but a dynamic heuristic referring to a particular relationship among things 
that can be actualised in a number of ways. The development of GST was not 
intended to end with the last full stop of von Benalanffy. The genius of 
Bertalanffy, suggests Battista [1977], does not depend on the validity of the 
classical systems theory he devised but rather that he was attempting to devise 
an altogether new kind of theory. It would not be in the spirit of Bertalanffy to 
attempt to develop a theory that could integrate all of science, or to accept his 
version of GST as the final form, any more than it would be in the spirit of 
Freud's attempt to develop a general theory of psychology, to accept the 
concept id as the final version. 
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With reference to the claim that GST has the potential to unite science, this has 
been interpreted in many ways. Does unification of science refer to a reduction 
to a common language, a synthesis of concepts or a form of encyclopaedic 
theory among disciplines '! 
In this context we may lastly return to Ayer [1971] who emphasised a point 
which appears to have relevance to GST within the systems movement. 
Namely that the most pressing matter is not so much the unity of science but 
rather the dynamic coupling of philosophy with science. 
With regard to the relationship of philosophy and the empirical 
sciences, we have remarked that philosophy does not in any way 
compete with the sciences. It does not make any speculative assertions 
which could conflict with the speculative assertions of science ... and, of 
course it is impossible by merely philosophising to determine the 
validity of a coherent system of scientific propositions. The function of 
the philosopher is merely to elucidate the theory by defining the 
symbols which occur in it ... science is blind without philosophy.' 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have drawn out two main points. Firstly that analogy 
is generally useful when used explicitly and rigourously. This has been 
shown specifically in the re-conceptualisations of systems concepts. 
Additionally it has been argued that issues raised in the analysis of 
analogy can be deployed in a defence of GST. The second main point 
has noted that concepts of analogy have flawed usage when used in 
partial observation, typically to point out aspects of similarity, which we 
have argued represent the most superficial appreciation of the 
framework of analogy. 
Also we have noted that problems arise when the rationalities of 
different domains are confronted. In the second half of the chapter we 
looked at the difficulties caused to systems thinking by a one-
dimensional understanding in a framework of abstraction. To alleviate 
this problem it has been argued that a dynamic systems rationality can be 
developed using processes of analogy. 
Now that we have established the utility of the framework of analogy in 
systems thinking, we can lastly move on to summarise the lessons for 
systems science. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
LESSONS FOR SYSTEMS SCIENCES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will briefly review and summarise the argument for the 
utility of analogy in systems sciences presented in this thesis. 
7.2 A REVIEW OF THE THESIS: Lessons for Systems Science 
The aim of the thesis has been to develop a rigoW'Ous understanding of the 
concepts of analogy and metaphor in order that we can more fully appreciate 
their potential utilities in the growth of systems thinking and theory. 
We have noted that much of systems thinking is inherently analogical but that 
the current enthusiasm to adopt these techniques more overtJy in methodology 
needs to be closely scrutinised to ensure credibility. To meet the objective of the 
thesis, the discus'sion has been theoretically based. The analysis developed 
three main themes; the Validity of analogy as a philosophical concept; the nature 
of 'reasoning by analogy' and the potential of the latter for use in practice, as 
well as theory. 
In the frrst chapter, 'USE OF ANALOOY IN SYSTEMS TInNKING: A 
SURVEY' a brief historical survey of the systems thinker's use of analogy and 
latterly of metaphor was presented. Through the work of early systems 
thinkers, the highly analogical basis for systems thinking became apparent 
alongside associated criticisms on the use of analogy. It was argued that there is 
confusion in the role attributed to analogical processes of reasoning by both 
systems practitioners and critics of systems sciences alike. Our expectations of 
the utility of analogy needed further examination before we could begin to 
develop a clearer understanding of that role and the contribution it could make in 
systems terms. The rest of the thesis set about enhancing our understanding of 
analogy. 
In this respect we initially found it important to make: the distinction between a 
systems conceptualisation of analogy and that of isomorphism, stressing that a 
looser contextual notion of analogy was to be introduced and latterly modelled. 
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It was similarly argued that the use of metaphor in methodology, although 
pragmatic is undisciplined and the implications of theories and analyses of 
concepts of analogy and metaphor have not been seriously absorbed. This 
situation, it was suggested, endangered the viability of analOI)' and metaphor as 
systems tools since the methodological adoption of metaphor was shown to be 
ad hoc and potentially indefensible on theoretical [and practical] grounds. By 
the end of the fIrst chapter we had noted that systems thinking has undergone a 
cynical attack for its use of analogy and thus we were ready to move on to 
consider the context of that attack on the systems approach. 
The opening survey had led us to consider how systems thinkers view science. 
It was suggested that it is on the grounds that analogy is somehow unscientific, 
that systems thinkers have retreated from a more explicit analysis of its utility in 
systems sciences. Hence in the second chapter 'A SYSTEMS TIflNKER'S 
VIEW OF SCIENCE' we drew out a number of points concerning the 
legitimacy of four characteristics of a model science. 
In the review of the model of factual science, it was argued that a fundamental 
negotiability within a rational framework infests the beau ideal of science. This 
constituted an important lesson for systems thinkers attempting to build a 
credible concept of analogy. Analogy is concerned with developing new 
conceptualisations in unfamiliar domains using concepts that are already either 
more familiar, or seemingly relevant, or practically useful elsewhere. Using an 
analogy involves in broad terms a matter of pointing out aspects of similarity 
with a difference. 
In other words analogy is, as it has been argued throughout the thesis, 
connected with notions of conceptual negotiability in ranonalframeworks. In 
our discussion of a systems thinkers view of science we considered the claims 
that 'Factual Science is Objective, Cumulative, Success Oriented and Value 
Free'. Firstly we found that 'facts' cannot be considered meaningful unless 
you go behind them, that is, the enterprise of science cannot be principally 
concerned with facts but with building a rationality that Jives them status. 
Secondly we noted that the criteria distinguishing matters of truth and belief 
cannot be unequivocally established and that arguably, science is based on 
belief as much as on notions of fact or truth. ~y, it was argued that the 
success orientation of science carries within it potentially compromising 
anomalies. Lastly we concluded that the values of any scientific rationality and 
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community must inevitably penetrate the enterprise of science; hence science is 
not value free. 
The discussion of the characteristics of science suggested that it was sensible 
for systems thinkers to reconsider the role of analogy in their thinking and to 
evaluate it independently. We subsequently revealed that there is a scientific 
context in which analogy is begrudingly acknowledged to have significant role. 
That is, in processes of discovery and hypothesis derivation. Systems thinkers 
had thus found a foxhole from which to defend the utility of their analogical 
basis. It was hence proposed that the traditional pre-conceptions of science 
cannot be taken as a relevant somce of criticism for the utility and legitimacy of 
analogy in systems science. There it can be credibly used to aid acts of re-
conceptualisation or to guide systems research in unfamiliar domains. 
That concepts of analogy have traditionally been criticised from a 'scientific' 
standpoint and having discussed the unsteadiness of that basis, we reconsidered 
the utility of analogy fundamentally, in 'ANALOGY; A PIDLOSOPHICAL 
POINT OF VIEW'. The aim of that chapter was to develop a deeper 
understanding of analogy and metaphor in order to identify and isolate relevant 
concepts and processes with which to model a concept of analogy specifically 
for systems thinkers. 
The chapter ranged over philosophical issues in an examination of analogies, 
models and metaphor and their interrelationships. It was suggested that analogy 
as a form of comparison contains parallel concepts of model and metaphor. 
Further, that although it can be conceived as a loose identification of 
resemblance, [as is implied in the vague notion of similarity with a difference] 
it can also be shown to be rigourous and vital in theory development. In other 
words it would be possible, in a model of analogy which classified the natures 
of similarities across domains. to also establish and exploit the utilities of the 
'with a difference' component. This was latterly attributed to the relationship 
between analogy and rationality. 
Additionally in that chapter. we began our discussion on the validity of the 
argument from analogy to systems thinkers. This is a matter which has much 
concerned philosophers at a broad level and which .is of lignificance to the 
pragmatic aims of systems thinkers. Without estabiishing reasoning on the 
basis of analogy as a valid argument, systems thinkers will be unable to 
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transfer the knowledge they might accumulate through their use. The situation 
might also allow another tedious recital of the lament of systems practitioners on 
the irrelevance or insubstantiveness of systems theory to work in the field. In 
this way it was stressed that. overall. analogy could be assessed in terms of an 
argument relating to any form of model. since models are vital ways of 
developing appreciations of theories and concepts. 
The following chapters concentrated on two main areas. asking what 
characteristics we wanted in a useful model of analogy for systems thinkers and 
on that basis. under what circumstances we could accept the argument from 
analogy as a valid argument. In Chapter Four. 'A MODEL OF ANALOGY' 
we established analogy as a systemic tool. Firstly a model of analogy was 
described for systems thinkers and the model presented comprised a framework 
for a modeVmethod of exploring analogy. Secondly. in the development of the 
positive. negative and neutral features of the model of analogy it was argued 
that rigour can be established in what was latterly taken as a framework of 
'loose resemblance' . These positive negative and neutral characteristics were 
the criteria representing the components explaining the functioning of analogy in 
modelling resemblance with a difference. Thirdly. although acknowledging that 
metaphor represents a particular case of analogy. we made a useful distinction 
between analogy and metaphor for systems thinkers. maintaining that the 
conceptual framework of analogy represents a continuum from analogical 
isomorphy to romantic metaphor. 
In Chapter Five. 'ANALOGY AND RATIONALITY' we analysed further the 
important characteristics of the framework of analogy for systems thinkers. 
Those were principally the concepts of positive. negative and neutral analogies. 
The three concepts were held to reveal the potential to explore different and 
contrasting rationalities. We discussed Bunge's attempt to exactify analogy and 
dismissed his model of analogy as attempting a realist and static map of a 
dynamic interpretive conceptual framework. In the discussion of Bunge's 
argument we were also able to establish criteria by which to distinguish notions 
of strong or weak analogy. These classifications were shown to be irrelevant 
once we have accepted conceptualisations of analogy acknowledging 
simultaneously. a number of rational viewpoints. In this context we considered 
aspects of negative analogy as a form of systemic dial~tic. 
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Hence the framework of analogy as a rigourous basis for analogical reasoning 
was developed following the establishment of some optimism for analogy as a 
concept in Chapters Three and Four. In a detailed argument we saw how 
analogy can work for systems thinkers and that we were able to appreciate the 
significance of differing rationalities within this concepmalisation. 
In Chapter Six, 'THE USE OF ANALOGY IN SYSTEMS TInNKING; 
UTILITY' we have established that systems thinking should not shy away from 
explicit use of analogy. The re-conceptualisation of two systems concepts 
using the framework was demonstrated. In the ensuing discussion we were able 
to draw out two further main points. Firstly that analogy is generally useful 
when used explicitly and rigourously. Additionally issues raised in a discussion 
of a model of analogy made visible as in the re-conceptualisations of systems 
concepts can also be invoked in a theoretical defence of General Systems 
Theory. 
Our second main point was that analogy has flawed usage when it is used in 
partial observation, typically to point out aspects of similarity. The latter case 
we have argued represents the most superficial appreciation of the framework of 
analogy, reinforcing the importance of using analogy to explore a number of 
juxtaposed rational frameworks. We also were able to note that problems arise 
when the rationalities of different domains are confronted especially when 
aspects of similarity only are being sought. We broached this issue in the 
second half of the chapter when we looked at the difficulties caused to systems 
thinking in terms of General Systems Theory. We accounted for the critical 
attacks on GST by exposing the one-dimensional understanding associated with 
methods of abstraction. It was argued that without a framework in which we 
can propose a juxtaposition of rationalities, critics and systems thinkers alike are 
unable to establish a valid critique or to appreciate the full utility of a framework 
of analogy to the theoretical development of a dynamic systems rationality. 
This must surely highlight the importance of establishing a theoretical 
understanding of analogy and metaphor before we go further in using these two 
concepts in systems practice. 
7.3 A NOTE ON A SORTIE INTO PRAXIS 
In the appendices two case srudies are presented illustrating some practical work 
undertaken in coIIUDelCial organisations during the research of the thesis. 
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The organisations concerned have preferred to remain anonymous and their 
wishes have been respected. The firms showed considerable interest in the 
nascent concepts of analogy considered in the thesis and set loose project 
outlines for practical analysis. Although this was initially encouraging, it 
caused some problems in deriving adequate hypotheses for. exploration via the 
model which as the reader will observe docs not feature explicitly in the reports 
submitted. We have seen in the thesis in the iteration of the analogical model 
that the initial hypothesis drives the model and consequently the practical studies 
do not have a sufficiently robust structure to exploit the full utilities implied 
theoretically by the roles of diverse rationality in the model. 
Nevertheless the practical experience was of benefit to the research highlighting 
if nothing else, the difficulties of conceptualising alternative perspectives within 
the rigid and largely deterministic conceptual environments of commercial 
organisations. Further, the emphasis of the research has been principally 
theoretical and has stressed the heuristic, iterative and dynamic nature of the 
framework of analogy and therein, I have argued, lie its potential benefits to the 
systems sciences. As a result, a full translation to methodology has been a task 
beyond the immediate objective of this thesis although it is hoped that research 
into the utility of analogy in the systems sciences will continue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The approach to this repon is systemic and will contrast with the characteristics 
of the 'Organisation and Methods' approach to problem-solving which breaks 
down problems into their 'constituent parts'. The latter is the most common 
method we adopt when we attempt to rationally devise problem-solving 
methodologies. It is held as scientific and therefore is the basis behind the 
concept of a 'work measurement' system, to which we shall come in due 
course. 
However, as Klein [1980] points out, ask a typist to think about which finger is 
being used to type which letter and watch the typing speed slow down. Ask a 
tennis player how they snap their wrist when serving and watch the strokes 
become self-conscious and unnatural. The Systems Science perspective 
attempts to view 'the whole' and because of this the analysis presented in the 
case study will probably seem quite abstract although I hope as a result, raise 
some wide ranging issues for further consideration by the Bank in question. 
Specifically the repon has been undenaken as an assessment of the utility of 
'analogy' and 'reasoning by analogy' within a practical, that is, methodological 
environment. This is an area which has been surveyed by several authors in 
recent years, for example, Dreyfus, [1979], Klein, [1980], Kahneman et aI., 
[1981]. The study considers the use of 'clerical work measurement' techniques 
by an Organisation and Methods Department and the additionally the role of the 
analyst in devising staffing levels and structures. 
This paper is intended to serve largely self reflective methodological purposes. 
Principally, to try to use the over-arching 'framework of analogy' to evaluate 
the nature of the overall 'methodology' employed on an 'Organisation and 
Methods' review of a major office. Then to assess the utility of the 'analytic' 
mode of the 'framework of analogy' to see if present methodological pitfalls, 
travails and shortcomings can be highlighted and possibly reconsidered. 
Hence, the objective of the case study is to examine the methodology used in a 
'real world' problem-solving exercise to review a major branch bank which, 
with its satellites, represents a significant profit centre to the organisation. 
Subsequent to this examination I will recommend a number of methodological 
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observations which might be of interest to the Organisation and Methods 
Department 
The operational constraints were; time allocated for the on-site review was three 
weeks. The team consisted of four analysts at varied levels of seniority and 
experience. 
THE ROLE OF THE 'O&M' DEPARTMENT 
The 'Organisation and Methods' Department fonns part of the Services Division 
within the Bank. Other co-habitees in the Services department are the 
Personnel, Property, Inspection and Management Services [Computer] 
Departments. 
Normally in large organisations there is no uniform pattern for a Services 
department. In fact some fIrms do not have such departments at all, with line 
and departmental managers solving their own problems as they arise and calling 
on specialists from inside or outside the organisation as they require. 
Otherwise, some fIrms, such as the Bank have preferred to develop large and 
'multi-disciplinary' Services departments. These departments typically include 
permanent specialists, with the structure of the division reflecting the needs of 
the organisation pertaining to where its activities are concentrated. As anyone 
set of problems appear to dominate at particular times during an organisation's 
development, so should the structure of a Services Division respond to these 
dynamic changes. 
While specialists within a such a division deal with a variety of the 
organisation's problems, .using a variety of tools and techniques to solve them, 
the problems themselves will usually surface from similar sources. Most 
commonly, branch or at times departmental managers become aware of a 
deficiency or pending deficiency in the performance of their area of 
responsibility and will ask for help. 
In other circumstances, a problem stretching over a number of departments, or a 
policy matter can be referred for investigation 'by a higher stratum of 
management. Where close working relationships or a particular level of 
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perceptiveness exist, the individual departments may themselves take the 
initiative in identifying worthwhile projects. As a result, in some cases the 
types of work undertaken will sometimes reflect the way in which the 
department is perceived by the rest of the organisation, with more responsive 
and dynamic departments attracting a more varied remit of projects, than 
departments which have taken the traditional approach more consistently. 
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THE ORGANISATION AND METHODS APPROACH 
Once a problem has been accepted it is allocated to the appropriate specialist 
and/or project team. From whatever source the problem has arisen, it is 
convenient to initially use the normal procedures for investigating organisational 
problems. Hence resolution is presumed to follow from; 
i) identification of the problem, 
ii) assembly of data, 
iii) evaluation of possible solutions, 
iv) implementation of the preferred solution. 
Each of these stages, of course, raise questions in themselves. In fact, they 
raise 'methodological' questions and show the need for careful analysis in this 
area. For example, in the primary stage calling for identification of the 
problem, we could also ask, for example; 
• has the problem been correctly identified? 
• what are the goals of the system, or sulrsystem under investigation? 
• is there a chance that any problem solution might interfere with these 
goals? 
• what criteria are used for measurements? 
• what methods can be used to help the investigator understand the 
system and its role in the wider system, which might not be under 
investigation" 
These are the sorts of methodological questions that it is easy to neglect as a 
result of the pressures of 'real world' problem-solving activity. But the issues 
they highlight are significant to any form of investigation since they are 
concerned to increase problem solving effectiveness. 
Hence in the usual approach to problem solving given here, we have frrstly 
assumed that a specific problem can be identified and in some sense isolated. 
However, even this may not be possible in some cases until a great deal of data 
has already been collected and processed according to some set of what we may 
call 'taken for granted' criteria. In other circumstances. problems might be 
'recognised' as types of problems demonstrating features for which 'solutions' 
already exist This gives rise to the idea of 'standard problems'. Equally, other 
types of problems may not be familiar or indeed amenable to already developed 
A-8 
techniques of analysis and for these, methodology may have to be developed 
from scratch. 
Secondly, the data and information required for analysis may not be readily 
available or collectable. In this context there is much reliance on standard 
techniques which have been developed for data collection, measurement and 
retrieval elsewhere. The project leader may, or may not, be in a position to 
make decisions about the appropriateness, the validity, or the accuracy of these 
methods and any analysis based on data of this sort will obviously be flawed at 
source. We will come to more questions in this area in due course. 
Thirdly, the formulation and selection of a solution is normally the result of an 
'evaluation of possible alternative solutions'. A case is then formally presented, 
verbally and in writing to support the most appropriate course of action with the 
obvious aim of relieving the problem symptoms which prompted the 
investigation. This process may vary on some occasions from a 'rubber 
stamping' exercise to a negotiated compromise involving the parties interested 
in the problem solution. Again further commentary on this process will arise 
later in the paper. 
Lastly, the preferred solution is implemented in the problem context which will 
allow a degree of post-hoc rationalisation and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the investigative work in the earlier stages. 
The operation of the 'Organisation and Methods' Department in this case 
derives much of its workload and hence remit with reference to a 'basket of 
monitors' generated in part via the mainframe data and in part by manual 
collection of the branch staff. The Department's allocated role within the 
Services Division is to assess branch [and internal department) staffing levels, 
in terms of quantity and grading, organisational structures and job functions. 
On the basis of the analyses, the department hence makes recommendations for 
change as necessary in these areas. 
The statistical monitors are intended to highlight branches/departments where an 
increase or decrease in staffmg levels might be required. This will normally 
lead to an on-site analysis. Plans -for refurbishment and so on also suggest the 
appropriateness of an O&M analysis, since the basis of workload monitoring 
must imply, via method study, a concern with layouts. 
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The Organisation and Methods Department have an advisory function and do 
not retain executive power to implement their reconunendations following their 
on site analyses. 
This report outlines a number of the methodological areas which have come 
under scrutiny following the review of the Sheffield Group. Significantly, 
several matters discussed during the review are now receiving close attention, 
principally the range and implementation of the 'Clerical Work Improvement 
Programme'system. 
This system of work measurement has hitherto been used to generate the 
statistics which prompt and subsequently structure, any analyses undertaken by 
the Organisation and Methods Department. Importantly. the version of CWIP 
in use is now itself under review with regard to 'efficiency and effectiveness'. 
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
Church Street was the principal case to be analysed. No Organisation and 
Methods review was undertaken with reference to the six sub branches which 
form part of the 'Sheffield Group'. Five of the six branches were briefly 
visited and their senior official consulted on the operation of the 'group' as a 
whole. 
Church Street itself has experienced quite substantial growth in recent years. 
The analysis was undertaken with a broad emphasis on this issue, although 
Manchester Regional Office had prompted the review after a major and lengthy 
refurbishment. 
The range of the analysiswas to incorporate: [Ref: O&M Dept., 1L W B], 
a) The operating structure and Managerial and Oerical staff numbers at 
present with a view to establishing capacity to accommodate 
predicted growth as suggested by statistical trends to date; 
b) examine the 'grouping' arrangement of main branch and sub-
branches; 
c) following analysis of clerical procedures, the development and 
installation of sectionalised work measurement; 
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d) an analysis of methodological procedures implied by sectionalised 
work measurement 
The main problems identified by the Organisation and Methods analysts during 
the 'on site' review were: 
1 Lack of defmed job roles at a variety of levels; 
2. Excessive workload of the four Senior Banking officials at Church 
Street indicated by level of work undertaken out of hours; 
3. Inadequate capacity for delegation; 
4. Inadequate support by and to the Accounts Managers; 
5. A need to support the Banking Manager, Branches. 
METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS 
This section will form the main body of the report in terms of a methodological 
evaluation of the overall approach to the review of the branch. 
i) Commentary on the 'CWIP' Model 
The most frequently used methodology in Organisation & Methods analysis 
has been the 'Clerical Work Improvement Programme'. This reporting system 
produces a monthly computer printout summarising data related to a number of 
'controls' monitoring the main banking transactions within each branch. The 
data on each 'control' is collected via the mainframe system and manually 
recorded registers. A print-out in the form of a 'Standard Hours Calculation 
Sheet' is analysed to assess staffing levels and organisational/structural 
implications. It should however be pointed out that CWIP figures refer chiefly 
to the individual tasks undertaken by staff below management grading. 
Management activites and work were, at the time of writing, seperately 
monitored by the 'Managerial Workload Rating.' 
The CWIP system produces information used by the Personnel Department for 
assessment of general staffing and manpower planning activites and by 
Property department for estimating space needs. The manual involvement at 
time of writing appeared to be high, onerous and inefficiently organised, 
although this would have significantly relieved by provision of a Personal 
Computer in the branch. 
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In referring to statistics in general, there will always be a degree of distortion 
and a loss of accuracy in information collected due to the time taken, the 
reliabilities of sources, integnty of 'controls', sample sizes and so forth. CWIP 
data is normally analysed with reference to continuous comparison over the 
previous three months. In terms of staffing however, the 'lag' in the system 
may have a detrimental impact 
During the course of anyon-site study examples arise for which 'standard 
times' have to be ascribed and there will be distortions, as there were in this 
particular case study, if reference to standard times is not consistent. For 
example, in some timed measurements, analysts would include certain tasks as 
part of the 'Interruption allowances' while others would include the task as part 
of the job. Further, in generating contextual data, activity sampling was carried 
out in neglect of fundamental rules [of sample sizes, for example], which 
served to make data gathered in this way merely 'pseudo-statistical'. 
Evidently, there is a loss in accuracy because of inconsistent measurement and 
also because in the data collection 'information' is being lost or hidden, needing 
time to trace. Theoretically, if they are to be applied, standardised measures 
must be applied according to strict procedures. 
By applying the work measurement techniques in different ways, in different 
circumstances and breaking the theoretical rules, there are some strongly 
practical benefits. These are the benefits which presumably account for the fact 
that despite the unsophisticated application of the 'broad principles' of work 
measurement, workable solutions are generated by the analysts. By 'workable 
solutions" I mean those acceptable to the particular context and circumstances 
of the branch. 
There is, therefore, room for discussion on the capacity of an analyst to 
'legitimise' subjective-decisions about candidate organisational solutions by 
reference to CWIP and other so-called 'statistical' data. For example, following 
meetings with branch managers, the analyst might agree to incorporate a higher 
margin of 'flexibility' or 'slack' into the branch work systems measurements in 
order that any subsequent allocation of an 'Establishment' level of staff, will not 
restrict branch growth. 
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Hence it is suggested that the dominating reliance on CWIP data neglects the 
perceptual, interpretive and interpersonal skills of the analyst in his/her 
examination of a given organisational situation. Thus any corruption of the 
accuracy of a 'structured measuring system' is to allow the adaptation of 
individual organisations to their'socio-cultural structures', which are invisible 
to CWIP measurements. 
There is a 'degree of objectivity' introduced in the relevant CWIP data 
processing techniques, that is in the nature of classifying, counting, computing 
and mathematical manipulation which are broadly considered as 'objective' 
measures in themselves or are capable of being 'objectified' without too much 
difficulty. Overall the 'art of processing' organisational data of this sort, is in 
processing the data in such a way that the output -the value of the variable- not 
only appears to have been obtained as objectively as possible, but appears to 
have immediate relevance as well. 
What we are really looking at here is symptomatic of a fundamental 
methodological problem concerning the roles of 'objective' and 'subjective' 
decision-making criteria. The maxims 'Facts speak for themselves' or 'Data 
speak for themselves' are commonplaces and these declarations are accepted 
because empirical facts, particularly measurements appear to stand alone and are 
therefore labelled as 'objective'. The basic scientific method behind this asserts 
that personal relations between the world and the investigator do not exist 
because the world is external to the person. 
Nevertheless, Counelis points out, 
The problem studied, the questions pondered and the employed data 
generation and data reduction methods are all results of the scientist's 
[investigator's] personal interests and thus a subjective choice. Facts, 
sources and methods are selected through the scientist's personal 
subjective criteria. The objective and subjective are not polar and 
therefore they are not divisibly yea/nay affective states. Rather the 
objective and the subjective are an indivisibly unitary affective state.' 
,(1989]. 
In this case, this problem has resulted in the adopted 'objective procedures' of 
reduced, elemental 'work unit' measurement being used to override subjective 
decision-making procedures arrived at through discussion, negotiation and 
accumulation of perceptual material. Why this ostensible disguise should be 
necessary, and why the arguably inaccurate data should be thought to have a 
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greater validity or legitimacy than expert opinion would be an interesting area 
for discussion. For example. people grasp paragraphs. chapters. stories and 
atmospheres. the unit of analysis is rarely a single. isolated sentence. 
The scope of this problem stretches further. The CWIP 'measuring instrument' 
and the decisions which arise from it, it could be argued, are at times 'mutually 
exclusive'. Also. at other times the relationship of the measuring instrument and 
the decisions it prompts. could be said to be 'non-reflective' of the dynamics of 
the environment. 
We will be discussing, in due course, the value to organisations of the skills of 
experienced personnel but at this stage we can consider it as the 'neglected 
dimension' in the CWIP measuring system. I refer to an organised monitoring 
of the value of human assets, a most important contributor to the running of the 
Bank, at all levels. 
Of course, this area was explored informally by the analysts during their on-site 
investigation of the Bank, but in view of the demographic problems that will be 
facing all organisations in the future, it is recommended that a more structured 
approach be developed for this problem as soon as possible. 
Paton, as long ago as 1962, stressed the significance of this argument; 
'In business enterprise a well organised and loyal personnel may be a 
much more important "asset" than a stock ofmerchandise ... Until some 
scheme is found by which these imponderables of the business 
enterprise may be assayed and given definite statistical expression, the 
accountant must continue to prepare the balance sheet as he has been 
doing ... At present there seems to be no way of measuring suchfactors 
in terms of the dollar; hence they cannot be recognised as specific 
economic assets. But let us accordingly admjt the serious limitations of 
the conventional balance sheet as a statement of financial 
[organisational) conditions. ' p104. 
There has been some academic attention paid to this since Paton rust made this 
remark. [Likert, R. The Human Organisation, New York; McGraw Hill 1967, 
and the same author in 'Human Resource Accounting- Building and Assessing 
Productive Organisations,' Personnel, vo1.24, pp8-34, 1973). 
Many authors still believe that there is an unsatisfactory lack of attention to 
standards for measuring an organisation's human resources. Most organisations 
are highly efficient at measuring and minimising the costs associated with 
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personnel management in its various phases, but little or no attention is given to 
tracking the benefits or marginal utility of experience and expertise; e.g. 
experience with certain systems in environments (this will be referred to later as 
tepisodict knowledge), career broadening assignments, routine career progress. 
training course marginal utilities and specifically, postgraduate education. 
It is generally conceded that most employees, particularly managers, find these 
opportunities valuable, but no general technique is available to measure or 
record the values that m~y be obtained and hence expert knowledge (know 
how) accumulation continues unpredicatbly. This area should be the concern 
of the Organisation and Methods Department, since although currently their 
specification is for assessing staff numbers and structure it is also within their 
present remit to consider tManagerial Roles'. 
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The Strategic Role of the Analy~t. 
Figure 1 
The problems caused by the vagaries of workforce dynamics will be 
exacerbated by demographic changes, and mean that this potential resource of 
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'know how', unless it is monitored or 'captured' [see points on Technological 
aids), will very likely be lost permanently to the Bank over time. 
Hence the role of analyst in processing organisational information and 
assimilating wide ranging organisational knowledge must be urgently 
addressed. Their strategic importance can be usefully displayed in a diagram. 
In the figure, it can also be shown that there is no direct relationship between 
the output of the measuring system and the subsequent development of an 
organisational structure to meet the project's stated objectives. 
The measurement system as it stood in terms of the CWIP system is not a direct 
mapping into the real world issues it was intended to address and thus arguably 
is inadequately able to offer guidance in these areas. 
Further. during the course of the study, the individual analysts stressed that 
they are aware of the 'grass roots' market and organisational information being 
generated at the non-formal level in their on site analyses as having importance 
to strategic issues and policy decisions. Indeed. it is felt ~at there is a well 
developed awareness of strategic matters assimilated intuitively in their 
individual modus operandi. So far this has been a neglected resource and what 
must be an urgent task for the bank should be to make these matters and 
processes explicit. 
Additionally, there were frequent attempts to extrapolate from past data to 
indicate present and future trends. This was particularly true with reference to 
activities pertaining to business development and personal account transactions. 
Extrapolation itself is not an accurate predictor of future needs which will 
almost certainly arise from changes in the environment. The internal 
Organisation and Methods Discussion paper on CWIP [Ref;JL WB/FS] raised 
the resulting associated problems. 
'Recent events have however highlighted the inadequacy o/using Work 
Measurement statistics in isolation/rom other /actors ... work monitoring 
in itself will not highlight the need/or procedural or other cost saving 
activity.' [p 8]. 
Hence many assumptions have been made at an unknown stage concerning the 
predictive capacity of the measurement instrume~t, although we have not 
established whether the CWIP system is sufficiently robust to give the Bank a 
market and/or organisational advantage. It is suggested that in this context the 
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role of the Organisation and Methods Department should be reconsidered to 
make it more pro-active rather than statistically, 'stimulus-response'. 
This consequence is entrenched in the fact that the Regional Office does not 
allow decision-making to be based on anything but reflective, that is, 'backward 
looking' data. How this condition restricts strategic and operational capacity of 
the Bank to respond to market needs should be obvious and it will ensure that 
the Bank can only remain a 'market follower' in the provision of financial 
services. 
ii) Recommendations on CWIP 
Since the Sheffield review was also intended to consider 'an analysis of 
methodological procedures implied by sectionalised work measurement' an 
internal discussion paper on CWIP has been already produced [Ref: 
Organisation and Methods JL WBIFS]. 
Some brief remarks may still be timely at this stage. The six major proposals of 
the discussion paper have been reproduced in Appendix 3. 
That paper reflected a number of the points implied in the previous section. For 
example examination of the Standard Hours Calculation Sheet indicated that 
95% of recorded workload was accounted for by 30 of the 120 controls. 
Further analysis postulates that a very large number of the controls collected and 
recorded are virtually redundant in terms of the value of the analytical 
information they contain. Additionally closer examination of the recorded 
controls revealed that their information value could be enhanced by merging it 
with another. 
This suggestion clouds the issue of the fundamental reasoning behind a 
basically dichotomous decision for the Bank concerning the CWIP 
measurement system. Either the Bank can continue with the systems in a 
revised format; including additional controls such as 'Word Processing 
Measurement' to replace 'Letters Produced', 'Advances measurement' or 
Business development allowances. Or the Bank can radically rethink its method 
of internal review based perhaps, on the kinds of analogical principles 
incorporated in integrated databases, as will be discussed later in the paper. This 
would re-direct the focus of any investigation away from the techniques of 
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quasi work measurement, back towards the analytical and perceptual skills of 
the Organisation and Methods analyst. 
Possibly the most valuable lesson to be learnt from the CWIP review is the 
realisation that the significance of information gathered under eWIP in its 
current format escaped many branch officials. 
Although I have not tackled the associated issue of the Managerial Workload 
Rating in this analysis, that figure offered an example of a deliberately distorted 
[by use of a 'hidden' constant] workload measurement. This was done to 
prevent the managers concerned becoming aware of the meaning constituents of 
their subsequent rating. This must be seen as having a detrimental effect since it 
would reinforce an unnecessary 'conceptual boundary' between the figures 
collected by the Organisation and Methods Department and what is going on in 
the actual branch bank. 
In other words, there appeared to be is no obvious connection between the 
purposes of the 'monitoring and the monitored' in this respect. I would 
recommend a rethink of the format of any work measurement figures. both to 
de-bunk their presentation and to make them much more 'User Friendly'. 
Clearly, the situation described would actively encourage under-utilisation of 
potentially useful and relevant information. [In this context, please see the 
distinction that will later be made between 'Knowledge' and 'Information']. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that any change in the CWIP reporting procedures or 
overall format would hopefully lead to releasing skilled 'Organisation and 
Methods' analysts from much of the unskilled filtering of paperwork that the 
present system entails. This would release substantial time and expertise to 
make other contributions to the overall 'efficiency and effectiveness' of branch 
and departmental areas. 
iii) Commentary on the Role of the Analyst;'The value of 
experience' • 
I have already mentioned that the role of the Orgnaisation and Methods t analyst 
is worth a closer analysis. Morgan's commentary provides a useful prelude to 
the points to follow; 
'Effective managers and professionals in all walks of life ... have to 
become skilled in the art of "reading" the situations that they are 
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attempting to organise or manage. The skill usually develops as an 
intuitive process, learned through experience and natural ability. 
Though at times a person may actually dec/are that he or she needs to 
"read what's happening at X", or to "get a handle on f", the process of 
reading and rereading often occurs at an almost subconscious level. For 
this reason it is often believed that effective managers and problem 
solvers are born rather than made, and have a kind of magical power to 
understand and transform the situations they encounter.' [1983] 
We may now take this point somewhat further. The experience of Organisation 
and Methods' analysts plays a significant role in the respect of allocating staff 
and with branch management, devising organisational structures capable of 
responding to expanding workloads and hence business. Again and again 
during the on-site analysis reference was made by the Project Leader and other 
members of the team to previous branch reviews in both written and recall 
forms. 
Overall, it was found that the individual skills and experience of the analysts 
and the project leader were of high significance in devising the new structure for 
the branch and this involved incorporating what appeared to be intuitive 
behaviour at times. 
This brings us to a necessary analysis of the methods by which experience aids 
the practical problem solver. How do they know what they know, how do they 
use their experience to reason and think and create new from old? For example, 
in this study, the process of analysis appeared to use the measured CWIP data 
not in the reductionist fashion it was arguably intended, [that is in reducing the 
various tasks to their components and then re-assembling them in new 
structures enhancing their component's 'efficiency and effectiveness']. 
Instead, it is suggested that the data gathered was utilised interpretively in quite 
the opposite way, to immediately attempt to build a bigger picture, in order to 
understand the particular context of work flows, control and co-ordination 
processes and management information flows, holistically. 
The broad contextual kind of understanding that was being sought in this way, 
psychologists would argue, is that involved in establishing the closest 
description available to explain a particular process or situation and then 
discriminating between the previous experience and the present case under 
examination. In other words, by eliminating the 'negative analogy' between the 
two cases and preserving what is correct, that is, the 'positive analogy'. Thus 
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'understanding' is thus a process that has its basis in memory (human or 
documented), particularly memory for closely related experiences accessible 
through analogy. 
The wide occurrence and usefulness of reasoning by analogy in managerial 
thinking is accepted by many organisational theorists [Morgan, 1986]. It 
normally begins by making an analogicaVmetaphorical link between two 
situations, reflecting on each [otherwise 'abstracting a model' of each] and then 
looking at the possibilities of importing information and knowledge across the 
two boundaries. 
In other words, the experienced 'O&M' analyst when s/he is confronted with a 
problem, compares it with what was done elsewhere, or in the past with a 
similar problem. This is clearly an informal attempt to use 'analogical 
reasoning', that is, using what is known about one situation to investigate an 
unknown situation, the present problem under scrutiny. Interestingly and 
indicating the value of the approach, much of what is known about analogical 
reasoning is to be found in the literature on 'intelligence research'. 
Psychologists have a high degree of confidence in the suggestion that 
'analogical reasoning' is a distinguishing feature of what we call 'intelligent' 
behaviour. 
We are all familiar with the use and utility of analogies, but the establishment of 
useful learning analogies of this sort is a non-trivial exercise. Although not 
fully agreed upon in the field, there is a basic 'information processing' model of 
analogical reasoning which has some relevance here. In this model, the analyst 
must begin solution by analogy by 'encoding' analogy terms, that is translating 
them into an internal representation [a model] upon which other mental 
operations can be performed. 
This behaviour was clearly evident in the progress of the case study. The 
project leader made repeated sketchings of potential organisational structures 
and their evaluation as candidate solutions appeared to take the form of 
incremental adaptations to an organisational structure developed in this form 
quite early on in the study. 
De Groot [1965] suggests that 'experts' differ from 'novices' in their capability 
to recognize individually a very large number of different problem situations, 
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and Klein [1980] argues that experts reason holistically. by analogy with 
previous similar experiences. rather than by explicit analysis and computation. 
In other words the 'expert' might produce creditable judgements of problem 
situations and components which he has seen before but that a less experienced 
individual would need to analyse into more familiar elements. Further Klein 
and De Groot argue that 'expertise' arises in this way from perceptual abilities; 
from the paradigm of the Gestalt tradition of instant recognition. The capacity 
to recognise 'whole situations' is rermed to the point that predictions or 
decisions learned through experience intuitively accompany situation 
recognition. 
Theorists disagree about the roles of three intermediate comparison operations 
that occur in recognising situations 'analogically' in this way. The stages 
themselves are called inference, mapping and application. They take place 
between the analyst's model building and indicating 'a response', that is. 
decision-making about the Validity of past experiences as useful analogies upon 
which to draw in the current situation. 
In systemic terms the 'encoding' process is a factor of the 'attribute 
identification' between the two domains, [Previous experience and the current 
problem]. 'Inferring', 'mapping' and 'application' constitute an attribute 
comparison process between the two systems of interest. [Previous experience 
and the current problem]. 
Thus, to briefly enlarge on these terms; 
'Encoding': In the process of encoding the analyst begins identifying 
a feature of the situation [e.g. a particular facility for business 
development) and then retrieves from long term memory the 
attributes (e.g .. political factors. skilled management support 
routines. rapid responsiveness characteristics in a particular branch) 
that may be relevant for a solution by analogy, The result is then 
stored in the 'working memory', Potentially relevant attributes are 
those that experience has indicated are useful in relating one concept 
to other concepts. 
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'Inference': Next the subject infers a relationship between all values 
of corresponding attributes between the two sets. 
'Mapping': The relationship is then mapped onto the unknown 
domain of the current situation. 
'Application': A decision is made penaining to the validity of the 
experience to the present situation. 
It thus appears safe to conclude that the expert's representation of knowledge in 
memory, retrieval and verification processes will playa vital role in establishing 
alternative candidate structures. 
An expert is defined in this analysis as one who possess two types of 
knowledge; deep structure semantic knowledge and significant accumulations of 
concrete, episodic knowledge. 'Semantic knowledge' concerns that human 
ability to construct an internal representation of 'reality'; to take in and interpret 
perceptual impressions to. combine them with the pr09ucts of previous 
experience, to draw inferences, implications and predictions and to reshuffle 
them into novel combinations. Episodic knowledge captures the temporal and 
spatial context of a person's past experience. 
This defmition is consistent with findings that maintain that experts are those 
individuals who possess such wide 'autobiographical experience' that they need 
not rely on the methods of formal analysis to infer the requisite information. 
This is arguably the case in this study, in that the CWIP material is used to a 
degree, for post hoc purposes. Novices, by contrast cannot recall either deep 
structure semantic nor obviously, substantial episodic knowledge. 
But experts too are subject to error and in this context we must look at the 
consequences of 'intuitive' modelling and judgements made under the influence 
of memory and the pitfalls of the use of analogical reasoning with reference to 
previous experience. 
There is a large body of psychological literature available in this area comparing 
the descriptive behaviour of analysts' 'intuitive problem-solving activity' 
involving information processing to the normative results that would prevail if 
people followed an optimal procedure. Silverman [1983] distils from 
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psychological literature six, [of twenty seven,] 'cognitive' biases that affect 
information processing. They are presented as having particular reference to 
the analyst's task of processing data and information on-site in branch reviews. 
Firstly, the availability of data; the decision-maker tends to use 
relatively easily available information and the possibilities of not easily 
collected information are ignored. This tendency is subject to strongly 
emphasised post-hoc rationalisation. Further an event or situation is 
believed to occur frequently if it is easy to recall similar events. 
Secondly, ease of recall; data which can be easily recalled or 
assessed will affect perception of the likelihood of similar events 
occurring again. More easily recalled data and experiences are weighted 
more in decision-making than the reverse case. 
Thirdly, fact-value confusion; strongly held values may often be 
presented as facts. That type of information or, in this case 
measurement, is sought which can confirm or lend credibility to, one's 
own views and values. In this sense, contradictory information tends to 
be ignored. There is in other words, 'selective perception'. 
Fourthly, 'gamblers fallacy'; the analyst or the decision-maker 
falsely assumes that a 'run' of some events enhances the probability of a 
change in the series of events. 
Fifthly, representativeness; when making inference from data. too 
much weight is given to results of small samples. [This tendency has 
already been raised in the preceding section]. As sample size is 
increased. the results of small samples are taken to be representative of 
larger populations. The "laws" of representativeness differ considerably 
from the laws of probability. 
Lastly, selective perception; issues are structured on the basis of 
personal experience and wishful thinking. 
More generally there are likely to be a number of human frailties in 'infonnation 
processing' and even before that stage when data is susceptible to the 
identifiable biases given above, others are evident at a broad level of 'retrieval'. 
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These include. when too little infonnation is generated in response to a query 
requiring creative supplementation. or estimation. Too much infonnation is a 
problem when not all collected data is relevant or necessary. and then there are 
additional problems of 'false recovery'. These occur when in recalling 
experience. there is 'overshoot' or an item is correctly recalled but taken out of 
context' and 1abrication', the incorrect reconstruction of a desired piece of 
information' and 'self correction', in which a sudden mind change occurs in 
the absence of information or hints. 
iv) Recommendations Pertaining to the Role of the Analyst 
There is a popular 'common sense' view among analysts and in general. that 
experience in a particular field engenders 'intuitive' problem solving skills 
Hopefully. it will be agreed that the potential utility and effectiveness of 
reasoning by encoding analogies in this way. is too important and complex a 
process to be left to the peculiarities of human judgement alone. 
For example, forgetting/remembering and then analogi sing experiences will be 
affected by the degree to which the original organisational system was studied 
with respect to gaining an understanding, or for short term recall purposes. Of 
course individuals differ in short and long term memory capacities, familiarity 
with the subject, sensitivities, semantic abilities, opinions, biases and purposes. 
The view presented clearly rests heavily on the suggestion that analysts tend to 
use their own experience of their job in forming broadly based mental models of 
the situation. For example, there is much talk, on arrival at the branch, of 
'getting the feel' of the environment, and also a healthy degree of informal 
speculation on what soft systems thinkers would call 'cultural', 'social' and 
'political' sub-systems to the visible organisational system under investigation. 
In a sense, the mental models constructed with the aid of situational analogy 
will lead to a degree of selective perception of measured CWIP results. 
Subsequently, whatever utility to the analysis the CWIP data might originally 
represent is susceptible to the problems of interpretation and decision-making 
under the influence of memory outlined above. 
Nevertheless a number of prescriptions can be offered to relieve the effects of 
biases of this sort. 
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• information should be sampled under a broad data base, including data 
bases which might contain disconfirming information. 
• avoid the 'hindsight bias' [i.e. the temptations of post-hoc 
rationalisation] by providing access to information at critical past 
times. 
• the use of structured methodological frameworks based on logical 
reasoning in order to avoid confusion of facts with values. 
• analysis from time to time of the type and size of the sample that data 
has been gathered from, to avoid the representativeness bias. 
• record and document potentially relevant comparison cases to aid the 
establishment of proto-typical formats and examples, e.g. the 
restructuring of the 'Sheffield Group'. 
• record and document what the various decisions are intended to 
accomplish in their individual contexts to maintain broader 
perspectives. 
• record and document options generated in comparative cases. 
• evaluate options for their implications in a broad, 'strategic' context. 
In this way conflicts and incompatibilities can be identified early on. 
Overall I hope that it will be agreed that the individual's development of these 
complex-intuitive analytical skills deserves some help. Sternberg [1975] in his 
studies of how people behave in problem solving activities, found that the 
difference between high and low scorers appeared to be the result of a lack of a 
consistent, systematic strategy on the part of the low scorers. Other major 
sources of error were lack of time, idiosyncratic knowledge gaps and inferential 
errors, i.e. just the sort of real world constraints analysts would normally 
encounter. 
In this context I would like to present a brief discussion on some ways in which 
the benefits of the analogical approach propose the development of areas for 
computer aided analysis by comparison guidance and other management 
decision support possibilities. Artificial intelligence of this sort has moved 
towards the development of 'expert systems'. The intention of these systems is 
described by Counelis [1989], 
'Such [expert systems] purport to provide the systematic use of logical 
thought within some given area be it chemical analysis, college student 
selection, engineering design, medical diagnostics or symbolic 
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mathematics. The intentlor expert systems is to replace the human art 
01 logical and scientific thought [which are not errorless] with a 
relatively higher level 01 subject matter competence and a greater degree 
01 consistency in thinking'. 
Although I would emphasise the usefulness of expen systems as being in 
supplementing rather than the replacing human decision-making processes, the 
above description outlines the direction of their present development. 
v) Technological Possibilities for Analysis Support. 
Silverman [op.cit.] has stressed that the metaphor of the 'analyst as an 
inlormation processor' holds great promise for helping to pinpoint precisely 
what kinds of integrated information systems and adjuvants (e.g. handbooks, 
software packages, expert systems, and so on) will best support the practitioner 
working in the field for whom bounded rationality, time limits to achieve a 
solution and organisational constraints all affect the analytical process. 
In accepting the significance of the analogy between the analyst and the human 
'information processing' view, there are a number of promising potential 
outputs. The value of this metaphor is twofold. Primarily, it delineates a basis 
for determining the types of information systems and analytical aids that an 
organisation should consider providing by way of support for analytical 
reasoning [and planning by analogical methods]. The usefulness of analogy is 
in providing the theoretical basis for the design of expert systems. Expert 
systems are 'single-purpose conceptual tools which provide knowledge based 
problem solving. The operational premise of expert systems is that belief in the 
results is credible because the data base is a source of 'true facts' and the 
'logical engine' is appropriate and precise in rendering results. Overall, the 
perspective of the approach goes beyond the boundaries of the Organisation and 
Methods Department. 
Secondly, in this case the metaphor clearly provides a research direction 
towards a generalised analogical reasoning system [although whether this could 
ever be automated or would require methodological enforcement would need to 
be further investigated]. 
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Elements of System Knowledge 
Figure 2 
The view of the descriptive emphasis in establishing analogical frameworks for 
investigation of branch structures suggests that a great many practical aids to the 
analyst in the field could be developed. The entire knowledge generation 
process is highly dynamic, for example, what was originally felt by one set of 
analysts to be a 'good structural design' is later observed by a different set 
differently. Knowledge generation is hence continuous and in flux i.e. what is 
at one time believed to be true, will change over time. 
Nevertheless, fairly strong and specific requirements for knowledge and 
information systems are beginning to emerge in most forward-looking 
organisations, if they have not already done so. It is felt that this is an issue 
that the Bank should address. There is at present a chronic under-utilisation of 
technological resources at branch [free access to pes would have aided 
compilation of much of the nonnal data records kept at the branch concerned, 
e.g. personnel attendance files and also aided monitoring of the manually 
recorded CWIP figures]. This lack of utilisation at branch level must also raise 
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questions as to the optimality of broad Data Processing and retrieval policies in 
the context of Organisation and Methods. 
Hence a possible remedial option in this context would be to change the remit of 
the O&M Department to allow them to have a fonna! input to computing and 
systems analysis and design. This is nonna! within some conceptualisations of 
a Services Division and such responsibility would fit most comfortably into the 
O&M department, since they are already versed to some degree in data, branch 
and strategic issues. Overall, the relationship between computing and 
organisational design should defmitely be enhanced since there is much of value 
to be exchanged between these two areas. [See 'Horizontal' knowledge 
integration]. 
There are various forms of information integration; e.g. 'vertical', 'horizontal' 
and 'longitudinal' (temporal) systems within the information field. Vertical 
knowledge integration is needed to avoid the situation of high level analogy 
practitioners having to re-collect information previously collected at lower 
levels. Horizontal knowledge integration across operating groups and and 
managerial functions is necessary, due to the multi-faceted nature of systems 
design through operation. umgitudinal (across time) knowledge integration is 
necessary due, on the one hand to the turnover, inexperience and/or availability 
of what we have named 'experts', and on the other to the sheer bulk of 'relevant 
information' that might be generated. We refer to 'knowledge' integration in 
this respect in order to highlight the distinction between 'information' and 
'knowledge' being that the latter is 'full of expertise'. 
In other words, management information systems could be designed with 
specific information retrieval goals, i.e. to facilitate analogical comparisons. 
Currently most data is stored principally as historical records. The prescriptions 
for expert de-biassing call for documentation that would form easily accessible 
input for such a database. The implication is that if decision aids are to exploit 
the individual capabilities of each potential user then a variety of adjuvants, with 
different functions and at different levels of aggregation should be made 
available. 
This policy would involve building relational databases and establishing 
'memory-modelling' capacities to allow an increased use of computer-aided 
analogical planning and design. Once developed, this kind of expert system 
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could guide the selection and/or generation of the 'ideal' analogy for planning or 
design problems, rather than the 'most recent' analogy which could be selected 
by analysts lacking technological support. 
This approach would avoid the old problems of non-integrated information 
systems for example, the same knowledge would not have to be collected many 
times for various levels or segments of the organisational hierarchy. There 
would be, necessarily, increased communication between these parts such that 
collection of replicated and hence redundant, relatively non-interfaceable 
knowledge systems would be avoided. 
Notably, the integration of information systems in such a large organisation as 
the Bank is to some degree inevitable but it will have radical implications for 
the structure of the entire Services Division and possibly further afield than that. 
In this context, it might be wise to consider the possible affects on control and 
co-ordination processes now. 
These could be affected, it is suggested by Silverman [op.cit], in two major 
ways. Firstly in the control and co-ordination of technical aids; cost growth, 
systems user take-up/satisfaction, level of technical performance and 
significantly the perpetual problem in building expen systems, the capture, 
storage, retrieval of accumulated 'Know-How'. 
Secondly, but arguably more difficult to manage, the organisational changes 
involving redefinition of cenain jobs, or elements of jobs requiring analysts to 
become much more computer literate in order to facilitate the development, 
maintenance and usage of 'comparison guiding' analytical aids. 
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CAVEAT 
We have not in this discussion mentioned the opposing argument from a school 
of psychologists [e.g. Dreyfus, 1982] who argue for the existence of a non-
verbalisable mental capacity which is called 'intuitive experience'. This 
experience is only actualised by situations and it may not be described by the 
expert. Hence, Dreyfus [op.cit] conjectures that, 
'Believers in information processing ... must hypothesise an 
unconscious decomposition into facts and recomposition by means of 
rules. Be that as it may, research shows that experience created typical 
examples, and the facts and rules, if any, that produce them are 
unavailable to the conscious mind of the expert. Consequently, they are 
non transferable to the mind of the modeller of expertise.' 
The twin horns of the dilemma are that unaided intuition is subject to bias at 
lesser or greater degrees and that the information processing analogy will not 
lead to replication of human behaviour in analogical reasoning. 
One way out of the dilemma would be to stress that the 'quality of service 
context' in which we would hope to build an expert comparison-guidance 
system is not a system which is anxious to retain diversity which may be 
considered as a by-product of 'intuitive' problem-solving. 
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SUMMARY 
This report has considered a broad perspective on the current role and potential 
directions for the development of the Organisation and Methods Department of 
the Bank. 
At the time of writing, there was already some debate within the department 
concerned with improving the quality and relevance of the information being 
generated by the O&M methods of analysis and in this context extending the 
range and utility to the User. 
We also mentioned initially in discussion, how in some cases the types of work 
undertaken will sometimes reflect the way in which the department is perceived 
by the rest of the organisation, with more responisve and dynamic departments 
attracting a more varied remit of projects. The dynamism is already there, and 
this report has, it is hoped, suggested where new projects might arise. 
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APPENDIX A·I 
O&M REPORT CONCLUSIONS 
Ref: Church Street Branch; O&M Department JWLB/March 1989. 
The management recommendations of the O&M analysts were as follows; 
'This report recommends a change in structure to strengthen and support the 
Management Team, in particular by the creation of an Advances Support Unit, 
together with a unit providing personal customer services in the new open plan 
Banking Hall. The existing separate functions of Securities and Foreign should 
be merged together and the number of Accounts Units reduced from three to 
two. 
The proposed structure should serve to reduce the pressure on the senior 
officials and enable greater time to be devoted to Business Development activity 
at a variety of levels. The other problems recognized of [sic] lack of capacity 
for proper delegation, inconsistency of staffing on the Accounts units and 
confused areas of responsibility will also be resolved. 
The reorganisation is possible within the existing accommodation although 
the need to create an additional Banking Manager's room in the short term is 
evident. 
An overall increase of five staff (4 officials, 1 clerk) is recommended as 
part of the package together with re-evaluation of all officials positions with the 
exception of the Senior Manager'. 
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APPENDIX A·2 
THE UTILITY OF WORK MEASUREMENT 
Work study and Organisation and Methods are often talked about together since 
many of the principles and techniques involved are common to both areas. 
Generally work study is more concerned with work methods and Organisation 
and Methods with the content of work systems. Both should be, however, 
concerned with the systematic examination of human work in all of its contexts, 
the presentation of the facts and the making of recommendations in order to 
improve productivity and/or service. 
Work measurement follows the gathering of data processed in order to identify 
individual components of the work system. Work measurement analyses the 
content of a task in order to make more effective use of workers, control 
materials scheduling and labour costs, establish performance indicators and so 
on. The necessity for each unit is examined as to whether modification, 
elimination or combination is possible together with the appropriateness of new 
technological applications. 
At the highest level, the procedures of work measurement are just as relevant to 
the planning and design of new systems as they are to the update and 
augmentation of the existing systems. At the lowest level, the basic of analysis 
tool is the structured determination of an appropriate time for a defined task to 
be completed by a specific method. 
Of course, different methods for carrying out the same job need to be compared 
so that members of staff, machines and their total cost can be evaluated. 
Similarly, when new methods are introduced work measurement will help to 
measure improvements in 'performance'. These 'measures' can subsequently 
be used to highlight a poor performer, bottlenecks and ineffective work 
distribution. It will aid the matching of the man/machine capacity with the work 
to be performed. Peaks, panic overtime and delays should all be uncovered and 
eventually eliminate by work measurement 
BH Walley [1973] gives points below as necessities in work measurement 
assignments. 
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1. Preliminary method study to evaluate the 'best way' of carrying out 
the job being studied. 
2. Decide the method of work measurement to be used. this is 
specifically important in clerical work measurement since the method 
must match the situation. 
3. Plan the operation. Decide which jobs need to be measured. Lay 
down an appropriate timetable and inform all concerned 
(management and staff) of what is going to happen. 
4. For each job which has to be measured. a breakdown into 
appropriate elements is required. An element is a part of the job 
which can be measured as a part separate from the whole. There 
are. for example. repetitive elements. random elements. constant 
elements. variables. manual and machine, constraint and foreign 
elements. 
S. Carry out the study which will be concerned with two factors. 
Firstly. the rate of working. i.e. what rate of working is actually 
being achieved. Secondly, the time taken monitored by reading 
element completion times from clock or watch. [in this instance the 
Organisation and Methods Department habitually refer to the 
ubiquitous Mulligan manual]. Walley suggests this can be assessed 
by accumulation of numerous observations and the results averaged. 
Various element times are then added together and an operational time results. 
To obtain a 'normal' time for the operation it is necessary to relate the observed 
time with the observed rating using the simple manipulation; 
Observed time· observed ratin~ 
Desired level. 
A number of allowances are normally included in the 'normal time'. e.g. fatigue 
(energy output). posture. motions. personal needs and general environmental 
conditions. The 'harder'. the job the longer the fatigue or relaxation allowances 
need to be. 
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APPENDIX A·3 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROPOSALS 
Six major proposals are set out below. Whilst each can be seen as an individual 
exercise, each will impact on the others. It is therefore suggested that they be 
treated as six elements of one integrated project 
1. Susbstantially reduce the number of controls reponed, both manual 
and computer captured. 
2. Introduce a small number of new controls for Advances and 
Business Development work and dispense with the Managerial 
Workload Rating system. 
3. Reformat the Standard Hours Calculation Sheets to improve user 
understanding of the information provided. 
4. Eradicate paper from the procedures by taking advantage of the 
introduction of p.e.'s to branches. 
5. Update Supervision, Error and Special Job Allowances through 
Activity Sampling. 
6. Examine other organisations' methods of setting staffing levels in a 
sales orientated environment. 
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